Gods Love

TO

MANKIND,

MANIFESTED

By disproving his Absolute Decree

FOR THEIR

DAMNATION.

Hos. 13. 9.

O Israel, *thou hast destroyed thy self: but in me is thy help.*

Wisd. 1. 12. 13.

Seek not Death in the errour of your Life; and pull not upon your selves destruction with the works of your hands.

For God made not Death: neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the Living.

LONDON, Printed for *John Clark*, and are to be sold at his Shop at the Entrance of *Mercers-Chappel* in *Cheapside*, 1673.

BODLEIAN
16
FEB
1928
OXFORD

TO THE READER.

THE Author of this Treatiſe was perſwaded to pen the reaſons of his opinion againſt abſolute Reprobation, that he might ſatisfie a worthy friend of his, who required it. What ſatisfaction that learned Gentleman, his friend, hath received by theſe reaſons, I know not: but ſure I am, they have given good content to ſome others, who have read them, and do ſtill deſire a Copy of them for their further uſe. To eaſe whoſe pains in tranſcribing this Treatiſe, it doth now appear in this form. If any of contrary opinion ſhall undertake to anſwer or refute it; I wiſh he would ſet down his opinion and reaſons with that perſpicuity and modeſty that our Author ſet down his. Such a courſe of diſputing will gain more credit to himſelf and his

cauſe, than voluminous Vagaries about impertinent things. If any ſhall uſe railing ſpeeches, or unneceſſary diverſions from the cauſe, I ſhall ever interpret that to be a ſtrong ſign of a weak cauſe: or, at leaſt, I ſhall think it to be an argument of an obſtinate mind, who neither knoweth how to yield to the Truth, nor to defend his errour. I hope the Reader, who loveth his own ſalvation, will be a more indifferent judge in a queſtion, which concerneth him ſo nearly. And ſo I leave him to Gods bleſſing.

By the ſame Author.

The *Souls Miſery* and *Recovery*, or *The Grieving of the Spirit*; how it is cauſed, and how redreſſed: wherein is ſhewed (among other things) the nature of Preſumptuous ſins, with Preſervatives againſt them, and Remedies for them.

GODS

GODS LOVE TO MANKIND.

SIR,

I Have ſent you here the reaſons which have moved me to change my opinion in ſome controverſies of late debated between the Remonſtrants and their Oppoſites.

I do the rather preſent them unto you;

1. That I may ſhew the due reſpect which I bear your Worſhip, with my forwardneſs to anſwer your deſires, as I can with regard to conſcience.

2. That you may ſee that I diſſent not without cauſe, but have reaſon on my ſide.

3. That if I can be convinced that my grounds are weak and inſufficient, I

may think better of the opinion which I have forsaken, than I can for the present.

In delivery of my motives I will proceed in this order.

1. I will state the opinion which I dislike.

2. I will lay-down my reasons against it.

h/ Toucing the first, your Worship knoweth these two things very well.

1. That the main ζητούμενον and question in these controversies, and that on which the rest do hang, is what the decrees of God are touching the everlasting condition of men, and how they are ordered.

2. That the men who have disputed these things, may be reduced to two sorts and sides.

The first side affirmeth, that there is *an absolute & peremptory decree* proceeding from the alone pleasure of God, without any consideration of mens final impenitency and unbelief; by which God casteth men off from grace and glory, and shutteth up the far greater part (even of those that are called by the preaching of the Gospel to repentance,

tance and ſalvation) under invincible and unavoidable ſin and damnation.

The other ſide diſavowing any ſuch decree, ſay, that *Gods decree* of caſting men off for ever, is grounded upon *the fore-ſight of their continuance in ſin and unbelief*, both avoidable by grace, and conſequently inferring no mans damnation neceſſarily.

The firſt ſide is divided, for

1. Some of them preſent man to God in the decree of *Reprobation* lookt on out of, or above the fall: and ſay,

That God of his meer pleaſure *antecedent* to all ſin in the creature, *originall or actuall*, did decree to glorifie his *ſoveraignty* and juſtice in the eternal rejection and damnation of the greateſt part of mankind, as the end; and in their unavoidable ſin and impenitency, as the means. And this way go *Calvin*, *Beza*, *Zanchius*, *Piſcator*, *Gomarus*, and ſome of our own Countrymen. *Such as Dr Edwards in his Preacher.*

2. The reſt of that ſide thinking to avoid the great inconveniences to which that *Supralapſarian* way lieth open, fall down a little lower, and pre-

ſent man to God in his decree of Reprobation, *lying in the fall*, and under the guilt of original ſin, ſaying,

That God looking upon miſerable mankind lying in *Adams* ſinne, did decree the greateſt number of men (even thoſe men whom he calls to repentance and ſalvation by the preaching of the Goſpel) to hell-torments for ever, and without all remedy, for the declaration of his ſevere juſtice. This way went the Synod.

The difference between them is not much, and even in their own account too ſmall a diſcord to cauſe a breach. Notwithſtanding this petty difference therefore, they agree very well together, as we may ſee in the *Hague*-Conference and Synod.

(z) *Col. Hag. Braud. pag.* 37. Quoad ſententiarum diverſitatem in hoc argumento, quòd Deus reſpexit hominem in hoc decreto nondum creatum, vel creatum & lapſum; quia hoc ad fundamentum hujus doctrinæ non pertinet, libenter alii alios æquitate Chriſtianâ toleramus.

In the Conference at *Hague*, Contra-remonſtrants have theſe words; (a) *As touching the diverſity of opinions in this argument*, viz. *that God look'd at man in this decree, not yet created, or created and fallen: becauſe this belongs not to the foundation of this doctrine; we do in Chriſtian equity bear with one another.*

After

After this in the Synod at *Dort*, they permitted *Gomarus* to set down his judgment in the upper way. And the Delegates of South-*Holland* were very indifferent which way they took: For these are their words, (b) *Whether God in choosing considered men as faln, or else as not faln; They* (the Delegates of South-*Holland*) *think it is not necessary to be determined, so it be held, that God in choosing considered men in a like estate.* (c) *Maccovius* also, Professor of Divinity at *Francker*, a violent and stiff maintainer of the most unsavoury speeches, which have been uttered in this Controversie, and one that undertook in the very Synod to make good against *Lubbert*, his fellow-Professor, that God did (d) *Will sins, ordain men to sin, and would not at all that all men be saved*: and besides this, openly and peremptorily affirmed, that *except these things were held and maintained by them*, they could not possibly keep their own ground, but *must come over to the Remonstrants*. This man was not only not censured, but publickly *declared* in the Synod to be *pure* and *Orthodox*, and *dismis-*

(b) *Acta Syn. par.* 3. *pag.* 38. An Deus in eligendo consideraverit homines ut lapsos, an etiam ut nondum lapsos, existimant non esse necessarium, ut definiatur, modò statuatur Deum in eligendo considerasse homines in pari statu.

(c) *Antidot. Remonstr. pag.* 32.

(d) Velle peccata, ordinare homines ad peccatum, qua peccatum, & neutiquam velle ut omnes homines salventur, &c.

dismissed only with this kind and friendly admonition, that he should hereafter take heed of such words as might give offence to tender ears, and could not well down with those, who are yet uncapable of such mysteries.

By these instances it appeareth, that they of the first side can easily bear one with another in this difference. And (to say the truth) there is no reason why they should quarrel about circumstances, seeing they agree in the substance. For they both contend,

1. That the *moving cause* of Reprobation is the alone will of God, and not the sin of man, Original or Actual.

2. That the final impenitency and damnation of Reprobates are *necessary* and *unavoidable* by Gods absolute Decree.

These two things are the [*maxima gravamina*] principal grievances that the other side stick at. So that these two paths meet at last in the same way.

Both these opinions of the first side I dislike.

My reasons why, are of two sorts;

1. Such as first made me to question their truth.

2. Such

2. Such as convince me of their untruth.

MY reaſons of the firſt ſort do indifferently reſpect and make againſt both, and I will ſet them down againſt both together.

My ſecond ſort of reaſons I will divide, delivering ſome of them againſt the upper and more rigid way, others againſt the lower and more moderate way.

I begin with thoſe reaſons which firſt moved me to queſtion the truth of abſolute Reprobation as it is taught both wayes.

They are theſe four which follow.

1. Reaſon, *Novelty.*

1. The *novelty* of this opinion. Abſolute and inevitable Reprobation hath little or no footing in Antiquity. The upper way was never taught or approved by any of the Fathers (even the ſtouteſt defenders of grace againſt the *Pelagians*) for the ſpace of 600 (I may ſay 800) years after CHRIST: nor the lower way till the time of S. *Auſtin*, which was about 400 years after CHRIST. They did generally agree upon the contrary concluſion, and taught

taught men in their times,

That it was *poſsible* for *them* to be ſaved, which in the event were not ſaved; and to have repented which repented not: and that there was no Decree of God which did lay a *neceſsity* of periſhing upon any ſon of *Adam*. This that I ſay Mr. *Calvin* himſelf doth freely acknowledge, ſpeaking of Election and Reprobation according to Gods fore-knowledge: (e) *This commonly received opinion* (ſaith he, of a conditional reſpective Decree) *is not the opinion only of common people, but hath had great Authors in all ages.* Reverend *Beza* likewiſe ſpeaking of the ſame opinion, hath theſe words to the ſame purpoſe: (f) *Into which* (*ſurely*) *moſt foul errour* Origen *hath driven many of the Ancients, both Greek and Latin.* To the ſame effect alſo *Proſper* (S. *Auſtin*'s follower) hath a remarkable ſpeech. (g) *Almoſt all the Ancients* (ſaith he) *did grant with one conſent, that God decreed mens ends according to his*

(e) *Cal. Inſtit. l. 3. c. 22. ſect. 1.* Neque hæc vulgo recepta opinio ſolius vulgi eſt: habuit enim ſeculis omnibus magnos authores.

(f) *Beza in cap. 11. ad Rom. v. 35.* In quem errorem ſanè turpiſſimum Origines veteres pleroſque, tum Græcos, tum Latinos adegit.

(g) *Proſper in Epiſt. ad Aug. prope finem.* Penè omnium patrem inveniri & unam ſententiam, quâ propoſitum & prædeſtinationem Dei ſecundum præſcientiam receperunt: ut ob hoc Deus alios vaſa contumeliæ, alios honoris vaſa fecerit; quia finem uniuſcujuſque prævideri, & ſub ipſo gratiæ adjutorio, in qua futurus eſſet voluntate & actione præſcierit.

fore-

fore-ſight of their actions, and not otherwiſe. To theſe ſpeeches let me add that of *Remigius* Archbiſhop of *Lyons*, who to *Rabanus* Archbiſhop of *Mentz*, objecting that S. *Auſtin* wrote a Book called *Hypognoſticon*, againſt *Pelagius* and *Caleſtius*, wherein he denyed that Reprobates were properly (*h*) [*prædeſtinati ad interitum*] *predeſtinate to deſtruction*; anſwereth, that St. *Auſtin ſaid not ſo, but ſome other man* (as is ſuppoſed) *to purge the Church of that calumny which ſome ill-affected ones did caſt upon it, namely, that it taught, that God by his predeſtination did impoſe upon men a neceſsity of periſhing, did withdraw the word* (Predeſtination) *from the poinr of Reprobates, and gave it only to the Elect, and ſo gave great occaſion of further errour and miſtake.* In this ſpeech of his is clearly implyed, that it was the conſtant doctrine of the Church then, that Reprobates ly under no neceſſitating decree of Perdition.

(h) *uſh. biſt. Gotte. p.* 137.

The truth of this charge may further appear by a few particular inſtances.

Minutius Fælix brings in the Pagans objecting to the Chriſtians, that they held

held the events of all things to be inevitable, and did feign and frame to themselves an unjust God, who did punish in men their unavoidable Destinies, not their ill choices. This is the Objection: (i) *Whatsoever we do, as others to fate, so you ascribe to God: you make therefore to your selves an unjust God, who punisheth in men their lot, not their will.* To this he answereth, (k) Christians hold no other *Fates* than *Gods Decrees*; *who* (l) *foreknowing all men and their actions, did accordingly determine their retributions.*

S. *Hierom*, an eager opposer of the *Pelagians*, in many places of his Writings saith the same thing; (m) *From the fore-knowledge of God it cometh to pass, that who he knoweth will be righteous, him he loveth before he cometh out of the womb; and who he knoweth will be a sinner, him he hateth before he sinneth.* In another place he speaketh to the same purpose, (n) *The love and ha-*

(i) *Min. Fœlix pag* 32. Quicquid agimus, ut alii fato, ita vos Deo addicitis: iniquum igitur Deum fingitis, qui sortem in hominibus puniat, non voluntatem.

(k) Illud fatum est, quod de unoquoque Deus fatus est.

(l) *Min. Fœlix p.* 116. Qui cum universã præscit materiam, pro meritis & qualitatibus singulorum etiam fata determinat, & ita in nobis non genitura plectitur, sed ingenii natura punitur.

(m) *Hier. ad Galat. c.* 1. *v.* 1. 5. Ex præscientia Dei evenit, ut quem justum futurum scit, prius diligat quam oriatur ex utero; & quem peccatorem, oderit antequam peccet.

(n) *Ad c.* 1. *Malac.* Dilectio & odium Dei, vel ex præscientia nascitur futurorum, vel ex operibus; alioquin novimus quod omnia Deus diligat, nec quicquam eorum oderit que creavit.

tred

tred of God ariſeth from the fore-ſight of future things, or from the works; otherwiſe we know that God loveth all things, nor doth he hate any thing that he hath made, And in his book againſt *Pelagius* he ſaith (o) [*Eligit Deus quem bonum cernit*] *God chooſeth whom he ſeeth to be good.*

(o) *Lib. 3. contra Pelag.*

The ſum of all which ſpeeches is but this, that there is no decree of damning or ſaving men, but what is built upon Gods fore-knowledge of the evil and good actions of men. *Fulgentius* is plain for it too: (p) *Thoſe whom God fore-ſaw would die in ſin, he decreed ſhould live in endleſs puniſhment.* I may take in S. *Auſtin* and *Proſper* alſo, who are judged to be the Patrons of the abſolute decree, as it is ſet down the *Sublapſarian* way: even they do many times let fall ſuch ſpeeches, as cannot fairly be reconciled with abſolute Reprobation.

(p) *Fulg. l. 1. ad Monimum.* Quos præſcivit Deus hanc vitam in peccato terminaturos, prædeſtinavit ſupplicio interminabili puniendos.

(q) *Proſp. obj. 3. Gall.* Non ex eo neceſſitatem pereundi habuerunt, quia prædeſtinati non ſunt, ſed ideo prædeſtinati non ſunt, quia tales futuri ex voluntariâ prævaricatione præſcii ſunt.

I will only cite *Proſper* (for S. *Auſtin* ſpeaks in him) he diſcourſing of ſome that fall away [*à ſanctitate ad immunditiem*] *from holineſs to uncleanneſs,* ſaith (q) *They that fall away from holineſs to uncleanneſs, lie not under a neceſſity*

ceſsity of periſhing, becauſe they were not predeſtinate; but therefore they were not predeſtinate, becauſe they were fore-known to be ſuch by voluntary prevarication.

Not long after ſpeaking of the ſame men, he ſaith (r) *Becauſe God foreſaw they would periſh by their own free-will; therefore he did not by any predeſtination ſever them from the children of perdition.* And again in his anſwer to the twelfth Objection, he hath theſe words; (s) *God hath not withdrawn from any man ability to yield obedience, becauſe he hath not predeſtinated him: but becauſe he foreſaw he would fall from obedience, therefore he hath not predeſtinated him.*

I will ſhut up mine inſtances of that Age with the judgment of the Councel at *Arles* againſt the *Pelagians* in the year 490, or thereabout. This Councel ſubſcribed to the Letter which was written by *Fauſtus* againſt *Lucidus* the Predeſtinarian, and made the Anathema's and Curſes which therein he denounceth againſt him and ſuch like, to be their own: Some of which were theſe (t) *Curſed be he that ſhall ſay that the man that periſheth might not have*

been

(r) *Proſp. reſp. ad Object 7.* Quia illos ruituros propria voluntate præſcivit, ob hoc à filiis perditionis nulla prædeſtinatione diſcrevit.

(s) *Ib. reſp. ad Object. 12.* Vires obedientiæ non ideo cuiquam ſubtraxit, quia eum non prædeſtinavit; ſed quia receſſurum ab ipſâ obedientiâ eſſe prævidit, ideo eum non prædeſtinavit.

(t) Anathema illi qui dixerit illum qui periit non accepiſſe ut ſalvus eſſe poſſit.

been saved: and again, (u) *Cursed be the man that shall say that a vessel of dishonour may not rise to be a vessel of honour.*

A testimony or two I borrow likewise from some persons of note, and those St. *Austin*'s followers too, who lived about 400 years after St. *Austins* time. *Remigius* the great Patron of *Gotischalk* (the zealous preacher & publisher of absolute reprobation in those times) in his answer to that Epistle, which we suppose to be the Epistle of *Rabanus*; to *Rabanus* saying, that *God* did (w) *make the nations of the world healthful*, and that he doth [*velle omnes homines salvos fieri*] will that all men be saved; he gives such an answer as cannot stand with absolute Reprobation; (x) *This* (saith he) *is very true, because God layeth on no man a necessity of perishing, as he hath laid on none a necessity of sinning.* And a little after he is plainer, (y) *Those whom God did foreknow would live and die in their wickedness, for reasons most just be decreed should perish, as himself saith, Him which sinneth against me, even him will I blot out of my Book.*

In the *Valentine*-Synod assembled in favour of *Gottschalk* we may find these words.

(u) Anathema illi qui dixerit, quod vas contumeliæ non possit assurgere ut sit vas in honorem.

(w) Bish. *Usher hist. Gottsch. pa.* 35. & 34. Sanabiles facere nationes orbis terrarum.

(x) Et hoc omnino verum est, quia nemini Deus imponit necessitatem pereundi, sicut nemini imponit necessitatem malè agendi.

(y) Quos verissimè præscivit impios & iniquos futuros & in suâ impietate & iniquitate permansuros, justis & rectissimis de causis decrevit, statuit & prædestinavit perituros, sicut ipse ait, *Qui peccaverit mihi, ipsum delebo de libro meo.*

(z) Can. 2. Nec ipsos malos ideò perire, quia boni esse non potuerunt, sed quia boni esse noluerunt, suoque vitio in massâ damnationis vel merito originali vel etiam actuali permanserunt.

(a) Can. 3. Verum aliquos ad malum prædestinatos esse divinâ potestate ut aliud esse non possint, non solum non credimus, sed etiamsi sunt qui tantum malum credere velint, cum omni detestatione, sicut Arausica Synodus, illis Anathema dicimus.

(z) *Therefore do the wicked perish, not because they could not, but because they would not be good, and by their own fault, Original or Actual also, remained in the mass of perdition.* And in the end of their third Canon, they denounce *Anathema* to those that hold that men are so predestinated unto evil, as that they cannot be otherwise. [a] *That any should be* (saith the Council) *predestinated to evil by the power of God, so as he cannot be otherwise; we do not only not believe, but also if there be any that will believe so great an evil, with all detestation we denounce them accursed, as the Arausican Council also did.* By these Testimonies (which are but a few of many) it appeareth that absolute and inevitable Reprobation found but cold entertainment from Antiquity.

Which considering, I began to call it into question.

For albeit I make not the decisions and determinations of the Fathers or Councils the Rules of my Faith, (because they are but men, and therefore subject to Errour:) yet I honour their *gray hairs* and their *grave assemblies*, and do vehemently mistrust those Doctrines which they never taught or approved,

proved, but misliked and condemned.

2. Its *Unwillingness* to abide the *trial.* I find that the Authors and Abettors of it have been very backward to bring it to the standard; not onely when they have been called upon by their Adversaries, to have it weighed, but also when they have been intreated thereto by their chief Magistrates, who might have compelled them: a shrewd argument (methinks) that it is too light.

2 Reason, *Unwillingness to be tried.*

In the disputation at *Mompelgart, anno* 1586. held between *Beza* and *Jacobus Andreæ*, with some seconds on both sides, *Beza* and his company having disputed with the Lutherans about the person of CHRIST and the Lords Supper, when they came to this point, did decline the sifting of it, and gave this reason among others, that it could not then be publickly disputed of (b) *without the great scandal and hurt of the ignorant, and unacquainted with these high mysteries.* (c) The Contraremonstrants also in their Conference with the opposite Parties at the *Hague*, in the year 1611. could not be drawn to dispute with them about this point, but delivered a Petition to the States of Hol-

(b) *Beza in Coll. Mompel. pa.* 373. Sine gravi eorum offendiculo qui tanti mysterii capaces non sunt

(c) *Braud. Col. Hag. pa.* 57.

land and West-Friezland, that they might not be urged to it, resolving rather to break off the Conference, than to meddle with it.

In the Synod likewise at *Dort*, in the years 1618. and 1619. the Remonstrants were warned by the President of the Synod, (d) *That they should rather dispute of the point of Election, than the odious point of Reprobation.*

(d) *Acta Syn. per.* 1. *p* 133. Ut de electione potius quam de odiosa Reprobationis materiâ agerent.

Can this Doctrine be a truth, and yet blush at the light, which maketh all things manifest? Especially considering these things.

1. That Reprobation is a principal head of Divinity, by the well or ill stating and ordering of which, the glory of God and the good of Religion is much promoted or hindered.

2. That there is such a necessary connexion between the Points of Election and Reprobation (both being parts of Predestination) that the one cannot well be handled without the other.

3. That the Doctrine of Reprobation was the chief cause of all the uproars in the Church at that time.

4. That it was accused with open mouth, and challenged of falshood; and there-

therefore bound in Juſtice to purge it ſelf of the crimination.

5. That the Remonſtrants did not at that time deſire that it ſhould be talked of among the common people, who might have ſtumbled at it; but diſputed of among the Judicious and Learned, who (as the threſhing Oxen which were to beat the Corn out of the Husk) are to bolt out thoſe truths which are couched and hidden in the letter of the Scriptures.

That the Doctrine which is loth to abide the triall even of learned men, carrieth with it a ſhrewd ſuſpition of falſhood, the Heathen Oratour ſhall witneſs for me; who to *Epicurus* ſaying that he would not publiſh his Opinion to the ſimple people, who might happily take offence at it, anſwereth thus; (e) *Declare thine Opinion in the place of judgment, or if thou art afraid of the aſſembly there, declare it in the Senate houſe*, among thoſe grave and judicious perſons. *Thou wilt never do it; and why, but becauſe it is a foul and diſhoneſt opinion?*

(e) *Cicer. de fin. bon. & malorum, l. 2. p. 115.* Aut tu eadem iſta dic in judicio, aut ſi coronam times, dic in Senatu. Nunquam facies. Cur, niſi quod turpis eſt oratio?

This ſtriving to lie cloſe, is (peradventure) no infallible argument of a bad

cauſe, yet it is a very probable one. For true Religion (as *Vives* ſaith) is not a thing *gilded over, but gold it ſelf; the more that's ſcraped and diſcovered, the brighter and goodlier it is*, and ſo is the truth. (f) *Diſputations illuſtrate and ſet forth true opinions more than ſilence can: let's not fear therefore* (ſaith he) *leſt our Faith when it is laid open, appear filthy to the eyes of the Beholders.* (g) *Let falſe and ſuperficial Religions, in which there is no ſoundneſs, be afraid of this.*

(f) *Vives de ver. fidei, l. 1. p.* 16. Puriorem ac nitidiorem illam reddit bellum, quam pax adverſus gentes

(g) Metuant hoc aliæ religiones falſæ & umbratiles.

The Jew is loth to reaſon with the Chriſtian touching his Law; and the Turk is forbidden to diſpute of his Alcoran, becauſe their Religions are brittle, like Glaſs broken with the leaſt touch. But the Chriſtian (h) *who is confident of the goodneſs of his Faith, feareth no examination, but rather as much as may be, ſoliciteth and provoketh his adverſary to the combat.*

(h) *Vives l.* 4. *p* 479. Qui veritate ſuâ fidit, nihil reformidat examen ingenii: imò advocat, & quantum poteſt, exacuit.

Truth, whether it be in men or doctrines, is beſt, when it is uncovered; it covets no corners, though errour do, but it is willing to abide the trial. (i) *Search me, O Lord, and know my heart, try me, and know my thoughts, and ſee if there be any way of wickedneſs in me,*

(i) Pſal. 139. 23, 24.

ſaith

ſaith the Prophet *David*, knowing his heart to be without guile. And our Saviour telleth us, (k) *that every one that doth evil, hateth the Light, and cometh not to it, leſt his deeds ſhould be reproved; but he that doth truth, cometh to the Light that his deeds may be made manifeſt, that they are wrought in God.* As S. *Paul* ſaith of an Heretick, he is [αὐτοκατάκριτος] *ſelf-condemned*; ſo we may ſay of Hereſie and Untruth; it condemneth it ſelf, and by nothing more than by refuſing the touchſtone. He is to be thought an empty Scholar, who is loth to be oppoſed; and his gold to be light and counterfeit, who will not have it touched and weighed, and and thoſe Opinions to be but Errours, which would ſo willingly walk in a miſt, and dwell in ſilence, when it concerneth the peace of the Church ſo much to have them examined.

(k) Joh 3.20, 21.

Tit. 3.11.

3. The *Infamy* of it. It is an opinion (eſpecially as it is defended the upper way) odious to the Papiſts, opening their foul mouths againſt our Church and Religion; abhorred (maintained either way) by all the Lutherans; who for this very Tenet call us damned

3 Reaſons. *Infamy.*

Calviniſts, think us unworthy to be above ground, and in their writings proteſt, that they will rather unite themſelves to the Papiſts than to us. And it is alſo diſtaſteful to all the Greek Churches, whch are very many. *Molin* in his Anatomy, ſpeaking of the *Supralapſarian* Doctrine, ſaith (*l*) If it ſhould be ſo that God hath reprobated men without the conſideration of ſin, or hath ordained them to ſin; yet it is the part of a wiſe man to conceal theſe things, or not to know them, rather than to utter them; (m) *becauſe when they are taught and defended, they fill mens heads with ſcruples, & give occaſion to the Adverſaries of defaming the true Religion.* The ſame may as truly be ſaid of the *Sublapſarian* way. For (as I have ſaid) they are in ſubſtance all one. And Sir *Edwin Sandys* is of the ſame mind too. For in his moſt excellent Book called a *Survey of the ſtate of Religion in the Weſtern parts of the World*, ſpeaking of the deadly Diviſion between the Lutherans and Calviniſts in *Germany*, he hath theſe words, That *though the Palſgrave & Landſgrave have with great Judgment and Wiſdom, to aſlake*

(l) *Moli. Anat. Arm. c. 12. de Præd.*

(m) Quia enunciata injiciunt ſcrupulos & anſam præbent adverſariis infamandi veram Religionem.

Sir *Edw. Sandys*, pag. 172.

aſſake thoſe flames, impoſed ſilence in that part to the Miniſters of their party, hoping the charity & diſcretion of the other party, would have done the like; yet it falls out otherwiſe. For both the Lutheran Preachers rail as bitterly againſt them in their Pulpits as ever, and their Princes and People have them in as great deteſtation, not forbearing to profeſs openly, that they will return to the Papacy, rather than ever admit that Sacramentary and Predeſtinary Peſtilence.

For theſe two points are the ground of the quarrel, and the latter more ſcandalous at this day than the former. And in the ſame Book, pag. 194. & 198. ſpeaking of men whom he commendeth for *ſingular learning and piety* (whoſe judgment he ſo ſets down, as that he declareth it to be his own) he ſaith, that they think it were *no blemiſh* for the reformed Doctors to *reviſe their Doctrines, and to abate the rigour of ſpeculative Opinions,* (for ſo he is pleaſed to call them) *eſpecially touching the eternal decrees of God: wherein ſome of their chief authors have run into ſuch an extream to all Romiſh Doctrine, as to have exceedingly ſcandalized all other Churches withall, yea*

and

Calviniſts, think us unworthy to be above ground, and in their writings proteſt, that they will rather unite themſelves to the Papiſts than to us. And it is alſo diſtaſteful to all the Greek Churches, whch are very many. *Molin* in his Anatomy, ſpeaking of the *Supralapſarian* Doctrine, ſaith (*l*) If it ſhould be ſo that God hath reprobated men without the conſideration of ſin, or hath ordained them to ſin; yet it is the part of a wiſe man to conceal theſe things, or not to know them, rather than to utter them; (m) *becauſe when they are taught and defended, they fill mens heads with ſcruples, & give occaſion to the Adverſaries of defaming the true Religion.* The ſame may as truly be ſaid of the *Sublapſarian* way. For (as I have ſaid) they are in ſubſtance all one. And Sir *Edwin Sandys* is of the ſame mind too. For in his moſt excellent Book called a *Survey of the ſtate of Religion in the Weſtern parts of the World*, ſpeaking of the deadly Diviſion between the Lutherans and Calviniſts in *Germany*, he hath theſe words, That *though the Palſgrave & Landſgrave have with great Judgment and Wiſdom, to aſlake*

(l) *Moli. Anat. Arm. c. 12. de Præd.*

(m) Quia enunciata injiciunt ſcrupulos & anſam præbent adverſariis infamandi veram Religionem.

Sir *Edw. Sandys*, pag. 172.

aſſake thoſe flames, impoſed ſilence in that part to the Miniſters of their party, hoping the charity & diſcretion of the other party, would have done the like; yet it falls out otherwiſe. For both the Lutheran Preachers rail as bitterly againſt them in their Pulpits as ever, and their Princes and People have them in as great deteſtation, not forbearing to profeſs openly, that they will return to the Papacy, rather than ever admit that Sacramentary and Predeſtinary Peſtilence.

For theſe two points are the ground of the quarrel, and the latter more ſcandalous at this day than the former. And in the ſame Book, pag. 194. & 198. ſpeaking of men whom he commendeth for *ſingular learning and piety* (whoſe judgment he ſo ſets down, as that he declareth it to be his own) he ſaith, that they think it were *no blemiſh* for the reformed Doctors to *reviſe their Doctrines, and to abate the rigour of ſpeculative Opinions*, (for ſo he is pleaſed to call them) *eſpecially touching the eternal decrees of God: wherein ſome of their chief authors have run into ſuch an extream to all Romiſh Doctrine, as to have exceedingly ſcandalized all other Churches withall, yea*

and

and many of their own to reſt very ill ſatisfied.

Coll. Momp. pag. 566, 567. Oſiand. Hiſt. Eccl. p. 1040. Cent. 16.

At the cloſing up of the Conference at *Mompelgart*, when *Frederick* Earl of *Wortenberg* exhorted his Divines to acknowledge *Beza* and his company for Brethren; and to declare it by giving them their hand; they utterly refuſed, ſaying, they would pray to God to open their eyes, and would do them any office of humanity and charity, but they would not give them the right hand of brotherhood, becauſe they were proved to be guilty [*errorum ieterrimorum*] *of the moſt peſtilent Errors*, among which they reckoned this for one.

Hemingius left his own ſide, and joyned with us in the point of the Sacrament: but he would come no nearer, maintaining always a diſtance in this.

Pag. 237.

And as for the Grecians, we learn alſo by Sir *Edwin Sandys* his relation, that they do mightily *diſſent from that Doctrine touching the eternal Counſels of God, which* Calvin (as ſome conceive) *firſt fully revealed, or rather introduced into the Chriſtian World, and ſince, ſome of his friends and followers have ſeconded; as thinking it very injurious to the good-*

goodneſs of God, and directly and immediately oppoſite to his very nature. In regard of which, one of their Biſhops hath written a Book againſt it, which hath been ſent to Geneva, and there received.

It is a morſel which the greateſt part of Chriſtian Churches cannot ſwallow: and therefore (I think) it ſhould not very eaſily without ſuſpicion, down with us. go/

And to ſay one thing more; beſide this *infamy* of it among Chriſtians, it is very probable, that among the too many Scandals given to the Jews by Chriſtians, among whom they dwell, this Doctrine is not one of the leaſt rubs in the way of their Converſion. For *they think it a bad opinion* (ſays the ſame Judicious and Learned Gentleman) *which ſome of great Name have ſeemed to hold, That God in his Everlaſting and abſolute pleaſure ſhould affect the extream miſery of any of his creatures for the ſhewing of his juſtice and ſeverity in tormenting them; or that the calamity, caſting away & damnation of ſome ſhould abſolutely and neceſſarily redound more to his glory, than the felicity of them all, conſidering that his nature is meer goodneſs* Pag 223, 224.

neſs & happineſs, & hath no affinity with rigour or miſery. This is my third reaſon.

Reaſon 4. *Affinity with Fate.*

The fourth, Its *affinity* with the old exploded Errours of the *Stoicks* and *Manichees.*

The opinion of the *Stoicks* was, that all actions and events were unavoidable, determined either by the Revolutions of the Heavens, and the qualities of ſuch ſtars as reigned at mens births, or by the concatenation of natural things, and the diſpoſition of the firſt matter, all things being ſo put together from eternity, that one thing muſt needs follow another, as it doth; and [*prima materia*] being ſo diſpoſed, that things cannot ſucceſſively come to paſs otherwiſe than they do, but muſt of neceſſity be as they are, even [*invito Deo*] though God would have ſome things to be otherwiſe than they are.

The *Manichees* held, that all mens actions, good or evil, were determined too; good actions by a good God, who was the Author of all good things that were created, and of all good actions that came to paſs in the World; evil actions by an evil God, who was the [*primum principium mali*] *the prime author*

thor of all evil things or actions that were extant in the world.

The Maintainers of the Absolute Decree do say one of these two things, either that all actions natural & moral, good and evil, and all events likewise are absolutely necessary; so the Supralapsarians: or that all mens ends (at least) are unalterable and indeterminable by the power of their wills; so the Sublapsarians. And this is upon the matter all one with the former. For first, in vain is our freedom in the actions and means, if the end at which they drive be pitched and determined; sith all actions are for the ends sake, that it might be obtained by them, which without them could not. And secondly, the determination of the end doth necessarily involve the means that precede that end: as if a man be fore-determined to Damnation, he must unavoidably sin, else he could not be damned.

Now in these three opinions we may note two things.

1. The *substance* and formality of them, which is an *unavoidableness* of mens actions and ends whatsoever they be:

be: in this all of them agree, all holding that in all things, at least in all mens ends, *undeclinable fates*, and insuperable necessity do domineer.

And therefore *Melancthon* doth not stick sundry times in his common places to call this Absolute Decree [*Fatum Stoicum & Tabulas Parcarum*] *Stoical Fate, and the Destinies Tables*: He also chargeth the Church of *Geneva* (the great Patron of it) with a labour to bring in the Stoicks Errour, as we may see in a certain Epistle of *Melancthons* to *Peucer*, where he hath these words. (n) *Lelius writeth unto me, that in* Geneva *there is such strife about the Stoicks fate, that one was cast into prison because he dissented from* Zeno. *O miserable times!* &c. And by the testimony of *Beza* too, who speaking of *Melancton*, saith, (o) *Philip hath so written of these things, as if he meant to tax the* Geneva *Divines for bringers in of Destiny.*

(n) *Melanct. in Epist. ad Peuc.* Scribit ad me Lelius de Stoico fato usque adeo litem Genevæ moveri, ut quidam in carcerem conjectus sit, propterea quòd à Zenone differret. O misera tempora! Doctrina salutis peregrinis quibusdam dubitationibus obscuratur.

(o) *Beza in vita Calv.* Philippus de his rebus ita scribere cœperat, ut Genevenses quasi Stoicum fatum invehentes notare quibusdam videatur.

2. We may note the *circumstance*, or the Grounds of their Opinions; The Stoicks derive this Necessity from the Stars, or the first matter; the Manichees from two [*prima principia, aterna*

&

& coæterna] *first principles of all things eternal and coeternal.* These last, from the peremptory decree of Almighty God.

So that they differ in their grounds indeed; but in this difference the Stoicks and the Manichees in some respects have the better. For it is better to derive this necessity of evil actions and unhappy events, from an evil God, or the course of Nature, than from the Decree of that God who is infinitely good. The substance of their opinions is all one, the ground wherein they differ, is but accidental to the Errour.

Which being so, for this very reason alone, may this Doctrine of Absolute Reprobation be suspected: because those Dreams of the Stoicks were exploded by the best Philosophers of all sorts; and this of the Manichees was generally cried down by the Fathers, not onely as fooliſh, but as impious and unworthy of entertainment in a Christian Heart, or Christian Commonwealth, not so much for any things circumstantial in it, as for the substance of the Errour; because it made all things and events to be necessary, and

so

so plucked up the roots of vertue, planted vice, and left no place for just rewards or punishments.

These are my reasons for the first part.

THe Reasons that have convinced me of the untruth of absolute Reprobation, now follow. And first of those that fight against the upper way.

They are drawn [*ab incommodo*] from the great evils and inconveniences which issue from it naturally: which may be referred to two main heads.

1. The dishonour of God.
2. The overthrow of Religion and Government.

1 *Inconvenience.* It *dishonoureth God.* For it chargeth him deeply with two things, no ways agreeable to his nature.

1. Mens eternal torments in Hell.
2. Their sins on Earth.

First, it chargeth him with mens *Eternal torments* in Hell, and maketh him to be the prime, principal, and invincible cause of the damnation of millions of miserable souls: the *prime* cause, because it reporteth him to have appointed

pointed them to deſtruction, of his own voluntary diſpoſition, antecedent to all deſerts in them; and the *principal* and *invincible* cauſe; becauſe it maketh the damnation of Reprobates to be neceſſary and unavoidable, through Gods abſolute and uncontroulable Decree; and ſo neceſſary, that they can no more eſcape it, than poor *Aſtyanax* could avoid the breaking of his neck, when the Grecians tumbled him down from the Tower of *Troy*.

Now this is a heavy charge, contrary to Scripture, Gods nature, and ſound reaſon.

1. To *Scripture*, which makes man the principal, nay the onely cauſe (in oppoſition to God) of his own ruine. *Thy deſtruction is of thy ſelf, O Iſrael, but in me is thy help*, Hoſ. 13. 9. *As I live, ſaith the Lord, I will not the death of the wicked, &c. Turn ye, turn ye, why will ye dye?* Ezek. 33. 11. *He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the Children of men*, Lam. 3. 33. To which ſpeeches, for likeneſs ſake, I will joyn one of *Proſpers*. (p) *Gods Predeſtination is to many the cauſe of ſtanding, to none of falling.*

(p) *Reſp. ad 12. Obj. Vincent.* Prædeſtinatio Dei multis eſt cauſa ſtandi, nemini eſt cauſa labendi.

(q) Exod. 34. 6. 2. It's contrary to *Gods nature*, (q) who sets forth himself to be *a God merciful, gracious, long-suffering, abundant in goodness*, &c. and he is acknowledged (r) Psal. 86. 5. to be so by King *David*, (r) *Thou, Lord, art good and merciful, and of great kindness to them that call upon thee.* And by Joel 2. 13. the Prophets *Joel*, *Jonah*, and *Micah*; *He is gracious and merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness*, saith *Joel*. Jonah 4. 2. *I know* (says *Jonah*) *that thou art a gracious God, merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness.* And *who* (saith *Micah*) Micah 7. 18. *is a God like unto thee that taketh away iniquity? &c. he retaineth not his wrath for ever, because mercy pleaseth him.*

3. 'Tis contrary also to *sound reason*, which cannot but argue such a Decree of extream cruelty, and consequently remove it from the Father of Mercies.

We cannot in reason think that any man in the World can so far put off Humanity and Nature, as to resolve with himself to marry and beget Children, that after they are born, and have lived a while with him, he may hang them up by the tongues, tear

their

their fleſh with ſcourges, pull it from their Bones with burning Pincers, or put them to any cruel tortures; that by thus torturing them he may ſhew what his Authority and Power is over them. Much leſs can we believe without great violence to reaſon, that the God of mercy can ſo far forget himſelf, as out of his abſolute Pleaſure to ordain ſuch infinite multitudes of his Children made after his own Image, to everlaſting fire; and create them one after another, that after the end of a ſhort life here, he might torment them without end hereafter, to ſhew his power and ſoveraignty over them. If to deſtroy the *righteous with the wicked* temporally, be ſuch a piece of Injuſtice, that *Abraham* removeth it from God with an *Abſit*, *Wilt thou deſtroy the Righteous with the wicked? That be far from thee, O Lord. Shall not the Judge of all the World do right?* How deeply (may we think) would that good man have deteſted one ſingle thought, that God reſolveth upon the deſtruction of many innocent ſouls eternally in Hell fire? Gen. 18. 25.

But God (ſome ſay) is ſoveraign Lord of *Object.*

of all creatures and men, they are truly and properly his own. Cannot he therefore dispose of them as he pleaseth, and do with his own what he will?

Answ. The question is not what an Almighty soveraign Power can do to poor vassals, but what a Power that is Just and Good may do. By the power of a Lord, his absolute and naked power, he can cast away the whole mass of mankind, for it is not repugnant to omnipotency or soveraignty: but by the power of a Judge, to wit, that actual power of his, which is always clothed with Goodness and Justice, he cannot.

For it is not compatible with these properties in God, to appoint men to Hell of his meer will and pleasure, no fault at all of theirs pre-existing in his eternal mind.

(s) *Aug. l. 3. cont. Julian, c. 31. p. 164. c.* Bonus est Deus, Justus est Deus: potest aliquem sine bonis meritis liberare, quia bonus est; non potest quenquā sine malis meritis damnare, quia justus est.

1. It is not compatible with *Justice*, which is a constant will of rendring to every one his proper due, and that is, vengeance to whom vengeance belongeth, namely to the obstinate and impenitent. (s) *God is good* (saith S. Austin) *and God is just: he may without any desert free men from punishment, because he is good; but he cannot without evil deser-*

vings

vings condemn any man, becauſe he is juſt. In another place alſo he ſaith, (t) *If God be believed to damn any man that by ſin deſerveth it not, he is not believed to be free from injuſtice.*

(t) *Aug. Epiſt.* 106. *ad Bonifac.* Quenquam verò immeritum & nulli obnoxium peccato ſi Deus damnare creditur, alienus ab iniquitate non creditur.

2. Nor is it compatible with *goodneſs*, which is an inclination in God of communicating that good which is in himſelf to his creatures, as far as he can without wronging his *Juſtice* : and therefore if God be (as the Scripture reporteth him) *good to all*; it cannot be that he ſhould of himſelf without any motive in the reaſonable creature provide for it from everlaſting the greateſt of all miſeries, and that before he thought of making it, or beſtowing any good at all upon it.

Object. 2. Perk l. de prad. pag. 25.

It is further objected, that we do and may ſlaughter our beaſts for our daily uſe, without any cruelty or injuſtice: and therefore God may as well, nay much more appoint as many of us as he pleaſeth to the torments of Hell for his glory, and yet be juſt and good notwithſtanding : for there is a greater diſproportion between God and us, than between us and beaſts.

Object.

1. For anſwer to this, we are firſt to *Anſw.* 1.

premiſe thus much, namely, that our ſlaughtering of our beaſts for our daily uſe, is by Gods ordinance and appointment: We had not this authority of our ſelves, but God of his bounty towards us gave it us, as we may ſee, *Gen.* 9. 2,3. where we may obſerve, Firſt, that God delivereth up all creatures, beaſts, birds, and fiſhes, into the hands of men. Secondly, that the end why he doth ſo, is, that they might be meat for men, and conſequently that they might be ſlain.

Which being ſo, our ſlaughtering of Oxen, Sheep, and other Creatures for our daily uſe, is to be accounted Gods doing, rather than ours. And therefore the Objection ſhould be made thus; God may without any breach of goodneſs or juſtice appoint brute Creatures to be ſlain for mans uſe: Therefore he may ordain men to be caſt into Hell torments for ever for his own uſe, that is, for the Declaration of his Soveraignty, *&c.*

This being premiſed, I anſwer further, that this compariſon holds not: for there is little *proportion* between the objects compared, & leſs between the acts. There is but ſmall *proportion* between

tween the objects, *beaſts* and *men*, creatures of different natures, and made for a different end. Beaſts are void of reaſon and liberty in their actions, creatures whoſe beings vaniſh with their breath, made onely for the uſe and ſervice of men upon Earth : but men are reaſonable and underſtanding creatures, able through the Creators bounty to diſcern between good and evil, and according to their firſt Principles, to chooſe the good and forſake the evil : they are the very image of Gods purity and eternity, and were made for the ſervice of God alone upon Earth, and his bleſſed and everlaſting Society in Heaven.

So that albeit there be a very great diſtance between God and men, yet nothing ſo great as between God and beaſts. It followeth not therefore, that if God may appoint Beaſts to be killed of his own free pleaſure for mans uſe, he may with like equity and reaſon appoint men of his own will to deſtruction for his own uſe. We read that God required of his People many thouſand beaſts for Sacrifices, but not one man. The firſt-born of other Creatures he challenged for burnt-offerings (except they

were unclean beaſts) but the firſt born of men were to be redeemed : which ſheweth, that he put a wide difference between the blood of men and beaſts. Beſides, in the 9. of *Gen.* he giveth men power to kill and feed upon all living Creatures, but he ſtraitly forbids them to ſhed mans blood, and giveth this reaſon of the prohibition, *Man is the Image of God.* So that we may well conclude, that there is but ſmall proportion between the objects compared, men and beaſts, in reſpect of this act of killing or ſlaughtering.

2. There is far leſs or rather no *proportion* at all between the acts compared, *killing* and *eternal tormenting*. A man may kill, but he cannot without barbarous injuſtice and cruelty torment his beaſt and prolong the life of it, that he may daily vex and torture it, to ſhew what *power* and *ſoveraignty* he hath over it : ſo I doubt not (though there be ſome that will not grant it, but charge the Arminians with contumely againſt God for affirming it) I doubt not (I ſay) but God may kill a man of his own free pleaſure, yea and reſolve him into nothing, without any cruelty

Vid. Molinæi enodat. quæſt. graviſſ. p. 125.

or

or injuſtice; becauſe in ſo doing he doth but take away what he had given him: but he cannot without both theſe, *antecedently decree* to keep him alive for ever in Hell, that he may there torment him without end, to ſhew his Soveraignty. For this is to inflict an infinite evil upon a guiltleſs creature, to whom he had given but a finite good. And ſo is the compariſon moſt unequal too in the acts compared: and therefore proveth juſt nothing.

But it is replied by ſome (who will rather ſpeak unreaſonably and againſt common ſenſe, than lay down the concluſions which they have undertaken to maintain) that it is *better* and more eligible *to be tortured in Hell*, than to want or loſe a being: for he that wants a being enjoyeth no good, but he that is tormented in Hell, hath a being; and by conſequence ſomething that is good. If therefore God may take away a mans being that is innocent, and turn him into nothing for his pleaſure; much more may he torment him in Hell.

Dr. *Twiſs* his *vindi. gra. l.* 2. *part.* 1. *digr.* 1. *pag.* 17. *Edit.* 2.

1. To the firſt part of this Reply, namely, that it is more deſirable to be in Hell, than to be nothing; I oppoſe three things. 1. The

Mat. 26. 24. 1. The ſpeech of our Saviour concerning *Judas*: *Wo be to that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed: it had been good for that man, if he had never been born.* Two things eſpecially are ſet forth in theſe words of our Saviour: Firſt, the *miſery* of *Judas* the betrayer of his Lord, *Wo be to, &c.* Secondly, the greatneſs of his miſery, *It had been good, &c.* It is as much as if our Lord had ſaid, *Judas* the Traytor ſhall be damned; and therefore ſo woful will his condition be, that it had been good and happy for him, if he had never received a being; good in earneſt, as Interpreters do generally expound it, not in the opinion or eſteem of weak-minded, faint-hearted men onely, as ſome few underſtand it. For,

1. Let it be granted that the Scripture ſpeaketh of things ſometimes according to mens opinions, yet without reaſon to faſten ſuch an expoſition upon any Scripture, is to do as Dunces do in the Schools, who being not able to anſwer a place in *Ariſtotle* wherewith they are charged, ſhift it off, and ſay, [*loquitur ex aliorum ſententia*] *he ſpeaks according to the opinion of others.*

2. This

2. This Scripture cannot in reaſon be thus expounded,

1. Becauſe it is an argument and ground by which Chriſt declareth the truth or greatneſs of the miſery of *Judas*, *Wo to the man, &c.* And why wo? Becauſe it had been good, &c. But it were no argument to ſhew his woful eſtate by, to ſay that it had been good for him that he had never been born, in the opinion of men who miſtake the caſe, but not in truth.

2. Becauſe this Expoſition would teach and encourage men to be Atheiſts and Epicures. In the ſecond of *wiſdom* we read how voluptuous men do ſtir up one another to enjoy the good things that are preſent, to fill themſelves with wine and oyntments, to leave ſome tokens of their jollity in every place, and to practice all manner of wickedneſs; and what is their motive? A falſe perſwaſion that their ſouls ſhould die with their bodies, and that they ſhould have no being after death. If this conceit could fleſh them thus in their impious and voluptuous courſes, how freely and eagerly (may we think) would they purſue their carnal and ſinful delights,

if

if they could be but once perſwaded, that after all their pleaſure they ſhall be in a better caſe than if they had no being?

Secondly, I oppoſe common conſent; where ſhall we pick out a man, but will ſay (if he ſpeak from his heart) that he had better vaniſh into a thouſand nothings, then to be caſt into Hell? What is the reaſon why men are ſo afraid of Hell, when they are touched to the quick with the conſcience of their ungodly lives, and the expectation of eternal vengeance, that with *Job* they curſe their birth-day, and wiſh a hundred times over, that they had never been, or might ceaſe to be, that ſo they might not come into the place of torments; but becauſe they judge a being there to be incomparably worſe than no being any where? and why are men who are ſenſible of hell fire, ſo ſtrongly curbed and held in by the fear of feeling it, even from darling and beloved ſins, but becauſe they apprehend it to be the moſt terrible of all terribles? fear of being annihilated can never do that which the fear of Hell doth.

The third thing which I oppoſe is common

mon ſenſe, which judgeth pains when they are extreme to be worſe than death. Hence it is, that *Job* being tormented in his body by the Devil, curſed his birth-day, magnified the condition of the dead, and wiſhed himſelf in the grave, plainly preferring the loſs of his being before that miſerable being which he then had.

And hence it is, that men even of ſtouteſt and hardeſt ſpirits (as we ſee by daily experience) would (if they might enjoy their option) chooſe rather to have no bodies at all, than bodies tormented with the ſtone or gout, or any other ſharp and ſenſible diſeaſe. It is a known ſaying grounded on this judgment of ſenſe, [*Præſtat ſemel quàm ſemper mori*] *better it is to die once, than to be always dying.*

This the Tyrant *Tiberius* knew very well: and therefore he would not ſuffer thoſe towards whom he purpoſed to exerciſe his cruelty, to be put to a ſpeedy death, but to lingring torments, as *Sueto-nius* reporteth of him in that chapter where he reckoneth up his barbarous and cruel practiſes.

(*u*) *Thoſe* (ſaith he) who through the ex-

(*u*) *Sueton. vit. Tib. cap.* 61. Mori volentibus vis adhibita vivendi.

extremity of their torments *would have dyed, he uſed means to keep alive*: [*Nam mortem adeò leve ſupplicium putabat*] *for he accounted death ſo light a puniſhment*, that when he heard that one *Carnulius*, a man appointed to torments, had prevented him, he cried out, [*Carnulius me evaſit*] *Carnulius hath eſcaped my hands.* To a priſoner intreating him to put him quickly to death, he gave this anſwer, [*Nondum tecum redii in gratiam*] *I am not yet friends with thee*; accounting it great kindneſs to put him quickly to death whom he might have tortured.

Many that were called into queſtion, did partly wound themſelves in their own Houſes [*ad vexationem ignominiamq; vitandam*] *to prevent that pain and ignominy* which they knew they ſhould endure: and partly poyſon'd themſelves in the midſt of the Court, as they were going to their arraignment, for the ſame cauſe. *Seneca* ſpeaking of one *Mecænas*, who was ſo afraid of being dead, that he ſaid he would not refuſe weakneſs, deformity, [*nec acutam crucem*] *no nor the ſharpeſt crucifying* (w) *ſo that he might live ſtill in the midſt of theſe*

Senec. Epiſt l. 17. Epiſt. 101.

(w) Dummodo inter hæc mala ſpiritus protegetur.

ex-

extremities; he calleth his deſire [*turpiſsimum votum*] a *baſe* and moſt ignoble and unnatural *wiſh*, and cenſured him for a moſt effeminate and contemptible man; (x) becauſe in all his evils *he was afraid of that which is the end of all evils*, the privation of his being. And certainly we muſt needs conceive and cenſure them to be ſtocks and ſtones rather than fleſh and blood, who can ſo put off all feeling and ſenſe, as to think a tormented being in Hell to be a lighter and leſſer evil than no being at all.

(x) Quia diſtulit id quod eſt in malis optimum, ſupplicii finem.

2. To the reaſon on which the Reply is grounded, which is, [*Melius eſt eſſe quàm non eſſe*] *it is better to be then to have no being*; I anſwer that it is a ſophiſm or fallacy *à non diſtributo ad diſtributum*. To be, in it ſelf is better than not to be: but it is not univerſally true in all particulars. Again, it is true in ſome caſes and *ex hypotheſi* [*ſi cætera ſint paria*] If there be any equality in the adjuncts. It is ſo far from being ſimply true, that our Saviour limiteth it, and putteth a caſe wherein it is not true, but the contrary to it is true: and that is the caſe of *Judas*, of which we have ſaid ſomewhat before.

Anſwer 2.

It had been good, &c. which words

St.

(y) Hieron. comment. in Mat. 6. 26. v. 24. Simpliciter dictum eſt, melius eſt non ſubſiſtere quàm malè ſubſiſtere.

St. *Hierom* expounding, ſaith, (y) *It is ſimply and plainly averred by our Saviour, that it is better to have no being, than an evil being.* This was the judgment too of *Job, cap.* 3. *ver.* 11, 12, 13. *Why dyed I not* (ſaith he) *in the birth? why did the knees prevent me? and why did I ſuck the breaſts? for now ſhould I have lain ſtill and been quiet: I ſhould have ſlept then, and been at reſt.* In which words he plainly implieth, that he thought it far better to have had no birth and being, than ſuch a painful and miſerable being. This was alſo the opinion of *Solomon, Eccl.* 4. 1, 2, 3. *So I returned* (ſaith he) *and conſidered all the oppreſſions that are done under the Sun; and behold the tears of ſuch as were oppreſſed, and they had no Comforter, &c. Wherefore I praiſed the dead which are already dead, more than the living which are yet alive: yea better is he than both they, which hath not yet been, who hath not ſeen the evil work that is done under the Sun.*

The words do clearly ſhew, that *Solomon* did think it better to be dead, and to be deprived of being, or to have alwayes wanted a being, than to be oppreſſed by the mighty, and to be without

out comforters: that is, than to have a miſerable and mournful being.

To this aſſenteth Sir *Francis Bacon* in his Colours of good and evil, where againſt this *mathematical poſition* (as he calls it) that *there is no proportion between ſomething and nothing*; and *that therefore the degree of privation* ſeemeth greater than the *degree of diminution*: he excepteth, that it is falſe in ſundry caſes, and among the reſt in this, namely, *when the degree of diminution is more ſenſitive than the degree of privation*. In this caſe a total privation is much better than a diminution: hence theſe uſual *forms of* ſpeech, *Better eye out, than always ake: make or mar, &c.*

Sir *Fr. Bacons* colours of good and evil, the laſt colour.

Some evils and pains (perhaps) either for their lightneſs, becauſe they may be well endured; or for their ſhortneſs, becauſe they are quickly over; are leſs than reſolution into nothing: and a man had better for a while endure them, than loſe his being to be rid of them; becauſe his being may afford him preſently or afterward ſuch and ſo many deſirable good things, as will more than recompence his pains. But when his pains are ſo many and violent

that they leave him no other good than a poor being, or ſo pinch him, that he cannot enjoy or joy in the goods that remain; it were a thouſand times better for him to have no being. And ſuch are the pains of Hell, which for their greatneſs are infinite, producing many miſerable weepings and waylings, and gnaſhing of teeth; all ſymptoms of intolerable griefs: and for their length, eternal; *The worm never dieth, the fire is never quenched: but the breath of the Lord, as a river of brimſtone, doth kindle it for ever.* And therefore it is incomparably better to ceaſe to be, than to live in thoſe torments which cannot be equalled by any good which a being can make us capable of: much leſs by that poor little entitative good, which is all the good the damned do enjoy in Hell.

This ſophiſtical evaſion therefore, and all others of the like ſort notwitſtanding; I doubt not but I may ſafely ſay, that the unavoidable damnation of ſo many millions cannot be abſolutely and antecedently intended by God, without the greateſt Injuſtice and cruelty, which may in no wiſe be imputed

to

to God. (a) *Plutarch* ſpeaking of the Pagans, who to pacifie the anger of their Gods, did ſacrifice to them men and women, ſaith; It had been much better with *Diagoras* and his fellows to deny the being of a God, than confeſſing a God, to think he delighteth in the blood of men. How much rather may we ſay, it were better be an Atheiſt and deny God, than to believe or report him to be a devourer of the Souls of men? The like argument is preſſed by *Euſebius* againſt thoſe cruel and mercileſs Gods of the Pagans: (b) *Doubtleſs* (ſaith he) *if there were any footſtep or ſpark of goodneſs in them, for which they might deſerve to be called good, they would be diſpoſed to do good, and deſirous to ſave all men: they would love juſtice, and take a care of men. And being ſuch, how could they delight in their ſlaughter? &c.* Yea, he concludeth that they were (c) *Devils or evil ſpirits, and not Gods or good ſpirits; becauſe, if they were good, they would do good, whereas thoſe which are evil uſe to do hurt.* I will therefore ſhut up my firſt reaſon with the ſpeech of *Proſper.*

(a) *Plut de ſuperſt. prope finem.*

(b) *Euſeb. de præparat. l. 4. c 16. p. 161. edit. Græcol.* Enim vero, ſi boni veſtigium in iis ullum eſſet, quâobrem bonorum appellationem jure ſortirentur, eos utiq; cùm naturâ ſuâ benignos ac ſalutis omnium cupidos, tum vero amantes juſtitiæ, hominumque ſtudioſos ac defenſores eſſe oportet, &c.

(c) *Ibid. c. 15. pag 153.* Non bonos ſed malos fuiſſe dæmones vel hac ipſa ratione confici exiſtimo. Quicquid bonum eſt prodeſſe ſolet; nocere vero contrarium.

(d) *Proſp. ad Obj. Vincent. reſp.* 3. Omnium quidem hominum Deus creator eſt, ſed nemo ab eo ideo creatus eſt, ut periret: quia alia eſt cauſa naſcendi, alia pereundi.

(d) *God is the Creator indeed of all men, but yet of no man for this end, that he might be damned; the reaſon why we are created, is one, and why we are damned another.*

SEcondly, this opinion chargeth God with mens ſins on earth, and makes him the Author, not of the firſt ſin onely that entred by *Adam* into the world, but of all other ſins that have been, are, or ſhall be committed to the worlds end: no murthers, robberies, rapes, adulteries, inſurrections, treaſons, blaſphemies, hereſies, perſecutions, or any other abominations whatſoever, fall out at any time, or in any place, but they are the neceſſary productions of Gods almighty decree. The Scriptures, I am ſure, teach us another leſſon. *Thou art not a God* (ſaith *David*) *that hath pleaſure in wickedneſs.* And the Prophet *Eſay* tells the people, that when they did evil in the ſight of the Lord, *they did chooſe the things which he would not. Let no man ſay when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man: but every man is tempted, when he is drawn away with*

Pſal. 5. 4.

Eſay 66. 4.

Jam. 1. 13, 14.

with his own concupiscence. And St. *John* having referred all the sins of the world to three heads, *the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life*; tell us, that they *are not of the Father, but of the world.* To which speeches let me adde the speech of *Siracides*, though not of the same authority: *Say not thou it is through the Lord that I fell away: for thou oughtest not to do the things that he hateth. Say not thou that he hath caused me to erre: for he hath no need of the sinful man.*

1 John 2. 16.

Ecclus. 15. 12.

Pious Antiquity hath constantly said the same, and drest it with sundry Reasons; some of which are these that follow. If God be the Author of sin; then,

1. He is worse than the Devil, because the Devil doth onely tempt and perswade to sin, and his action may be resisted: but God (by this opinion) doth will and procure it by *a powerful and effectual decree*, which cannot be resisted. This is *Prospers* argument, (*a*) who to some, objecting that by St. *Austins* Doctrine, when *Fathers defile their own Daughters, and Mothers their own Sons, Servants murder their Masters,*

(*a*) P. Osper. resp. ad obj. 11. Vincent.

and men commit any horrible villanies; *it cometh to paſs, becauſe God hath ſo decreed:* anſwereth, that *if this were laid to the Devils charge,* he *might in ſome ſort clear himſelf of the imputation;* (b) *Becauſe though he be delighted with mens ſins, yet he doth not, he cannot compel them to ſin:* (c) *What a madneſs therefore is it to impute that to God which cannot be juſtly fathered upon the Devil?*

2. He cannot be a *puniſher* of ſin: for none can juſtly puniſh thoſe offences, of which they are the Authors. This is *Proſpers* argument too: (d) *It is againſt reaſon to ſay that he which is the damner of the Devil, would have any man to be the Devils Servant.* This reaſon *Fulgentius* uſeth likewiſe (e) [*Illius rei Deus alter eſt cujus author non eſt*] *God is the avenger of that which he is not the author of. Tertullian* alſo before them hath ſaid, (f) *He is not to be accounted the Author of ſin, who is the Forbidder, yea and the Condemner of it.*

3. He cannot be God; becauſe he

(b) Quia etſi delectatus eſt furore peccantium, probaret tamen ſe non intuliſſe vim criminum.

(c) Quâ ergo inſipientiâ, quave dementiâ definitur ad Dei referendum eſſe conſilium quod nec diabolo totum aſcribi poteſt, qui in peccantium flagitiis, illecebrarum adjutor, non voluntatum credendus eſt eſſe generator.

(d) *Proſp. Reſp. ad Obi. 4. Vincent.* Inſanum omnino & contra rationem eſt dicere damnatorem diaboli, & ejus famulorum, velle ut diabolo ſerviatur.

(e) *Fulgent. lib. 1. ad Momm. c. 19.*

(f) *Tert. l. 2. cont. Marcian. c. 9.* Nec idem habendus eſt delicti author, qui invenitur interdictor & condemnator.

ſhould

ſhould not be juſt, nor holy, nor the Judge of the world; all properties eſſential to God. And this is *S. Baſils* reaſon, who hath written a whole Homily againſt this wicked aſſertion. (g) *It is all one* (ſaith he) *to ſay that God is the Author of ſin, and to ſay he is not God.*

(g) *Baſil. homil.* quod Deus non eſt, &c. Tantundem eſt Deum aſſerere eſſe authorem peccati, & negare eſſe Deum.

Upon theſe and the like conſiderations I may well concclude, that the opinion which chargeth the holy God with the ſins of men, is neither good nor true.

But this opinion doth ſo. For albeit the Writers that have defended it (*Piſcator* and a few more of the blunter ſort excepted) have never ſaid directly and *in terminis* that God is the cauſe of ſin; yet have they delivered thoſe things, from which it muſt needs follow by neceſſary conſequence that he is ſo. For they ſay,

(h) *Marlor. Com. in Job* 15. *v.* 2. Stat igitur firma ſententia: Quemcunque Deus ante conditum orbem elegerit, eum non poſſe perire; quem vero rejecerit, eum non poſſe ſalvari, etſi omnia ſanctorum opera fecerit: uſqs adeo irretractabilis eſt ſententia.

1. That as the decree of Reprobation is abſolute, ſo it is *inevitable*: thoſe poor ſouls which lie under it, muſt of neceſſity be damned. (h) *It is* (ſaith *Marlorat*) *a firm and ſtable truth, that the man whom God in his eternal counſel hath rejected, though he do all the good*

works of the ſaints, cannot poſſibly be ſaved.

2. That without ſin, this Decree of Reprobation cannot be juſtly executed. (*i*) *God* (ſaith *Piſcator*) *did create men for this very purpoſe, that they might indeed fall: for otherwiſe he could not have attained thoſe his principal ends.* He meaneth the manifeſtation of his Juſtice in the damnation of Reprobates, and of his Mercy in the ſalvation of the Elect. *Maccovius* alſo ſaith the ſame: (*k*) *If ſin had not been, the manifeſtation of Juſtice and Mercy* (which is as much to ſay as the damnation of Reprobates) *had never been.*

3. That therefore God decreed, that Reprobates ſhould unavoidably ſin, and ſin unto death, that his eternal ordinance might be executed; and they damned. (*l*) *We grant* (ſaith *Zanchius*) *that reprobates are held ſo faſt under Gods almighty decree, that they cannot but ſin and periſh.* A little after he ſaith (*m*) *We doubt not therefore to confeſs, that there lyeth upon Reprobates by the power of their unchange-*

(*i*) *Piſcat. l. contr. Schaſm. p. 29. theſ 27.* Deus hoc conſilio condidit homines, ut reipſa laberentur; quippe cum niſi hac ratione pervenire non potuerit ad fines illos ſuos principales.

(*k*) *Macc. diſp. 17. p. 11.* Locus miſericordiæ & juſtitiæ manifeſtandæ nullus fuiſſet futurus, ſi peccatum non extitiſſet.

(*l*) *Zanch. lib. 5 de nat. Dei c. 2. de præd. part. 4. reſp. ad poſtr. arg. prope finem.* Damus reprobos neceſſitate peccandi, eoque & pereundi, ex hac Dei ordinatione conſtringi, atque ita conſtringi, ut nequeant non peccare, atque perire.

(*m*) Non dubitamus itaque confiteri, ex immutabili reprobatione neceſſitatem peccandi, & quidem ſine reſipiſcentia ad mortem uſque peccandi, eóque & pœnas æternas dandi reprobis incumbere.

unchangable reprobation, a necessity of sinning, yea of sinning unto death without repentance, and consequently of perishing everlastingly.

Calvin also saith, that Reprobates obey not the word of God, partly through the wickedness of their own hearts, and partly because (*n*) *they are raised up by the unsearchable judgment of God to illustrate his glory by their damnation.* I will end this with that speech of *Piscator*, (*o*) *Reprobates are precisely appointed to this double evil, to be punished everlastingly, and to sin; and therefore to sin, that they might be justly punished.*

(*a*) *Calv. l. 3. Instit. cap. 24. sect. 14.* Inscrutabili Dei judicio suscitati sunt ad gloriam ejus suâ damnatione illustrandum.

(*o*) *Pisc resp. ad dupl. Vost part. 1. pag. 220.* Reprobi ad utrumque hoc malum à Deo præcise destinati sunt, ut in æternum puniantur, & necessario peccent, & quidem ideò peccent, quo justè puniri possint.

4. That as he hath immutably decreed that Reprobates shall live and die in sin; so he procures their sins in due time by his Almighty hand, partly by withdrawing from them Grace necessary for the avoiding of sin, and partly by moving and inclining them by his irresistible and secret workings on their hearts, to sinful actions. (*p*) *Calvin* saith, that Devils and reprobate men are not onely held fast in Gods fetters, so as they cannot do what they would, but are also urged and forced by Gods bridle [*ad obsequia præstanda*] *to do*

(*p*) *Calv Inst. l. 1. c. 17. sect. 11.*

as he would have them. And in the next Chapter theſe are his words, (q) *that men have nothing in agitation, that they bring nothing into action, but what God by his ſecret direction hath ordered, is apparent by many and clear teſtimonies.* In the Section following he ſaith, (r) And *ſurely unleſs God did work inwardly in the minds of men, 'twould not be rightly ſaid, that he taketh away wiſdom from the wiſe, &c.* In thoſe two chapters that which he mainly driveth at, is to ſhew, that God doth not onely behave himſelf privatively in procuring the ſins of men, but doth alſo put forth powerful and poſitive acts in the bringing of them to paſs. And in his ſecond Book and fourth Chapter, after he had ſaid, that God may be ſaid to harden men by forſaking them, he putteth in another way by which God hardneth men, and that (he ſaith) cometh a great deal nearer to the propriety of the Scripture phraſes; namely, by ſtirring up their wills: (s) God doth not onely harden men by leaving them to themſelves, but *by appointing their counſels, ordering their*

(q) Ib. cap. 18. ſect. 1. Quod nihil efficiant homines niſi arcano Dei nutu, nec quicquam deliberando agitent, niſi quod ipſe jam apud ſe decreverit, & arcanâ ſuâ directione conſtituat; innumeris & claris teſtimoniis probatur.

(r) Ib. ſect. 2. Et certe niſi intus operaretur in mentibus hominum, non rectè dictum eſſet, auferre labium à veracibus, & à ſenibus prudentiam, &c.

(s) Inſtit. l. 2. c. 4. ſect. 3. ad exequenda ſua judicia per miniſtrum iræ ſuæ Satanam, & conſilia eorum deſtinat quo viſum eſt, & voluntates excitat, & conatus firmat.

deli-

deliberations, stirring up their wills, confirming their purposes and endeavours by the Minister of his anger, Satan. And this he proveth by the work of God on *Sihon* king of the Amorites, *Deut.*2.30. and then insinuateth the end too, why God thus hardens men in their wicked courses, which is, that he might *destroy them,* (t) *because God intended his ruine, he prepared him for it by his induration.*

(t) Quia perditum Deus volebat, obstinatio cordis divina fuit ad ruinam præparatio.

The sum of all these propositions is this; God, who from all eternity appointed many miserable men to endless and unavoidable torments, decreed for the bringing about of their intended ruine, that they should without remedy live and dye in a state of sin: and what he thus decreed from everlasting, he doth most powerfully effect in time, so governing, over-ruling, and working upon the wills of those Reprobates, that they have no liberty or ability at all in the issue, of avoiding their sins, but must of necessity commit them.

Thus they teach: and therefore by just consequence they make God the author of sin; as it will plainly appear by these following considerations.

1. It is ordinary to impute sin to those

those, who have not so great a hand in the production of it, as hath the Almighty by the grounds of this opinion. For,

(1) The devil is called a *father of lies*, *Joh.*8.44. and by the like reason of all other sins; and therefore *he that committeth sin*, is said *to be of the devil*, and to be a child of the devil, 1 *John* 3. 8, 10. and sin is called *a work of the devil*, *which the Son of God appeared to loose*, vers.8. And why is the Devil so called, but because he doth egge and allure men by inward suggestions and outward temptations to fall into sin, this is all he doth or can do. But God doth much more, if he necessitate, and by his decree first, and next by his powerful and secret working in the Souls of men, determine their wills irresistibly to sin, For to determine, is infinitely more than barely to perswade; for as much as sin must needs follow the determination, but not the perswasion of the Will. God is therefore a truer cause of sin (by this Doctrine) than the Devil.

(2) Wicked men are esteemed authors of their own offences; because they plot, purpose, choose and commit them,

them, and are immediate agents in the acting of them.

But God (by this opinion) doth more, for he over-ruleth the projects and purpoſes of wicked men, and by an uncontrollable motion proceeding from an immutable decree, carrieth all their deliberations, reſolutions choiſes and actions preciſely that very way, ſo as they cannot chuſe but do as they do, whatſoever they may think to the contrary. They have indeed [*potentiam in ſe liberam*] *a power in it ſelf free*, to chooſe what they refuſe, or to refuſe what they chooſe, to determine themſelves this way or that way, as liketh them beſt, but they have not [*liberum uſum*] *a free uſe* of this their power. God doth determine their will, before it hath determined it ſelf; and maketh them do thoſe onely actions which his omnipotent will hath determined, and not which their wills out of any abſolute dominion over their own actions, have preſcribed. More rightly therefore may God be called the Author of thoſe offences; for (*u*) deeds whether good or bad, are owned more truly by him that over-ruleth them, than by

(*u*) Opera magis pertinent ad imperantem, quam ad exequentem.

by the servile instruments that only execute and do them.

3. Wicked Counsellers, and they who allure and advise men to sin, are accounted by God and men to be the causes of those sins to which they are the perswaders; and have been punished for those misdeeds, which others through their instigations have committed: *Jezabel*, *Ahabs* wife, was reputed and punished as the murderer of *Naboth*, because she counselled and contrived the doing of it, as we may see 1 *Kin.* 21.23,25. But what is counselling to inforcing? Evil counsels may be refused, but an Almighty power cannot be resisted: God therefore that useth this, (according to their doctrine) in the production of sins, is much more an Author of them, than he that onely useth the other.

2. If we could find out a King that should so carry himself in procuring the ruine and the offences of any subject, as (by this opinion) God doth in the effecting of the damnation and transgressions of Reprobates, we would all charge him with the ruine and sins of those his Subjects. (w) *Who would not ab-*

(w) *Molin. Anat. c. 12. de praedest. p. 73. Quis non regem abominetur sic loquentem.*

abhor (ſaith *Moulin*) *a King ſpeaking thus*; (x) *I will have this man hang'd, and that I may hang him juſtly, I will have him murther or ſteal?* This King (ſaith he) ſhould not onely make an innocent man miſerable, [*ſed & ſceleratum*] *but wicked too*, and ſhould puniſh him for that offence [*cujus ipſe cauſa eſſet*] of which himſelf is the cauſe. It is a clear caſe. (y) *Tyberius* (as *Suetonius* reports) having a purpoſe to put certain Virgins to death, becauſe it was not *lawful* among the Romans *to ſtrangle Virgins*, cauſed them all to be *deflowred by the Hangman*, that ſo they might be ſtrangled. Who will not ſay, that *Tiberius* was the principal author of the *deflouring* of thoſe maids? In like manner (ſay the *Supralapſarians*) God hath a purpoſe of putting great ſtore of men to the ſecond death; but becauſe it is not lawful for him by reaſon of his juſtice to put to death men innocent and without blame, he hath decreed that the Devil ſhall deflour them, that afterward he may damn them. It followeth therefore, that God is the main cauſe of thoſe their ſins.

(x) Ego hunc hominem addico ſuſpendio, ſed ut juſtè ſuſpendatur, volo patret homicidium vel peculatum.

(y) *Sueton. vit. Tib. cap.* 61.

3. That God is the Author of mens ſal-

salvation and conversion, all sides grant: and yet he doth no more in the procuring of them, than these men report him to do in the Reprobates impenitency and damnation. The salvation and conversion of the Elect (say they) he hath *absolutely* and *antecedently*, without the foresight of any deservings of theirs, resolved upon, and by irresistible means in their several Generations draweth them to believe, repent, and endure to the end, that so they might be saved and his absolute Decree accomplished. On the other side, the damnation, the sins, and the final impenitency of Reprobates, he hath of his alone will and pleasure *peremptorily* decreed; this his Decree he executeth in time, drawing them on by his unconquerable Power and Providence from sin to sin, till they have made up their measure, and in the end have inflicted on them that eternal vengeance which he had provided for them. What difference is here in the course which God taketh for the conversion and salvation of the Elect, and the obduration and damnation of Reprobates? And therefore what hindereth, but that God (by

their

their grounds, may as truly be ſtiled the prime cauſe and author of the ſins of the one, as of the Converſion of the other.

The Fathers thought it a plain caſe, and therefore they did generally make ſin an object of preſcience, not predeſtination, and bent the moſt of thoſe arguments by which they refuted this foul aſſertion againſt an abſolute, irreſiſtible, and neceſſitating decree, as I could eaſily ſhew, but that I fear to be overlong. Onely I will cite ſome few of thoſe Authors words whom the Learned and Reverend Biſhop hath alledged in favour and for the defence of the *Predeſtinarians* and the maintainers of *Gotteſchalkes* opinion.

The Church of *Lions* in their anſwer to the poſitions of *Johannes Scotus* which he framed againſt *Gotteſchalk*, hath theſe words (z) *Whoſoever ſaith, that God hath laid a conſtraint or a neceſſity of ſinning upon any man, he doth manifeſtly and fearfully blaſpheme God, inaſmuch as he maketh him* by affirming that of him, *to be the very Author of ſin.* *Remigius* Archbiſhop of that Church, explaining his Churches opinion in the

(z) *Biſh. uſher his Hiſt. of Gotteſc. p* 138. Quivim & neceſſitatem peccandi Deum in uliſſe homini vel inferre dicit, manifeſte horribiliter in Deum blaſphemat, quem ad peccata compellendo utiq; authorem peccati eſſe confirmat.

point of preſcience and predeſtination in ſeven ſeveral Rules; in the fifth of thoſe Rules he hath theſe words to the ſame purpoſe. God (ſaith he:) by his preſcience and predeſtination hath laid a neceſſity of being wicked upon no man; (a) *For if he had done this, he ſhould have been the Author of ſins.*

(a) *Id ib. p.* 173 Hoc enim ſi teciſſet, ipſe utiq; eſſet author malorum, &c.

And thus (in my judgment) doth it plainly appear that by abſolute Reprobation, as it is taught the upper way, God is made to be the true cauſe of mens ſins.

Many diſtinctions are brought to free the *Supralapſarian* way from this crimination: all which (methinks) are no better than meer deluſions of the ſimple and inconſiderate, and give no true ſatisfaction to to the underſtanding.

Diſtinction 1.

There is (ſay they) a twofold decree:

1. An *Operative*, by which God poſitively & efficaciouſly worketh a thing.

2. A *Permiſſive*, by which he decreeth onely to let it come to paſs. If God ſhould work ſin by an *operative* decree, then he ſhould be the author of ſin; but not if he decree by a *permiſſive* decree, to let it come to paſs. And this onely they ſay they maintain.

It

It is true, that God hath decreed to suffer sin: for otherwise there would be none. Who can bring forth that which God will absolutely hinder? He suffered *Adam* to sin, leaving him in the hand of his own counsel, *Eccles.* 15.14. he suffered the nations in times past to walk in their own ways, and daily doth he suffer both good and bad to fall into many sins. And this he doth, not because he stands in need of sin for the setting forth of his glory; for he hath no need of the sinful man: *Ecclus.* 15. but partly because he is [*summus provisor*] supreme Moderator of the world, and knoweth how to use that well, which is ill done, and to bring good out of evil: and especially for that reason which *Tertullian* presseth, namely, because man is made by Gods own gracious constitution, a free creature, undetermined in his actions, till he determine himself: and therefore may not be hindred from sinning by omnipotency, because God useth not to repeal his own ordinances.

Answ. 1.

Act. 14.16.

Tertul. l. 1. *contr. Marcion.*

2. It is true also, that a *permissive* decree is no cause of sin, because it is meerly extrinsecal to the sinner, and

hath no influence at all upon the sin: it is an antecedent onely, and such a one too, as being put, sin followeth not of necessity. And therefore it is fitly contradistinguish'd to an *operative* decree. And if that side would in good earnest impute no more in sinful events to the divine power, than the word [*Permission*] imports, their main Conclusion would fall, and the controversie between us end. But,

(1) Many of them reject this distinction utterly, and will have God to decree sin [*efficaciter*] with an energetical and working will. Witness that discourse of *Beza*, wherein he averreth and labour-reth to prove, that God doth not onely permit sin, but will it also: and witness *Calvin* too, who hath a whole Section against it: calling it a carnal distinction invented by the flesh, and [*effugium*] a meer evasion to shift off this seeming absurdity, that that man is made blind [*volente & jubente Deo*] *by Gods will and commandment*, who must shortly after be punished for his blindness: he calleth it also [*figmentum*] a *fiction*, and saith they do [*inepire*] *play the fools that use it.*

Colloq. Mompel. 2 par. p. 177.

Calv. Instit. l. 4. c. 18. Sect. 1. & 2.

By

By many reaſons alſo doth he endeavour to lay open the weakneſs of it, taxing thoſe who underſtand ſuch Scriptures as ſpeak of Gods ſmiting men with a *ſpirit of ſlumber* and giddineſs, of blinding their minds, infatuating and hardening their hearts, &c. of a permiſſion and ſuffering of men to be blinded and hardened, (b) [*Nimis frivola eſt iſta ſolutio*] ſaith he, *is too frivolous a gloſs.* In another place he blameth thoſe that refer ſin to Gods preſcience onely, calling their ſpeeches [*argutiæ*] *tricks and quirks*, which Scripture will not bear: and thoſe likewiſe that aſcribe it to Gods permiſſion: and ſaith, (c) *What they bring touching the Divine permiſſion* in this buſineſs, *will not hold water.*

(b) *Id. ib. l. 2. c. 4. ſect. 3.*

(c) Similiter quod de permiſſione affe-runt, dilutius eſt quam ut ſubſiſtat.

(2) They that admit the word (*Permiſſive*) do willingly miſtake it, and while (to keep off this blow) they uſe the word, they corrupt the meaning. For,

1. *Permiſſion* is an act of Gods conſequent and judiciary will, by which he puniſheth men for abuſing their freedom, and committing ſuch ſins day by day, as they might have avoided,

hath no influence at all upon the sin: it is an antecedent onely, and such a one too, as being put, sin followeth not of necessity. And therefore it is fitly contradistinguish'd to an *operative* decree. And if that side would in good earnest impute no more in sinful events to the divine power, than the word [*Permission*] imports, their main Conclusion would fall, and the controversie between us end. But,

(1) Many of them reject this distinction utterly, and will have God to decree sin [*efficaciter*] with an energetical and working will. Witness that discourse of *Beza*, wherein he averreth and laboureth to prove, that God doth not onely permit sin, but will it also: and witness *Calvin* too, who hath a whole Section against it: calling it a carnal distinction invented by the flesh, and [*effugium*] a meer evasion to shift off this seeming absurdity, that that man is made blind [*volente & jubente Deo*] *by Gods will and commandment*, who must shortly after be punished for his blindness: he calleth it also [*figmentum*] a *fiction*, and saith they do [*inepire*] *play the fools that use it.*

Colloq. Mompel. 2 par. p. 177.

Calv. Instit. l. 4. c. 18. Sect. 1. & 2.

By

By many reaſons alſo doth he endeavour to lay open the weakneſs of it, taxing thoſe who underſtand ſuch Scriptures as ſpeak of Gods ſmiting men with a *ſpirit of ſlumber* and giddineſs, of blinding their minds, infatuating and hardening their hearts, &c. of a permiſſion and ſuffering of men to be blinded and hardened, (b) [*Nimis frivola eſt iſta ſolutio*] ſaith he, *is too frivolous a gloſs.* In another place he blameth thoſe that refer ſin to Gods preſcience onely, calling their ſpeeches [*argutiæ*] *tricks and quirks*, which Scripture will not bear: and thoſe likewiſe that aſcribe it to Gods permiſſion: and ſaith, (c) *What they bring touching the Divine permiſſion* in this buſineſs, *will not hold water.*

(b) *Id. ib. l.2. c.4. ſect.3.*

(c) Similiter quod de permiſſione afferunt, dilutius eſt quam ut ſubſiſtat.

(2) They that admit the word (*Permiſſive*) do willingly miſtake it, and while (to keep off this blow) they uſe the word, they corrupt the meaning. For,

1. *Permiſſion* is an act of Gods conſequent and judiciary will, by which he puniſheth men for abuſing their freedom, and committing ſuch ſins day by day, as they might have avoided,

and to which he proceedeth [*lento gradu*] slowly and unwillingly, as we may see, *Psal.* 81. 11, 12, Israel would none of me: so I gave them up, &c. *Ezek.* 18. 39, Go and serve every one his Idol; seeing ye will not obey me, &c. *Rom.* 1. 21, 24, *Because when they knew God, they glorified him not as God: therefore God gave them up to their hearts lust, to vile affections, and to a Reprobate mind, Rev.* 22. 11. *He which is unjust, let him be unjust still.* In these places and many more, we may see that persons left to themselves are sinners onely; and not all sinners, but the obstinate and wilful, which will by no means be reclaimed. But the permission which they mean, is an act of Gods antecedent will, exercised about innocent men, lying under no guilt at all in Gods eternal consideration.

2. *Permission*, about whomsoever it is exercised, obstinate sinners, or men considered without sin, is no more than a not hindring of them from falling, that are able to stand, and supposeth a possibility of sinning, or not sinning, in the parties permitted: but with them it is a withdrawing or with-holding of grace

need-

needful for the avoiding of sin, and so includeth an absolute necessity of sinning: for from the withdrawing of such grace sin must needs follow; as the fall of *Dagons* house followed *Sampsons* plucking away the Pillars that were necessary for the upholding of it. *Maccovius* in two disputations, expounding this word (Permission) circumscribes it within two acts: the first of which, is a *subtraction* of divine assistance necessary to the preventing of sin: and having proved it by two arguments, that none may think he is alone in this, he saith, that he is compassed about with a cloud of witnesses, and produceth two. The first of them is our Reverend and Learned *Whitaker*, some of whose words alledged by him are these. (*d*) *Permission of sin, is a privation of that aid, which being present, sin would have been hindred.* The second is *Pareus*, for saying that (*e*) *that help* (which God withdrew from *Adam*) *being withdrawn, Adam could not so use his endowments as to persevere.* And this doctrine (saith he) is defended by our men, as it appeareth out of *Pareus lib. de gratia primi hominis, cap.4. p.46.*

Maccov coll. theol disp.9. p.10.

(*d*) Pag.15. Permissio peccati est privatio auxilii divini, quo posito peccatum impediretur.

(*e*) Subtracto auxilio Dei, homo (Adamus) istis facultatibus ad standum bonè uti non potuit.

Their permission therefore of sin being a subtraction of necessary grace, is equivalent to an actual, effectual procuring and working of it. For [*causa deficiens in necessariis est efficiens*] *a deficient cause in things necessary, is truly efficient*) and so is but a meer fig-leaf to cover the foulness of their opinion.

Distinction 2. There are two things (they say) in every ill act,———

1. The *material* part, which is the substance of the action.

2. The *formal* part, which is the evil or obliquity of it. God is the Author of the action it self, but not of the obliquity and evil that cleaveth to it; as he that causeth a lame Horse to go, is the cause of his going, but not of his lame going. And therefore it followeth not from their opinion, that God is the Author of sin.

Answ. 1, 1. All sins receive not this distinction; because of many sins the acts themselves are sinful, as of the eating of the forbidden Fruit, and *Sauls* sparing of *Agag*, and the fat beasts of the *Amalekites*.

2. It is not true that they make the decree of God onely of actions and not

of their aberrations: for they make it to be the cause of all those means that lead to damnation, and therefore of sinful actions as sinful, and not as bare actions. For actions deserve damnation, not as actions, but as transgressions of Gods law.

3. To the *Simile* I say, that the rider or master that shall resolve first to flea his Horse, or knock him on the head, and then to make him lame, that for his halting he may kill him, is undoubtedly the cause of his halting; and so if God determine to cast men into Hell, and then to bring them into a state of sin, that for their sins he may bring them to ruine, we cannot conceive him to be less than the Author as well of their sins, as of those actions to which they do inseparably adhere, and that out of Gods intention to destroy them.

The will is determined to an Object two ways: *Distinct.* 3.

1. By *Compulsion*, against the bent and inclination of it.

2. By *necessity*, according to the natural desire and liking of it.

Gods predestination (say they) determineth the Will to sin this last way, but not the first: It forceth no man to

do

do that which he would not, but carryeth him towards that which he would: when men sin, it is true they cannot choose, and it is as true they will not chuse. It followeth not therefore from the grounds of their doctrine, that Gods decree is the cause of mens sins, but their own wicked wills.

Answ. 1. The Ancients made no distinction between these two words [*Necessity*] and [*Compulsion*] but used them in this argument promiscuously: and did deny that God did necessitate men to sin, lest they should grant him hereby to be the Author of sin, as I have touched before, and shall intimate again afterward.

Nor did the Schoolmen put any difference between them, as may appear by the Testimony of Mr. *Calvin*, who speaking of the School-distinction of the Wills threefold Liberty, from *Necessity*, from *Sin*, from *Misery*, saith, *This Distinction I could willingly receive, but that it confoundeth Necessity with coaction.*

Calv. Instit. l. 2. c. 2. sect. 5.

2. That which necessitateth the Will to sin, is as truely the cause of sin, as that which forceth it; because it maketh the sin to be inevitably committed,

ted, which otherwiſe might be avoided; and therefore if the divine decree neceſſitate mans will to ſin, it is as truly the cauſe of the ſin as if it did inforce it.

3. That which neceſſitateth the Will to ſin, is more truly the cauſe of the ſin, than the Will is; becauſe it over-ruleth the Will, and beareth all the ſtroke, taketh from it its true liberty by which it ſhould be Lord of it ſelf, and diſpoſer of its own acts, and in reſpect of which it hath been uſually called by Philoſophers and Fathers too, [αὐτεξούσιον, αὐτοδέσποτον, ἀδέσποτον] *a power which is under the inſuperable check and controul of no Lord but it ſelf.* It over-ruleth (I ſay) and maketh it become a ſervile inſtrument, irreſiſtibly ſubject to ſuperiour command and determination: and therefore is a truer cauſe of all ſuch acts and ſins as proceed from the Will ſo determined, than the Will is. For when two cauſes concur to the producing of an effect, the one a principal over-ruling cauſe, the other but inſtrumental, and wholly at the devotion of the principal; then is the effect, in all reaſon, to be imputed to the prin-

principal, which by the force of its influx and impression produceth it, rather than to the subordinate and instrumental, which is but a meer servant in the production of it. We shall find it ordinary in Scripture, to ascribe the *effect* to the principal Agent. *It is not ye that speak* (saith CHRIST) *but the Spirit of my Father that speaketh in you*, Matth. 10.20. *I laboured more abundantly than they all, yet not I, but the grace of God which was in me*, 1 Cor. 15.10. And, *I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me*, saith St. *Paul*, *Gal.* 2.20.

In these and many other places, the *effect*, or work spoken of, is taken from the Instrument, and given to the principal Agent. Which being so, though mans Will work with Gods Decree in the commission of sin, and willeth the sin which it doth, yet seeing what the Will doth, it doth by the commanding power of Gods almighty Decree, and so it doth, that otherwise it cannot do; the sin committed cannot so rightly be ascribed to mans Will, the inferiour, as to Gods necessitating Decree, the superiour cause.

4. That which maketh a man sin

by

by way of neceſſity onely, that is with and not againſt his will, is the cauſe of his ſin in a worſe manner than that which conſtraineth him to ſin againſt his will; as he which by powerful perſwaſions draweth a man to ſtab, or hang, or poyſon himſelf, is in a groſſer manner the cauſe of that evil and unnatural action, then he that by force compelleth him, becauſe he maketh him to conſent to his own Death. And ſo, if GOD's Decree do not onely make men ſin, but ſin willingly too; not onely cauſe that they ſhall [*malè agere*] *do evil*, but [*malè velle*] *will evil*; it hath the deeper hand in the ſin.

3. Sin may be conſidered as ſin, or as means of declaring Gods juſtice in mens puniſhments: God doth not predeſtinate men to ſin, as it is ſin, but as a means of their puniſhment. He is not therefore (ſay they) the Author of Sin. *Diſtinct.* 4.

4. A good *end* cannot moralize a bad *action*; it remaineth evil, though the end be never ſo good: [*bonum ordiur ex integris*] end, manner, yea, and matter too muſt be good, or elſe the *action* is naught. *Anſw.* 4.

naught. He that shall steal, that he may give an alms, or commit adultery, that he may beget Children for the Church, or oppress the poor to teach them patience, or kill a wicked man that he may do no more hurt with his example, or do any forbidden thing; though his end be never so good, he sinneth notwithstanding, and the reason is, because the evil of sin is greater than any good that can come by sin, for as much as it is [*læsio divinæ majestatis*] a wronging of Gods Majesty, and so [*divino bono opposita*] directly prejudicial to the good of almighty God, as much as any thing can be. This S. *Paul* knew very well, & therefore he telleth us plainly, that *we must not do evil that good may come of it*, Rom. 3. 8. Whosoever therefore willeth a sin, though for never so good an end, he willeth that which is truly and formally a sin: and consequently God, though he will sin for ends never so good, yet willing it with such a powerful and effectual will as giveth a necessary being to it, he becometh Author of that which is formally sin.

2. The members of this distinction are not opposite: for Sin as Sin, and

in

in no other consideration, is a means of punishment. If God therefore willeth it as a means of punishment, he willeth it as a Sin; his decree is terminated at the very formality of it.

3. This distinction fastneth upon God a further aspersion, and loadeth him with three special indignities more.

(1) *Want* of *Wisdom* and Providence. His Counsels must needs be weak, if he can find out no means to glorifie justice, but by the bringing in of sin, which his Soul hateth, into the world, and appointing men to commit it, that so he may manifest his justice in the punishment of it.

(2) Want of *sincerity* and plain dealing with men.

Tiberius (as *Suetonius* reporteth) having a purpose to put the two Sons of *Germanicus* (*Drusus* and *Nero*) to death, (f) used sundry cunning Contrivances to draw them to revile him, that reviling him they might be put to death: and herein is justly censured for great Hypocrisie. And so, if God having appointed men by his absolute will to inevitable perdition, do decree that they shall sin, that so they may be damned.

(f) *Suetonius in vit. Tib. cap.* 54. Variâ fraude induxit ut concitarentur ad convitia, & concitati perderentur.

naught. He that shall steal, that he may give an alms, or commit adultery, that he may beget Children for the Church, or oppress the poor to teach them patience, or kill a wicked man that he may do no more hurt with his example, or do any forbidden thing; though his end be never so good, he sinneth notwithstanding, and the reason is, because the evil of sin is greater than any good that can come by sin, for as much as it is [*læsio divinæ majestatis*] a wronging of Gods Majesty, and so [*divino bono oppositæ*] directly prejudicial to the good of almighty God, as much as any thing can be. This S. *Paul* knew very well, & therefore he telleth us plainly, that *we must not do evil that good may come of it*, Rom. 3. 8. Whosoever therefore willeth a sin, though for never so good an end, he willeth that which is truly and formally a sin: and consequently God, though he will sin for ends never so good, yet willing it with such a powerful and effectual will as giveth a necessary being to it, he becometh Author of that which is formally sin.

2. The members of this distinction are not opposite: for Sin as Sin, and

in

in no other consideration, is a means of punishment. If God therefore willeth it as a means of punishment, he willeth it as a Sin; his decree is terminated at the very formality of it.

3. This distinction fastneth upon God a further aspersion, and loadeth him with three special indignities more.

(1) *Want* of *Wisdom* and Providence. His Counsels must needs be weak, if he can find out no means to glorifie justice, but by the bringing in of sin, which his Soul hateth, into the world, and appointing men to commit it, that so he may manifest his justice in the punishment of it.

(2) Want of *sincerity* and plain dealing with men.

Tiberius (as *Suetonius* reporteth) having a purpose to put the two Sons of *Germanicus* (*Drusus* and *Nero*) to death, (f) used sundry cunning Contrivances to draw them to revile him, that reviling him they might be put to death: and herein is justly censured for great Hypocrisie. And so, if God having appointed men by his absolute will to inevitable perdition, do decree that they shall sin, that so they may be damned.

(f) *Suetonius in vit. Tib. cap. 54.* Variâ fraude induxit ut concitarentur ad convitia, & concitati perderentur.

naught. He that shall steal, that he may give an alms, or commit adultery, that he may beget Children for the Church, or oppress the poor to teach them patience, or kill a wicked man that he may do no more hurt with his example, or do any forbidden thing; though his end be never so good, he sinneth notwithstanding, and the reason is, because the evil of sin is greater than any good that can come by sin, for as much as it is [*læsio divinæ majestatis*] a wronging of Gods Majesty, and so [*divino bono oppositæ*] directly prejudicial to the good of almighty God, as much as any thing can be. This S. *Paul* knew very well, & therefore he telleth us plainly, that *we must not do evil that good may come of it*, Rom. 3. 8. Whosoever therefore willeth a sin, though for never so good an end, he willeth that which is truly and formally a sin: and consequently God, though he will sin for ends never so good, yet willing it with such a powerful and effectual will as giveth a necessary being to it, he becometh Author of that which is formally sin.

2. The members of this distinction are not opposite: for Sin as Sin, and

in

in no other consideration, is a means of punishment. If God therefore willeth it as a means of punishment, he willeth it as a Sin; his decree is terminated at the very formality of it.

3. This distinction fastneth upon God a further aspersion, and loadeth him with three special indignities more.

(1) *Want* of *Wisdom* and Providence. His Counsels must needs be weak, if he can find out no means to glorifie justice, but by the bringing in of sin, which his Soul hateth, into the world, and appointing men to commit it, that so he may manifest his justice in the punishment of it.

(2) Want of *sincerity* and plain dealing with men.

Tiberius (as *Suetonius* reporteth) having a purpose to put the two Sons of *Germanicus* (*Drusus* and *Nero*) to death, (*f*) used sundry cunning Contrivances to draw them to revile him, that reviling him they might be put to death: and herein is justly censured for great Hypocrisie. And so, if God having appointed men by his absolute will to inevitable perdition, do decree that they shall sin, that so they may be damned.

(*f*) *Suetonius in vit. Tib. cap.* 54. Variâ fraude induxit ut concitarentur ad convitia, & concitati perderentur.

ned for those sins which he decreeth and draweth them into; he dissembleth, because he slaughtereth them under a pretext of justice; for sin, but yet for such sins onely as he hath by his eternal counsel appointed as the means of their ruine.

(3) Want of *mercy* in a high degree; as if he did so delight in blood, that rather than he will not destroy mens souls, he will have them live and die in sin, that he may destroy them; like to those Pagan Princes, of whom *Ju. Mart. Apol. 2.* two or three leaves from the beginning, saith, (g) *They are afraid that all should be just, lest they should have none to punish: But this is the disposition of hangmen, rather than of good Princes.* And therefore far be these foul enormities, and in particular this later, from the God of truth and father of mercies.

(g) Videmini vereri nè omnes colant justitiam, atq, ita desint in quos animadvertatis. Verùm hæc cura fuit magis carnificum quam bonorum principum.

And thus notwithstanding these distinctions, it is (in my conceit) most evident, that the rigid and upper way maketh God the Author of mens sins as well as punishments. And so much for the first general Inconvenience, which ariseth from this opinion, namely, the dishonour of God.

The

THe ſecond Inconvenience is, the overthrow of true Religion, and good Government among men.

To this, this opinion ſeemeth to tend, for theſe Reaſons.

1. Becauſe it maketh Sin to be no Sin indeed, but onely in opinion. We uſe to ſay, *Neceſsity hath no law:* creatures or actions in which neceſſity beareth ſway, are without law. Lions are not forbidden to prey, birds to fly, fiſhes to ſwim, or any bruit creatures to do according to their kinds, becauſe their actions are natural and neceſſary: they cannot upon any admonition do otherwiſe. Among creatures indued with reaſon and liberty, laws are given to none but ſuch as can uſe their principles of reaſon and freedom: fools, mad-men, & children, are ſubject to no law, becauſe they have no liberty. To men that can uſe their liberty, laws are not given neither, but in thoſe actions which are voluntary. No man is forbidden to be hungry, thirſty, weary, ſleepy, to weep, to laugh, to love, or to hate, becauſe theſe actions and affections are natural and neceſſary: the will may govern them, but it cannot ſuppreſs them.

And ſo if to deal juſtly, to exerciſe charity, *&c.* with their contraries, be abſolutely and antecedently neceſſary too, whether this neceſſity flow from a Principle within, or a Mover without, we are as lawleſs in theſe as in the other.

Now if Neceſſity have no law, then actions in themſelves evil, if under the dominion of abſolute neceſſity, are tranſgreſſions of no law, and conſequently no ſins: For, *Sin is a tranſgreſſion of the Law*, 1 John 3.4.

This that I ſay, hath been ſaid long ago. For *Juſtin Martyr* ſpeaking againſt deſtiny, hath theſe words; (*b*) *If it be by deſtiny* (that is, by abſolute neceſſity, for that the Fathers do generally call by the name of deſtiny) *that men are good or bad, they are indeed neither good nor bad.* A ſpeech like to this he hath a little after; (*i*) *It would ſeem*, if this be ſo, *that virtue and vice are nothing; but things are judged to be good or evil by opinion only, which, as good reaſon teacheth, is very great injuſtice and impiety.* And ſurely well might he ſay ſo: for to what purpoſe was the Son of God made man, and being man, made a ſacrifice for ſin? why was the miniſtery of the Word and Sacraments

(*b*) *Juſt. Mart. Apol.* 2. *a little beyond the middle* Si fato fieret ut eſſet aut improbus aut bonus, nec alii quidem probi eſſent nec alii mali.

(*i*) Videretur verum eſſe nihil eſſe virtutem nec vitium, ſed opinione ſolùm bona & mala judicari: quæ, ut vera ratio docet, eſt maxima impietas & injuſtitia.

craments ordained? To what end are Heaven and Hell propounded? Why are Exhortations, Diſſwaſions, or any other means to hinder men from ſin applied, if ſin be nothing but a meer Opinion?

CHRIST, The Chriſtian Faith, the Word and Sacraments, and whatſoever according to the Scripture, hath been done for the applying of the pardon of ſin, are all but meer Fables, nay very Impoſtures, if ſin be nothing. And by conſequence it is no matter at all, whether men be Chriſtians, Jews, Turks, or Pagans, of what Religion, or whether of any Religion at all. Now whither tendeth this, but to the overthrow of Religion?

2. Becauſe it taketh away the conſcience of ſin.

Why ſhould men be afraid of any ſin that pleaſeth or may profit them, if they muſt needs ſin? Or what reaſon have they to weep and mourn when they have ſinned, ſeeing they have not ſinned truly, becauſe they ſinned neceſſarily?

The Tragedian ſaith, (*k*) when a man ſinneth, *his deſtiny muſt bear the blame, Neceſſity freeth him from all iniqui-*

(*k*) Fati iſta culpa eſt, nemo fit fato nocens.

17. Sins are either the faults of that *irreſiſtible decree* that cauſeth them, or no faults at all. If either, then ſorrow, fear, or any other act of Repentance whatſoevet, may as well be ſpared as ſpent. This conceit being once drunk in, Religion cannot long continue; for the affections have been the ſtrongeſt Planters and are the ſureſt upholders of it in the world. *Primus in orbe deos fecit timor.*

3. Becauſe it taketh away the deſert and guilt of ſin.

Offences, if fatal, cannot be juſtly puniſhed. The reaſon is, becauſe thoſe deeds for which men are puniſhed or rewarded, muſt be their own, under their own power and ſoveraignty: but ſuch are no fatal actions or events. Neither temporally nor eternally can Sin be puniſhed, if it be abſolutely neceſſary.

(1) Not *temporally*, as God himſelf hath given us to underſtand by that law which he preſcribed the Jews, *Deut.* 22. 25. which was, That if a maid commit uncleanneſs by conſtraint, ſhe ſhould not be puniſhed. His reaſon was, becauſe *there was no cauſe of death in her*: what ſhe yielded to, was through compulſion, being over-born by power; as a man

man that is wounded to death by his neighbour, ſo was a Virgin in that Caſe, a *ſufferer* rather than a *doer*. This particular law is of univerſal right: no juſt puniſhment can be inflicted for ſin, where there is no power in the party to avoid it. The ſpeech of *Lypſius* is but a meer *crotchet* contrary to reaſon, [*Fatali culpæ fatalis pœna*] *Fatal faults muſt have fatal puniſhments*. Did Magiſtrates think mens offences unavoidable, they would think it bootleſs and unreaſonable to puniſh them. Nay, not onely ſo, but we ſee by daily experience, that Judges following the direction of reaſon, have very remiſly puniſhed ſuch faults as have been committed through the power of head-ſtrong and exorbitant paſſions. Yea, we may read of ſome, who have not thought it fit to puniſh ſuch faults at all. *Valerius Maximus* tel- *Val. Max. l.8. c. 1.*
leth, that *Popilius* a Roman Prætor, ſitting in judgment on a Woman who had in a bitter paſſion ſlain her Mother, becauſe ſhe had murthered her children; [*neque damnavit, neque abſolvit*] *neither cleared her nor condemned her*. And *Aulus Gellius* reporteth of *Dolabella* the *Gell. l 12.*
Proconſul of *Aſia*, that when a Woman

of *Smyrna* was brought before him, who had poyſoned her Husband and Son for murdering a ſon of hers which ſhe had by a former Husband; he turned her over to the *Areopagus* (which was the graveſt and moſt renowned Judgment-Seat in the World:) The Judges there not daring to acquit her being ſtained with a double ſlaughter, nor yet to puniſh her, being provoked with juſt grief; commanded the Accuſer and the Offender to come before them 100 years after. And ſo (*l*) *Neither was the womans fact juſtified, the Laws not allowing it, nor yet the woman puniſhed, becauſe ſhe was worthy to be pardoned.* If wiſe Magiſtrates have ſpared ſuch offenders as as have bin over-ſwayed with paſſions which did but incline, not determine them to their irregular actions, they would never have puniſhed any treſpaſſers, if they had thought them to be ſuch by invincible neceſſity. Or, if offenders did think that their Offences were their Deſtinies, and that when they murther, ſteal, commit adultery, make Inſurrections, Plot Treaſons, or practice any other outragious villanies; they doe them by the neceſſity of Gods un-

(*l*) Neq; abſolutum mulieris veneficium eſt quod per leges non licuit; neq; nocens damnata puniraq; quæ digna venia fuit.

al-

alterable decree, and can do no otherwiſe: they would (and might) complain of their puniſhments as unjuſt; as *Zenoes* ſervant did, when he was beaten by his Maſter for a fault, he told him out of his own grounds, that he was unjuſtly beaten; becauſe he was [*fato coactus peccare*] *conſtrained to make that fault by his undeclinable fate.*

The *Adrumetine* Monks, miſ-led by *S. Auſtin, Epiſt.* 105. *ad Sixtum Presbyterum* (which he calleth a Book, wherein he ſetteth down his Opinion concerning Gods Grace) did ſo teach Grace, that they denied Free-will. And this Saint *Auſtin* confuted in his Book *De gratia & lib. arb.* And thinking the grace of God (as St. *Auſtin* taught) to be ſuch, as could not ſtand with freedom of will, they thought that no man ſhould be puniſhed for his faults, but rather prayed for, that God would give them grace to do better. Againſt this, *S. Auſtin* directed his other Book, *De Cor. & grat.* In which diſcourſe, though it be grace that is ſtill named, yet Predeſtination is included. For as *Kimedoncius* ſaith truly in his Preface to *Luther, de ſervo arbiter.* Between *Grace and Predeſtination,* there

Kimed in præfat. ad Luth. de ſerv. arbit.

there is onely this difference (as St. *Aug.* teacheth, *l. de Prædeſt. Sanctorum c.* 10.) *that Predeſtination is a preparation of Grace, and Grace a beſtowing of Predeſtination.* As *Zenoes* ſervant and theſe Monks did, ſo would all men judge; did they conſiderately think that men could not chuſe but offend. And what would be the reſultance of ſuch a perſwaſion, but an innundation of the greateſt inſolencies, and a diſſolution of all good government.

2. Nor if this be true, can ſin be puniſhed *eternally*, or that tribunal be juſt, on which the ſentence of eternal fire ſhall be denounced againſt the wicked at the laſt day. To this, I have the Fathers bearing witneſs generally and plainly. *Tertullian* hath theſe words, (*m*) *The recompence of good or evil can with no juſtice be given to him who is good or evil, not freely, but of neceſſity.*

S. *Hierom* ſaith, (*n*) *Where neceſſity domineers, there is no place for retribution.* *Epiphanius* ſaith, (*o*) *The ſtars which impoſe upon men a neceſſity of ſinning, may be puniſhed with better juſtice then the men*

(*m*) *Tertul. lib. 2. contr. Marcion.* Cæterùm, nec boni nec mali merces jure penſaretur ei, qui aut bonus aut malus neceſſitate fuit inventus, non voluntate.

(*n*) Liberi arbitrii nos condidit Deus, nec ad virtutes nec ad vitia neceſſitate trahim. alioquin ubi neceſſitas eſt, nec damnatio, nec corona eſt.

(*o*) *Epip. adverſ. har. l. 1. hær. 5. num. 3.* Sanè quidem juſtùm à ſtellis quæ neceſſitatem pariunt, pœnæ repetantur, quam ab eo qui quod agit (ἀναγκαζόμενος) neceſſitate adactus agitur.

them-

themſelves. (p) *We place mens nativities under no fatal conſtellations* (ſaith Saint *Aug.*) *that we may free the will by which a man liveth either well or ill, from all bands of neceſsity, becauſe of the righteous judgment of God.* *Proſper* ſpeaking of the judgment of God, by which he decreed to render unto every man according to his works, ſaith, (q) *This judgment ſhould never be, if men did ſin by the will and determination of God.* *Fulgentius* alſo ſaith the ſame, (r) *It is great injuſtice in* God *to puniſh him whom he doth not find but make an offender.* This was *S. Bern.* opinion too, (s) *It is onely a will free from compulſion and neceſsity* (ſaith he) *which maketh a creature capable of reward and puniſhment.* Out of theſe teſtimonies laid together, may be collected three things:

(p) *Aug. l. 2. contr. Fauſt. c. 5.* Et nos quidem ſub fato ſtellarum nullius hominis geneſin ponimus, ut liberum arbitrium voluntatis, quo bene vel male vivitur, propter juſtum Dei judicium ab omni neceſſitatis vinculo vindicemus,

(q) *Proſp. ad Obj. 10. Vinc.* Quod judicium futurum omnino non eſſet, ſi homines Dei voluntate peccarent.

(r) *Fulgent. l. 1. ad Mon. cap. 22.* Nec juſtitia judicatur. Major quem ſtantem prædeſtinaſſe dicitur ad ruinam. (s) *Ber. l. de gra. & lib. arb. pag.* 908. Sola voluntas, quoniam pro ſui ingenita libertate aut diſſentire ſibi aut præter ſe in aliquo conſentire nulla vi, nulla cogitur neceſſitate, non immerito juſtam vel injuſtam, beatitudine ſeu miſeria dignam ac capacem creaturam conſtituit, prout ſcilicet juſtitiæ injuſtitiæve conſenſerit.

1. That the Ancients did uſe to call a *neceſſity* of humane actions good and bad by the name of *deſtiny*, from what external cauſe ſoever this neceſſity did ariſe.

2. That

2. That they did uſe theſe two words [*Neceſſity*] and [*Compulſion*] promiſcuouſly: and therefore that neceſſity as well as compulſion, did take away the wills liberty.

3. (Which is for our preſent purpoſe) that they believed and contended, that the judgments of God on ſinners could not be juſt, if they were held by the Adamantine chains of any abſolute neceſſity under the power of their ſins.

I will therefore conclude this argument with the words of *Epiphanius*, writing of the error of the Phariſees, who believed the immortality of the ſoul, and the reſurrection of the dead, and yet held that all things come to paſs by neceſſity. (t) *It is* (ſaith he) *a point of extreme ignorance or madneſs rather, for him that confeſſeth the reſurrection of the dead, and the great day appointed for the revelation of Gods righteous judgment, to ſay that there is any deſtiny*, any neceſſity in mens actions. *For how can the righteous judgment of God and deſtiny comply and ſtand together.*

And (let me adde) how can the belief of this and true piety ſtand together? For where this perſwaſion, that mens

ſins

(t) *Epiph. l. 1. adv. hæreſ. hær. 16. p. 35. num. 3.* Eſt illud vero extremæ cujuſdam imperitiæ, ne dicam amentiæ, cùm reſurrectionem mortuorum eſſe fateare, ac juſtiſſimum cujuſque facti judicium conſtitutum, fatum nihilominus eſſe unum, aſſerere. Quî enim duo iſta convenire poſſunt, judicium atque fatum?

ſins are neceſſary, and that therefore there can be no righteous judgment, is rooted in; Religion will quickly be rooted out.

4. It tendeth to Religions overthrow, becauſe it maketh the whole circle of a mans life, but a meer Deſtiny. By it all our doings are Gods Ordinances, all our imaginations branches of his predeſtination, and all events in Kingdoms and Commonweals the neceſſary iſſues of the Divine Decree. All things whatſoever, though they ſeem to do ſomewhat, yet (by this opinion) they do indeed juſt nothing: The beſt Laws reſtrain not one offender, the ſweeteſt Rewards promote not one Virtue, the powerfulleſt Sermons convert not one Sinner, the humbleſt Devotions divert not one Calamity, the ſtrongeſt Endeavours in things of any nature whatſoever, effect no more than would be done without them; but the neceſſitating, over-ruling Decree of God doth all. And if Laws do nothing, wherefore are they made? If Rules of Religion do nothing, why are they preſcribed? If the wills of men do nothing, why are men encouraged to one thing, ſcared

ſcared from another? And if good endeavours and onſets do nothing (being excited, continued, limited, controlled, and every way governed by an active, abſolute, and almighty decree) to what purpoſe are they uſed? who ſeeth not plainly whither theſe things tend? To nothing more than the ſubverſion of Piety and Policy, Religion and Laws, Society and Government. This did the Romans ſee full well: and therefore, they baniſhed [*Mathematicos*] *The Teachers and Abetters of Deſtiny*, out of Rome. Theſe and the like inconveniences which come from the upper way, did work ſo with *Proſper*, as that he calls him no Catholick who is of this opinion. (*u*) *Whoſoever ſaith, that men are urged to ſin and to be damned by the predeſtination of God, as by a fatal* (unavoidable) *neceſſity, he is no Catholick.*

They did alſo make the Arauſican Council denounce a curſe againſt ſuch. (*w*) *That any are predeſtinated by the divine power to ſin, we do not onely not believe, but with the greateſt deteſtation that we can, we denounce Anathema to ſuch* (*if there be any ſuch*) *as will believe ſo great an evil.*

(*u*) *Proſp. ad ca. Gall. ſent.* 1. Quiſquis ergo ex prædeſtinatione Dei, velut fatali neceſſitate, homines in peccata compulſos cogi dicit in mortem, non eſt Catholicus.

(*w*) *Concil. Araus.* 2. *Can.* 25. Aliquos ad malum divina poteſtate prædeſtinatos eſſe non ſolum non credimus, ſed etiã ſi qui ſint, qui tantum malum credere velint, cum omni deteſtatione illis Anathema dicimus.

Thus

Thus far of my reaſons againſt the upper, and moſt harſh and rigorous way.

THe Arguments by which for the preſent I ſtand convinced of the untruth, even of the milder and lower way too, I will take from

Theſe five following heads; namely, from

1. Pregnant *Teſtimonies* of Scripture, directly oppoſing it.
2. Some Principal *Attributes* of God, not compatible with it.
3. The *end of the Word* and Sacraments, with other excellent gifts of God to men, quite thwarted by it.
4. *Holy Endeavours* much hindred, if not wholly ſubverted by it.
5. *Grounds of Comfort* (by which the Conſcience in diſtreſs ſhould be relieved) which are all removed by it.

It is,
1. *Repugnant to Scripture.*

1. It is repugnant to plain and evident places of Scripture, even *in terminis*,

nis, as will appear by theſe inſtances.

Ezek. 33. 11. *As I live, ſaith the Lord, I have no pleaſure in the death of a ſinner, but that the wicked turn from his ways and live.*

And leſt men ſhould ſay, It is true, God willeth not the death of a repenting ſinner; the Lord in another place of the

Ezek. 18. 32. ſame Prophet, extendeth the propoſition to them alſo that periſh; —— *I have no pleaſure in the death of him that dieth.*

In this Scripture we may note three things:

1. Gods affection to men, ſet forth { *Negatively, I have no pleaſure in his death that dieth.* *Affirmatively, But that the wicked turn.*

2. The perſons in whoſe deſtruction God delighteth not: (*wicked* men) ſuch as for their rejecting of grace die and are damned. If God have no pleaſure in their death, much leſs in the death of men, either altogether innocent, or tainted onely with Original ſin.

3. The truth of his affection; *As I live*, [*Cupit credi ſibi*] *God would fain have us believe him* (ſaith *Tertullian*) when he ſaith, *I will not the death of him that dieth:* and therefore he bindeth his ſpeech with an Oath. (*x*) *Happy*

Tertul. lib de pœn. c. 4.
(*x*) O beatos nos, quorum cauſâ Deus jurat! O miſerrimos, ſi nec juranti domino credimus.

are

are we for whose ſake the Lord vouchſafeth to ſwear; but moſt unhappy, if we believe him not when he ſweareth.

Now if God delight not in the deſtruction of wicked men, certainly he never did out of his abſolute pleaſure ſeal up ſo many millions of men lying in the fall under invincible damnation: for ſuch a decreeing of men to eternal death, is directly oppoſite to a delight in their repentance and everlaſting life.

God hath ſhut up all in unbelief, that he might have mercy over all. Rom. 11. 2.

In theſe the Apoſtles words are two [*Alls*] of equal extent, the one ſtanding againſt the other.

An *All* of unbelievers, and an *All* of objects of mercy: look how many unbelievers there be, on ſo many hath God a will of ſhewing mercy. And therefore if all men of all ſorts and conditions, and every man in every ſort be an unbeliever; then is every man of every condition under mercy: and if every man be under mercy, then there is no preciſe antecedent will of God, of ſhutting up ſome, and thoſe the moſt, from all poſſibility of obtaining mercy. For theſe two are ἀσύστατα, and cannot ſtand together.

God

John 3. 16. *God ſo loved the World, that he gave his onely begotten Son, that whoſoever believeth in him ſhould not periſh, &c. God loved the world*, ſaith the Text, that is, the whole lump of mankind: therefore he did not abſolutely hate the greateſt part of men.

Again, God loved it faln into a gulph of ſin & miſery. For he ſo loved them, as to ſend his Son to redeem them; and a Saviour preſuppoſeth ſin. He did not therefore hate the moſt of them lying in the fall; for love and hatred are contrary acts in God, and cannot be exerciſed about the ſame objects.

Many Expoſitors (I know) do take [world] here in a reſtrained ſenſe, and underſtand by it the company of the Elect, or the world of Believers onely; but they have little reaſon for it in my opinion: For,

1. I think there can be no place of Scripture alledged, wherein this word [*world*] eſpecially with the addition of *whole*, as 1 *Ep.* of *John*, *cap.*2.*v.*2. (a place equivalent to this for the matter of it, and a comment upon it) I ſay no place (I think) can be produced, where *World* doth ſignifie onely the Elect,

or onely Believers; but it ſignifieth either all men, or at leaſt the moſt men living in ſome certain place, and at ſome certain time, but without diſtinction of good and bad; or if it be uſed any where more reſtrainedly, it is applied onely to wicked and reprobate men, who in their affections are wedded to the World and its tranſitory delights: and therefore do moſt properly deſerve this name.

2. Suppoſe it be granted that (*World*) in ſome Scriptures is reſtrained to the Elect, yet it cannot bear this ſignification here: —— becauſe

1. The words then would have a ſenſleſs conſtruction, for thus would they run; *God ſo loved the Elect, that whoſoever believeth in him ſhould not periſh*, &c. and if they run thus, this would follow; There are two ſorts of the Elect, ſome that do believe and ſhall be ſaved, others that do not believe and ſhall be damned; which is a diviſion or diſtinction unknown in Divinity.

2. Believers and Unbelievers, damned and ſaved, comprehend all mankind: for there is no man but he is one of theſe. Now (*World*, in this place includeth Believers and Unbelievers, the ſa-

ved and the damned, as appeareth most plainly to him that layeth the 16, 17, and 18 verses together. Therefore it signifieth here all mankind without exception of any.

2 Tim. 2. 4. *Who would have all to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the Truth.*

In these words the Apostle deliverеth two things:

1. That it is Gods will that men should enjoy a happy end, & be saved.

2. That it is also his will, they should have the means, and make a good use of them in coming to the knowledge of the truth, that so they might be saved. There is no let in God, but that all men may believe and be saved: and therefore there is no absolute will that many thousand men shall die in unbelief & be damned.

Two answers are usually returned, which I confess give me little satisfaction.

1. That by (*All*) here we are to understand all sorts, and not every particular man in those sorts.

It is true, that (*All*) is sometimes so taken in Scripture; but (I believe) not here: for the very context sheweth, that we are to understand by it the indivi-

duals,

duals, and not the kinds. In the first verse there is a duty enjoyned, [*I will that prayers and supplications be made for all men*] and in this verse the motive is annexed [*God will have all to be saved.*] As if he should have said— Our Charity must reach to all whom God extends his love to.

God out of his love will have all to be saved: and therefore in Charity we must pray for all. Now in the duty, (*All*) signifieth every man: for no man, though wicked and profane, is to be excluded from our prayers.

Pray for them (saith our Saviour) *that persecute you*: *and pray* (saith the Apostle here) *for Kings, and all that are in authority*; men in those days, though the greatest, yet the worst, the very Lyons, Wolves and Bears of the Church: *Pray for them*. And if for them, then for any other. Thus in the Duty it signifieth every man: and therefore it must have the same extent in the Motive too, or else the Motive doth not reach home, nor is strong enough to enforce the Duty.

The second answer is, that God will have all to be saved with his *revealed*

will, but millions to be damned with his *ſecret will*.

But if this anſwer ſtand, then (in my apprehenſion) theſe inconveniences will follow.

1. That Gods words (which are his revealed will) are not interpretations of his mind and meaning; and by conſequence are not true: for the ſpeech which is not the ſignification of the mind is a lye.

2. That there are two contrary wills in God; a *ſecret will*, that many Sons of *Adam* ſhall irrevocably be damned, and a *revealed will*, that all the Sons of *Adam* may be ſaved.

3. That one of Gods wills muſt needs be bad, either the ſecret or the revealed will. For of contraries, if the one be good, the other is bad; and ſo of Gods contrary wills, if one be good, the other muſt needs be bad. For, *Malum eſt contrarium bono*.

2 Per. 3. 9. *Not willing that any ſhould periſh, but that all ſhould come to repentance*, &c.

This Scripture is not ſo liable to the exceptions againſt the former Teſtimony. For it is a negative propoſition, and muſt be taken diſtributively: and there-

fore

fore ſpeaketh that in plain terms which is contrary to abſolute Reprobation.

That which is uſually replyed, is, that the perſons here ſpoken of are the Elect onely, and ſuch as truely believe: God is not willing that any of them ſhould periſh.

But the contrary appeareth in the text. For the perſons here mentioned are thoſe toward whom God exerciſeth *much patience* and *long-ſuffering*; as it is in the words next going before. And who are they? Are they the Elect? Are they Believers onely? No, but Reprobates rather, who die for their contempt of grace. For it is apparent by Scriptures, that God doth patiently expect the converſion even of them that are never changed, but die in their ſins, as we may ſee, 1 *Pet*, 3.19,20. where we read that the *patience* of God was exerciſed towards thoſe, who in the days of *Noah* deſpiſed it, and went to priſon, that is, to Hell for it. Yea of all men Reprobates are the trueſt and moſt proper objects of Gods patience, as we may ſee, *Rom*.2.4. where S. *Paul*, ſpeaking of ſuch as go on in ſin, and treaſure up wrath to themſelves againſt the day of

wrath, saith, that God useth patience towards them, that he might lead them to repentance. And *Rom.* 9. 22. *He endureth* (saith the Text) *with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction.* In the 5th of *Esay*, ver. 2. and *Cap.* 65. v. 2. we may see the same thing. Reprobates therefore as well as others, nay rather then others, doth *Peter* here speak of, and saith, that God would have none of them to perish: if they do perish, it is through their own fault and folly, and not Gods absolute pleasure, who would have no man to perish.

To these Testimonies I may add these conditional speeches.

1 Chr. 28. 9. *If thou seek him, he will be found of thee: but if thou forsake him, he will cast thee off for ever.*

2 Chr. 15. 2. *If you seek him, he will be found of you: but if you forsake him, he will forsake you.*

Gen. 4. 7. *If thou do well, shalt not thou be accepted? And if thou doest not well, sin lyeth at the door.*

Heb. 10. 38. *The just shall live by faith; but if any man withdraw himself, my soul* [ἐν αὐτῷ] *shall have no pleasure in him,* shall not like him, he shall be a Reprobate.

By all these and many other places that

that ſpeak conditionally (for ought I can ſee) it is clear, that God forſaketh no man conſidered ſimply in the fall, till by actual ſins and continuance in them he forſake God. Now if God reject no man from Salvation in time and indeed, till he caſt off God: then ſurely he rejected no man in purpoſe and decree, but ſuch an one as he foreſaw would reject and caſt off him; for Gods acts in time are regulated by his decrees before time. *Epheſ* 1.11. *He worketh all things* (ſaith the Apoſtle) *according to the counſel of his own will*; and therefore there muſt be an exact conformity between them, as between [*regulum*] and [*regulatum*] the rule and the thing ſquared thereby. By whatſoever therefore God doth in the world, we may know that he purpoſed to do before the world, and by his actual caſting men off when they grow rebellious and impenitent, and not before, we may certainly gather, that he decreed to caſt them off for their fore-ſeen rebellion and impenitency, and not before.

Beſides, it is in ſubſtance all one, to caſt a man off indeed and to entertain

a resolution to do it. Our *velle* and *facere* are all one in Gods account: and the reason is, because where there is a deliberate and settled will, the deed will follow, and nothing hinder. Much more is Gods will and deed all one, seeing his will is omnipotent and irresistible: and whatsoever he willeth directly and absolutely, is certainly done, when the time cometh.

Well: all these plain and express Scriptures, with the whole course and tenour of Gods Word, this opinion flatly contradicting; though it do (perhaps) shrowd it self in some dark and obscure speeches of holy Writ, I take it to be an untruth. For what *S. Austin* saith in another case, I may safely say in this, (y) *Shall we contradict plain places, because we cannot comprehend the obscure?* (z) *A few Testimonies* (saith *Tertullian*) *must receive an exposition answerable to the current of Scripture, not contrary to it.* This is my first reason.

(y) Nunquid ideo negandum quod apertum est, quia comprehendi non potest quod occultum est?

(z) Secundum plura pauciora sunt intelligenda, & ne unus sermo subvertat alios, secundum omnes potius quam adversus omnes intelligendus erit.

2. *It is incompatible with Gods Attributes.*

SEcondly, it *crosseth* some principal *Attributes* of God; therefore it cannot be true. For God useth not to make decrees contrary to his own most glo-

glorious nature, and such as are incompatible with those excellent Attributes, by which he hath discovered part of himself to men. [*Voluntas Dei semper sequitur naturam suam*] is a rule among Divines, *Gods Will always follows his Nature*; the reason why, is given by the Apostle, 2 *Tim.* 2. 13. *God cannot deny himself.*

Two things are here to be premised.

1. That Gods chief Attributes are those perfections, in the manifestation of which by acts conformable to them, God is most glorified, which are *Mercy*, *Justice*, *Truth*, and *Holiness*. For God is more honoured by the exercise of these among men, than by the putting forth of his unlimited *power* and *soveraignty*; as a King is more renowned among his Subjects for his equity, candor and clemency, than for his Dominion and Authority, or any thing that is done onely for the manifestation thereof. And there is good reason for it. For,

(1) *Power* is no vertue; but Holiness, Mercy, Justice, and Truth are; acts of power are not morally good in themselves, but are made good or evil by their concomitants. If they be ac-

companied with Justice, Mercy, &c. they are good, if otherwise, they are naught. For [*justum oportet esse quod Laudem meretur*] *Nothing deserveth praise unless it be just.*

(2) *Power* and soveraignty may as well be shewed in barbarous and unjust actions, as in their contraries. *Saul* shewed his authority and power to the full, in slaying the Lords Priests; and *Nebuchadnezzar* in casting the three Children into the fiery furnace, and *Daniel* into the Lyons Den, but no Mercy, nor Justice, nor any thing else that was good.

2. The second thing to be preconsidered, is——

That Justice, Mercy, Truth and Holiness in God, are the same in nature with these Virtues in men, though infinitely differing in degree; (as light in the Air and the Sun, are the same in nature, not degree) and that which is just, upright and merciful in men, is so in God too, and by these Virtues in our selves, with acts conformable to them [*tanquam ex pede Herculem*] we may safely measure what are so in God. For otherwise these things will follow.

(1) The

(1) The common and received diſtinction of divine Attributes into *communicable* and *incommunicable*, would fall to the ground. For againſt it this might be ſaid, That the Holineſs, Mercy, Juſtice, and Sincerity, with other Virtues, that are in us, are not the perfections of God in a lower degree communicated to us, but things of a different nature.

(2) Men cannot be truly ſaid to be made according to Gods Image, nor when they are regenerated to be renewed after the ſame image, and to be made partakers of the Divine Nature. That Picture cannot be the Picture of ſuch a man, which does not in his parts and lineaments truly reſemble him; no more can we be truly called the Picture or Image of God, if in our graces (in reſpect of which we are principally ſo called) there be not a lively reſemblance of Gods Attributes. Gen. 1.27. Col. 3.10. 2 Pet. 1.4. Matth. 5.48. 1 Pet. 1.16.

(3) We may not ſafely imitate God, as we are commanded; *Be ye perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect*; and, *Be ye holy as I am holy*. Nor when we ſhew forth Holineſs, Mercy, Juſtice, and Sincerity in our doings, can we be properly

ſaid

said to imitate God, if these be one thing in God, and in men another.

These two things being thus premised, *viz.* Gods Holiness, Mercy, Justice, and Truth, are four of his cheif Attributes, in the exercise of which, he taketh himself to be much glorified; and that we are to measure these Attributes by the same virtues in our selves:

I come to the proof of my second reason, against absolute Reprobation stated even in the mildest and most plausible way.

It opposeth Gods principal Attributes, particularly

His { Holiness. / Mercy. / Justice. / Sincerity.

1. Repugnant to Gods Holiness.

First, it fighteth with Gods *Holiness*, and maketh him the principal cause of sin in the greatest number of men. I know that the Defenders of it do not think so. For the main reason which moved the Synod at *Dort*, and some other Divines before and since, to bring down Predestination thus low, and begin their Reprobation after the fall; was, that they might maintain a fatal

and

end abſolute Reprobation of men, and yet avoid this imputation, as * Dr. *Twiſſe* hath noted. But what they intend (for ought that I can ſee) they have not compaſſed. For it followeth evident enough, even from their Concluſions too, that of all the ſins of Reprobates, which are the greateſt number by many degrees, God is the true and principal Author.

* *Dr. Twiſſe his vind. gra. l. 1. par. 1. c. 4. inſtio.*

Two things they ſay, which taken together (methinks) infer it.

1. That God of his own will and pleaſure hath brought men into an eſtate in which they cannot avoid ſin.

2. That he leaveth the Reprobate irrecoverably in it.

I. That God of his own will and pleaſure hath brought men into an eſtate in which they cannot poſſibly avoid ſin; that is, into the ſtate of original ſin, which conſiſts of two parts, 1. The guilt of *Adams* tranſgreſſions, 2. The corruption of nature. In both theſe they ſay Mankind is intereſſed, not through the force and efficiency of Natural Generation, becauſe we all derive our nature from *Adam* as our firſt principle; but by Gods free and voluntary order

order and imputation. (a) *It came not to pass by any natural means* (saith Calvin) *that all men fell from salvation by the fault of our first Parents.* (b) *That all men are held under the guilt of eternal death in the person of one man, it is the clear and constant voice of Scripture. Now this cannot be ascribed to any natural cause; it must therfore come from the wonderful counsel of God.* A little after he hath the same again with as great an Emphasis, (c) *How is it that so many nations with their Children should be involved in the fall without remedy, but because God would have it so?* As roundly doth Dr. *Twisse* affirm the same. (d) *The guilt of original sin is derived to us onely by imputation; the filth only by propagation:* and *both these onely by Gods free constitution.* A little before he hath these words; (e) *The fault of our nature commeth from Gods free appointment; for he doth not out of any necessity, but of his meer will onely impute the sin of* Adam

(a) *Calv. Instit. l. 3. c. 23. Sect. 7.* Non enim factum est naturaliter, ut à salute excidèrent omnes unius parentis culpâ.

(b) Cunctos mortales in unius hominis personâ morti æternæ mancipatos fuisse Scriptura clamat hoc: cum naturæ nequeat ascribi, ab admirabili Dei consilio profectum esse minime obscurum est.

(c) Quomodo factum est, ut tot gentes unà cùm liberis eorum infantibus æternæ morti involveret lapsus Adæ absq; remedio, nisi quia Deo ita visum est?

(d) *Twisse vind. grat. l. 1. par. 1. dirg. 4 c. 3. prope finem.* Originalis peccati reatus, non nisi imputatione; labes, non nisi propagatione ad nos derivatur; quorum utraq; non nisi à libera Dei constitutione proficiscitur. (e) Etenim naturæ vitium non est cuiq; suum voluntate propriâ contractum, sed solâ imputatione aut propagatione derivatum; quarum utraque fit voluntate Dei, Deus enim nulla necessitate, sed pro merâ suâ voluntate nobis imputat peccatum Adæ.

to us. To this purpoſe he ſpeaketh a great deal more in the ſame place. To theſe ſayings S. *Bernard* hath the like; ſpeaking of *Adams* ſin, he ſaith, (*f*) *Adams ſin is anothers, beauſe we knew not of it, and yet ours, becauſe it was through the juſt, though ſecret judgment of God reputed ours.*

(*f*) *Bern. Serm. 1. domi. 1. poſt. 8. Epiph.* Aliena eſt, quia in Adam omnes neſcientes peccauimus; noſtra, quia etſi in alio, nos tamen peccavimus, & nobis juſto Dei conſilio imputabatur licet occulto.

And this that they ſay is agreeable to reaſon. For if we be fallen into the guilt for the firſt ſin and the corruption of nature, onely becauſe we were in *Adams* loyns when he ſinned, and derive our being from him, then theſe two things will follow:

1. That we ſtand guilty of all the ſins which *Adam* committed from his fall to his lives end. For we were virtually in his loyns as well after his fall as before, and in every paſſage and variation of his life he was ſtill a principle of mankind. But where do we read that we are guilty of any other of his ſins? To the firſt ſin onely doth the Scripture entitle that ſin and miſery which entered into the *World*, and invaded *all Mankind*, as we may ſee *Romans* 5. 15, 16, 17. &c.

2. That Children are guilty of the ſins of

of all their Progenitors, especially of their immediate Parents. For they were in their loyns when they sinned, and more immediately than in *Adams*. But Children are not guilty of their Parents faults, nor obnoxious to their punishments because they are their Children, as we may see, *Exod.* 20. 5. where God saying, that he will *visit the sins of the Fathers upon the Children to the third and fourth generation in them that* [*hate*] him, plainly implyeth, that Children are not simply charged with their Fathers sins, but conditionally, if they be *haters* of God as their fathers were, if by imitating their wicked parents, they become partakers of their sins. In *Ezek.* 18. 14, *&c.* The Lord signifies thus much in his Apology against the cavil of the Jews. For first he saith, that if a wicked man beget a son that seeth his Fathers sins, and doth not like, he shall not dy for the iniquity of his Father. This implieth, that the derivation of being from the Parent doth not render the Child obnoxious to the punishment of the fathers sin, nor consequently to the sin. For the good Child is not obnoxious, and yet the good Child is equally

in

n the fathers loyns with the bad, and equally receiveth nature and being from him.

And then *verſe* 20. the Lord telleth them expreſly thus much, in two propoſitions.

1. *Affirmatively. The ſoul that ſinneth, it ſhall die.* And that it may be known that he ſpeaketh excluſively, onely the ſoul that ſinneth ſhall die; he delivers his mind

2. *Negatively: The Son ſhall not bear the iniquity of the Father, neither ſhall the Father bear the iniquity of the Son, &c.*

Our Saviour in that woful ſpeech of his to the Phariſees, *Matth.* 23. 32, 34. *Fulfil ye alſo the meaſure of your Fathers. Behold, I ſend unto you Prophets, &c. them ye ſhall kill and crucifie. that on you may come all the righteous bloud, &c.* Intimateth apparently, that the Phariſees were not inheritors of their Fathers ſins and puniſhments by birth; but by the commiſſion and imitation of their fathers ſins, they came to inherit both their ſins and plagues. Miſerable would our caſe be on whom the ends of the world are come, if children ſhould be guilty of all their Anceſtors prevarica-

tions. What a world of sins should we be to answer for, personal sins, parents, progenitors sins, to a thousand past generations? A thing with no reason to be imagined.

This is the first thing.

II. Secondly, They say that God hath immutably decreed to leave the far greatest part of Mankind in this impotent condition irrecoverably, and to afford them no power and ability sufficient to make them rise out of sin to newness of life; and this decree he executeth in time, and both these he doth out of his onely will and pleasure.

Of this proposition there be three branches.

1. God decreeth to leave them.

2. He doth leave them.

3. He doth both out of his alone pleasure.

1. God (say they) hath decreed to leave them without sufficient grace, and consequently under an everlasting necessity of sinning. This is the very *Helen* which they fight for, the main act of that absolute Reprobation, which with joynt consent and endeavour they labour to maintain.

Most

Moſt of them caſt their Reprobation into two acts: a *Negative*, which is a peremptory denial of grace and glory to ſome men lying in the fall: and a *Poſitive*, which they ſay is a preordination of the men thus left, to the eternal torments of Hell.

Others among them define Reprobation by an act meerly negative, and call it [*Non-Electionem, decretum quo ſtatuit non eò uſque miſereri, &c.*] Thus our Divines in their Suffrage define it; and in their explication of the definition which they give, they ſay, that the proper acts of Reprobation, as it ſtandeth oppoſed to Election, are no other than a denial of that ſame glory and grace, which are prepared in the Decree of Election for the Sonnes of God. But in this they all agree, that by the Decree of Reprobation, grace neceſſary for the avoiding of ſin, is flatly denyed to Reprobates. And if at any time we hear them ſay, that God hath gratified Reprobates with ſome grace; (for ſo ſaith *Walæus*) Reprobates are left (g) *Under the common providence of God*, and conſequently under ſome common endowments: And our Divines in the Synod

Suffrag. Brit. Art. 1. de Repr. theſ. 1.

(g) *Wal. defenſ. Anat. Armin. de Repr.* In ſtatu priſtino & ſub exercitio arbitrii ſui, & adminiſtratione communis providentiæ.

ſay, (h) *Reprobates, though they are not elected, yet receive many of Gods graces*: they are to be underſtood of ſuch gifts and graces as are inſufficient to make them avoid ſin: as we may ſee in theſe two cited places, and many more.

(h) *Suffr. Brit. theſ.* 1. *de Reprob* Hos etſi non electos, percipere tamen multa gratiæ divinæ effecta non negamus.

2. God doth actually according to his eternal and unchangeable decree leave the Reprobates in their ſeveral times and generations without his grace, under a neceſſity of final ſin and impenitency.

This is the ſecond branch of that ſecond propoſition.

And this muſt they needs ſay. For Gods decrees cannot be fruſtrated: what he purpoſed before time, without fail he doth in time. I ſhall not need therefore to prove that they ſay ſo; Nevertheleſs, to let it be ſeen how poſitively and categorically they ſay ſo. I will give an inſtance or two. The Divines of *Geneva* at the Synod among their Theſes of Reprobation, have this for one --- (i) *Thoſe whom God hath reprobated, out of the ſame will by which he hath rejected them, either he calleth not at all, or being called, he reneweth not throughly by the ſpirit of regeneration, ingraffeth not into*

(i) *Aſſ. Syn. Suffr. Genev. de Reprob.* Eaſdem perſonas in tempore, ex eodem placito voluntatis, vel non vocat, vel vocatos in Eccleſiam, Spiritu regenerationis non renovat penitiſſimè, non inſerit Chriſto myſticè, non juſtificat, &c.

into Chriſt myſtically, nor juſtifieth, &c. Like to this is the ſpeech of *Lubbert*, who ſpeaking of Reprobates, ſaith; (*k*) To them either he revealeth not the way of ſalvation, or giveth not faith and regeneration: but leaveth them in ſin and miſery. The ſame Author, ſpeaking againſt the poſition of the Remonſtrants, (*viz.* that *God doth ſupply to all men ſufficient and neceſſary means of ſalvation, with an intention of ſaving them*;) ſetteth down this Antitheſis,--- (*l*) *God doth not adminiſter to all men means needfull and ſufficient to ſalvation, and that with an intention of ſaving them.* And to this his Antitheſis, *Polyander*, *Walæus*, and *Thyſeus*, three other Profeſſors of Divinity in the Low-Countries, did ſet their hands.

(*k*) *Act. Syn. Suffr. Lubbert. de Reprob.* Iis vel non revelat viam ſalutis, vel non donat eos fide & cognitione Jeſu Chriſti, non regignit eos, non juſtificat, ſed relinquit eos in peccato & miſeria, &c.

(*l*) Deus non ſubminiſtrat omnibus hominibus neceſſaria & ſufficientia media ad ſalutem: quod cum intentione ſervandi.

3. God both decreeth and executeth this leaving of men to themſelves, of his alone abſolute will and pleaſure.

This is the third branch.

That they ſay ſo, witneſs the ſuffrage of our Engliſh Divines. (*m*) *We affirm, that this non-Election is founded in the moſt free pleaſure of God.* And (*n*)

(*m*) *Suffr. Bit. art.* 1. *de Reprob explic. theſ.* 1. *Orthodox.* Hanc *non-electionem* in liberrima Dei voluntate fundari dicimus. (*n*) *Ib. theſ.* 3. *heterodox.* Neminem poſt lapſum merâ Dei voluntate præteritum eſſe.

that no man lying in the fall is paſt over by the meer will of God; is numbred by the ſame Divines among the Heterodox poſitions. To this purpoſe alſo ſpeak the Miniſters of the Palatinate, (o) The cauſe of Reprobation is the moſt free and juſt will of God; (p) *That God paſſeth over ſome, and denieth them the grace of the Goſpel, the cauſe is the ſame free pleaſure of God.*

(q) *God decreed to leave ſome in the fall of his own good pleaſure.* Thus the Divines of *Heſſen.* The proof of this, they fetch from the execution of this Decree in time, (r) *God doth in time leave ſome of mankind fallen, and doth not beſtow upon them means neceſſary to believe, &c.* and *this out of his moſt free pleaſure.* This they joyntly affirm, and prove it by this reaſon eſpecially; All men were look'd on as ſinners: If ſin therefore were the cauſe that moved God to reprobate, he ſhould have reprobated or rejected all. But he did not reprobate all: Therefore for ſin he reprobated none, but for his own pleaſure, in which we muſt reſt, without ſeeking any other cauſe.

(o) *Act. Syn. Jud. Pal. theſ.* 3 Cauſa reprobationis eſt liberrima ac juſtiſſima Dei voluntas.

(p) *Ib. Theſ.* 4. Quod Deus nonnullos præterit gratiâ prædicationis evangelii, ejus cauſa eſt idem beneplacitum, ſive eadem libera voluntas.

(q) *Theol. Huſſiac.* Decrevit deus quoſdam in lapſu & miſeria relinquere pro ſuo beneplacito.

(r) Deus in tempore quoſdam è genere humano derelinquit in miſeriâ ſuâ, nec media ad fidem & converſionem ipſamque etiam ſalutem obtinendam neceſſaria eis confert, &c. Idque pro liberrimâ ſuâ voluntate.

Now

Now from theſe two things laid together, viz.

1. That God did bring men into a neceſſity of ſinning.

2. That he hath left the Reprobates under this neceſſity: It will follow that he is the author of the Reprobates ſins.

1. Becauſe [*Cauſa cauſæ eſt cauſa cauſati,*] *The cauſe of a cauſe is the cauſe of its effect,* (if there be a neceſſary ſubordination between the cauſes and the effect) whether it be a cauſe by acts negative, or poſitive. But God is the chief or ſole cauſe (by their doctrine) of that which is the neceſſary and immediate cauſe of the ſins of Reprobates, namely their impotency and want of ſupernatural grace; therefore he is (by the ſame Doctrine) the true and proper cauſe of their ſins.

2. Becauſe [*Removens, prohibens, &c.*] that which withdraweth or withholdeth a thing, which being preſent would hinder an event, is the cauſe of that event: as for example, he that cutteth a ſtring in which a ſtone hangs, is the cauſe of the falling of that ſtone; and he that withdraweth a pillar, which being put to, would uphold a houſe, is the true cauſe in mens account of the falling of that

houſe. But God (by their opinion) withholdeth from Reprobates that power, which being granted them, might keep them from falling into ſin: therefore he becometh a true moral cauſe of their ſins. -- (s) *In whoſe power it is that a thing be not done, to him it is imputed, when it is done*, ſaith *Tertullian*.

(s) *Tertul. l. 1. contr. Marcion. c. 22.* In cujus manu eſt quid ne fiat, ei deputatur, cum jam fit.

It will not ſuffice to ſay, that God by withholding grace from Reprobates becommeth onely an *accidental*, not a proper and direct cauſe of their ſins. For a cauſe is then onely accidental in relation to the effect, when the effect is beſide the intention and expectation of the cauſe. For example; digging in a field is then an accidental cauſe of the finding a bag of gold, when that event is neither expected nor intended by the Husbandman in digging: But when the effect is lookt for and aimed at, then the cauſe (though it be the cauſe only by withholding the impediment) is not accidental; as a Pilot who withholdeth his care and skill from a ſhip in a ſtorm, foreſeeing that by his neglect the ſhip will be drowned, is not to be reputed an accidental, but a direct and proper cauſe of the loſs of this ſhip.

This

This being ſo, it followeth, that God by this act and decree of removing and detaining grace neceſſary to the avoiding of ſin, from Reprobates, not as one ignorant and careleſs what will or ſhall follow, but knowing infallibly what miſchief will follow, and determining preciſely that which doth follow, namely, their impenitency and damnation, becometh the proper and direct cauſe of their ſins.

2 *Contrary to his* Mercy.

SEcondly, it oppoſeth Gods *Mercy*. God is merciful; a part it is of his title, *Exod.* 34.6. *merciful and gracious.* He is mercy in the abſtract, 1 *Joh.*4.16. *God is love, a Father of mercies*, and *God of all conſolations*, 2 *Cor.*1.3. *a Saviour of men*, 1 *Tim.*4.10. And thus the Church hath alwayes taken him to be. And therefore hath of old ſtyled him in her Liturgy, *A God, whoſe nature and property is alwayes to have mercy and to forgive.*

Two wayes is Gods mercy ſpoken of in Scripture, abſolutely and comparatively.

(1) *Abſolutely*, and ſo it is ſet out in high and ſtately terms. It is called *rich mercy*, *Epheſ.* 2. 4. *great holineſs*, *Jonah* 4 2. *Abundant mercy*, 1 *Peter.*1.2.

with-

without *heighth* or *depth*, *length* or *breadth*, or any dimenſions, love *paſsing knowledge*, *Eph.*3.18. So great it is, that *Jonah* could not intreat him to puniſh the little, infant, harmleſs Ninivites with temporal death for the ſins of their guilty parents, *Jonah* 4.11.

(2) *Comparatively*; with two things it is compared.

1. His own Juſtice.

2. The love that dwelleth in the Creature; and is advanced above both.

I. With his own Juſtice it is compared, and advanced above it; not in its eſſence (for all Gods excellencies are infinite good, and one is not greater than another) but in its expreſſions, and ſome things that have relation to it; particularly in theſe.

(1) In its *naturalneſs* and dearneſs to God. It is ſaid of *Mercy*, it *pleaſeth him*, *Micah* 7.18. but Juſtice is called *his ſtrange work* [*alienum à naturâ ſuâ*] *Eſay* 28.21. *He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the Children of men. Lamentations* 3.33.

(2) In the frequent *exerciſe* of it ſelf. He is ſaid to be *ſlow to anger*, but *abundant in goodneſs*, Exod.3 4,6. Mercies are beſtowed every day, Judgments in-

inflicted but now and then, ſparingly, and after a long time of forbearance, when there is *no remedy*, 2 Chron.36. 15. *All the day long have I ſtretched out my hands to a gain-ſaying and rebellious people*, Iſa 65.2. That is, I have been patient a long time, and in that time I have not been idle, but imployed in exhorting, promiſing, and ſhewing mercy, that ſo I might do you good. God waits a great while for the converſion of ſinners, as Mariners do for their tyde; and and at laſt with much ado, if there be a neceſſity, he chideth and fighteth.

(3) In its *amplitude*, or Objects to whom it is extended, viſiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children *to the third and fourth Generation*, but ſhewing mercy to *thouſands*, Exod.20.5. In theſe words God implieth, that his Mercy reacheth farther than his Juſtice, and that look how much three or four come ſhort of a thouſand; ſo much doth his Juſtice come ſhort of his Mercy in the exerciſe of it.

(4) In the *occaſions* that move God to exerciſe them. It is a great matter that moveth God to puniſh, as we may ſee, *Gen.*6.5,6,7,12,13. when the *wickedneſs*

edneſs of man was great in the earth, and all fleſh had corrupted his way, then God thinketh of a floud. He would not deſtroy the Amorites, till their wickedneſs was full. *How oft would I have gathered thee?* ſaith CHRIST to Jeruſalem, *Matthew* 23. 37. that is, I have not taken advantage againſt thee, nor upon the firſt, ſecond, or third unkindneſs, caſt thee off: ſmall matters have not moved me to deſtroy thee, O Jeruſalem. But how ſmall an occaſion doth God take to ſpare men? when he had examined *Sodom*, and found their ſins to be anſwerable to the cry, yet then, for ten righteous mens ſakes would he have ſpared *Sodom*, *Gen.* 18. 32. Nay, he ſhould have ſpared *Jeruſalem*, if the Prophet could by his ſearching have *found one man who did execute judgment and ſeek the truth*, *Jer.* 5. 1. What a ſlender humiliation made him to ſpare wicked *Ahab* and his houſe a long time? 2 *Kings* 21. 29. And the repentance of *Ninive*, whoſe wickedneſs eryed to the Lord for vengeance, *Jonah* 1. 2. did eaſily procure her a pardon.

Thus is Gods mercy advanced above Juſtice.

It is compared alſo with the affecti-

on

on of a father to his ſon, of a tender mother to her child, and of the moſt affectionate brutes to their brood, and ſet above them all. It goeth beyond a fathers to his ſon, *Matth.* 7. 11. *If you that are evil, can give good gifts to your children, how much more will your heavenly Father give good things to them that ask him?* What doth this (*quantò magis*) imply, but that Gods love outſtrip a fathers? And ſo it doth a mothers too. *Eſay* 49. 15. *Can a woman forget her ſucking child, that ſhe ſhould not have compaſsion upon the ſon of her womb? yea they may forget, yet I will not forget thee.* Women are compaſſionate toward their children, becauſe they are the fruit of their wombs, and a part of themſelves: but moſt indulgent are they toward thoſe children to whom they are *Nurſes*, as well as *Mothers* to their ſucking children. And yet Mothers may foget even their ſucking children: but as for God, he can never forget his children.

Again, God compareth himſelf with one of the moſt affectionate females among unreaſonable creatures, (the Hen) *Mat.* 23. 37. *O Jeruſalem, how oft would I have gathered thee, as a Hen gathers her chick-*

chickens under her wings, &c. No Bird (ſaith S. *Auſtin*) expreſſeth ſuch a tender love to her young ones, as the Hen doth; (t) No Fowls diſcover themſelves to be Mothers, ſo much as Hens do. *Others, when we ſee them in their neſts with their young, we know them to be mothers, but no way elſe*; but the Hen diſcovereth her ſelf to be ſo, *even when her Chickens do not follow her, her feathers ſtand up, her wings hang down, ſhe clocketh mournfully, and goeth feebly; ſo that we may know her to be a Mother, when yet we cannot ſee her Brood.*

Such another ſpeech he hath in another place, and concludeth it with theſe words; (u) *Our Lord did therefore compare himſelf to a Hen*, rather than to any other Creature, becauſe of her ſingular expreſſions of love to her young ones, even when they are out of her ſight.

By theſe things we ſee how highly the Scriptures ſpeak of Gods mercy, eſpecially in its expreſſions to mankind, to whom he hath born a greater love, and for whom he hath declared himſelf to have done far greater matters than

(t) *Aug. tract. 25 in Joh. pag. 46.* Videmus nidificare paſſeres quoſlibet ante oculos noſtros, hirundines, ciconias, columbas, quotidie videmus nidificare; quos niſi quando in nidis videmus, parentes eſſe non agnoſcimus: Gallina verò ſic infirmatur in pullis ſuis, ut etiamſi ipſi pulli non ſequantur, filios non videas, matrem tamen intelligas. Ita fit alis demiſſis, plumis hiſpida, voce rauca, omnibus membris demiſſa & abjecta; (ut quem admodum dixi) etſi filios non videas, matrem tamen intelligas

(u) *Id. in Pſ. 58. p. 112. B.C.* Quare ergo Dominus, niſi propter hoc, gallina eſſe voluit; in Sancta Scriptura dicens, O Jeruſalem, Jeruſalem, quoties volui te congregare ut gallina? &c.

for

for the Angels; the wiſdom of God *delighting it ſelf in the Children of men, before the world was*, Prov. 8. 31. and gratifying them in the fulneſs of time with the aſſumption of their Nature. (*Heb.* 2. 16.) and the redemption of their ſouls with his blood, 1 *Pet.* 1. *&c.*

Now with ſuch a *Mercy* cannot ſtand ſuch a Decree; abſolute Reprobation being once granted, we may (methinks) more properly call God a *Father of cruelties*, than of *Mercies*, and of [*hatred*] rather than of [*love.*] And the Devils name Satan, and [Ἀπολλύων] an *adverſary*, a *deſtroyer*, may be fitter for him, than [Σωτὴρ] a *Saviour*; which I tremble to think. Doth *mercy pleaſe him*, when he hath made a Decree which ſheweth far more ſeverity toward poor men, than mercy? Is he *ſlow to anger*, when he hath taken ſuch a ſmall and ſpeedy occaſion to puniſh the greater part of men for ever; and for one ſin once committed, hath ſhut them up under invincible ſin and Damnation? Is his *Mercy abundant?* Doth it reach further than Juſtice, when it is tuck'd up ſo ſhort, limited to a very few ſelected ones, when a hundred for one at leaſt

(take

(take in all parts of the world) are unavoidably cast away out of his onely will and pleasure? Or doth his *love pass knowledge*, when we see daily far greater love than this in men and other creatures? What Father and Mother (that have not onely cast off fatherhood and motherhood, but humanity too) would determine their children to certain death, nay, to cruel torments worse than death, for one only offence, and that committed too, not by them in their own persons, but by some other, and imputed onely to them?

But to deliver things a little more closely. Four things (in my conceit) being well and distinctly considered, do make it apparent, that this decree is incompatible with Gods mercy.

1. That *Adams* sin is the sin of mans nature onely, and no mans personal transgression but *Adams*: it was neither committed nor consented to by any of his posterity in their own persons.

2. That it was the sin of our nature, not by generation (as I have shewed) but by Gods own voluntary imputation.

3. That God did pardon it in *Adam*,

(for

(for ſo it is generally believed) who did actually and freely commit it in his own perſon.

4 That CHRIST came into the world to take away [*Peccatum mundi*] *the ſin of the world, Joh.* 1.29. That God either did or might have ſatisfied his wronged juſtice, in the bloud of the Covenant for all mankind, and without any impeachment to juſtice, and have opened a way of ſalvation to all and every man.

Theſe conſiderations (I think) being well digeſted, will make any man to think, that either there is no decree of abſolute reprobation; or that God is not merciſull to men at all; much leſſe more merciſull to them then to other creatures, but more ſharp a great deale and ſevere then he is

to { 1 any Creatures in the world.
{ 2 the very Devils themſelves.

1. Then to any other creatures. For they, even the baſeſt among them, though perhaps they have but a deſpicable being, yet they have ſuch a being as is far better then no being at all: whereas men are determined by his omnipotent decree to ſuch a woful being, as is a thouſand times worſe then no being

at all. What man would have accepted of life, when firſt he entred upon poſſeſſion of it, if he had known upon what lamentable conditions, it was to be tendred? Or (did men firmly believe this Decree) they would at a venture with *Job* curſe their birth-day, be releaſed willingly from the right of creatures, and deſire their immortal ſouls might vaniſh into nothing. *Malunt extingui penitus, quam ad ſupplicia reparari* (as *Minutius Felix* ſpeaks in another caſe: And Parents out of meer compaſſion to their Children, would wiſh that they might be born Toads and Serpents, rather then men; Creatures whoſe beings at laſt ſhall be deſolved into nothing, rather then immortal Spirits.

Minut. Felix pag. 113.

2 To the very Devils alſo (ſuppoſing this Decree) is God more merciful then to men; and yet the Devils are ſet forth in Scripture for the greateſt ſpectacles of Gods ireful ſeverity. In one thing, this Decree maketh moſt men and Devils equal, [*Utriſque deſperata ſalus,*] they are both ſure to be damned; but in three things, men are in a far worſe condition by it.

(1) In their appointment to hell, not for

for their *own, proper, perſonal ſins*, for which onely the Devils are Damned; but for the ſin of another Man, that lived and ſinned long before they were born.

(2) In their *unavoydable* deſtination to endleſs miſery, under a *colour* of the contrary. The Devils, as they are decreed to damnation, ſo they know it, they expect it, they look for no other: But men, who are appointed to wrath, are yet fed up with hopes of ſalvation, and made to believe that the whole buſineſs is put into their hands, ſo as if they periſh, it is not [*defectu miſericordiæ*] becauſe God will have no mercy on them, but [*defectu voluntatis propriæ*] becauſe they will not be ſaved; when yet indeed there is no ſuch matter.

Now if it be worſe to be deluded in miſery, then ſimply to be miſerable; then is the condition of men in this reſpect (by this decree) much worſe then the ſtate of Devils.

(3) In their *obligation* to believe, and the *aggravation* of their puniſhment by not believing. The Devils, becauſe they muſt be damned, are not commanded to believe in CHRIST, nor is their puniſhment heightned by their not

believing; but miſerable men, who by this decree have no more liberty to eſcape Hell, than the Devils, muſt yet be tyed to believe in CHRIST, and have their torments increaſed, if they believe not. Theſe things being ſo, (I think) I may conclude with the words of *Proſper.* (y) *He which ſaith, that God would not have all men to be ſaved, but a certain ſet number of predeſtinate perſons onely, he ſpeaketh more harſhly then he ſhould of the height of Gods unſearchable grace.* Nay, he ſpeaketh that which cannot ſtand with his infinite grace and mercy, eſpecially to the ſons of men.

(y) Senten. ſuper. 8. c. Gall. Qui dicit quòd non omnes homines velit Deus ſalvos fieri, ſed certum numerum prædeſtinatorum; durius loquitur quam loquendum eſt de altitudine inſcrutabilis gratiæ Dei.

Nor doth that give me ſatisfaction, which is uſually anſwered, namely, that God by this abſolute decree doth fully manifeſt his juſtice and his mercy too; his juſtice toward Reprobates, his mercy toward the Elect, and that it is neceſſary his decrees ſhould ſo be ordered, as that both theſe may be clearly declared by them. For,

1 Gods mercy is revealed to be *rich mercy, abundant long-ſuffering*, ſurmounting juſtice, and beyond underſtanding. Now ſuch a mercy ſet forth with ſuch titles, clothed with ſuch properties, is

no

no wayes manifested by this decree.

2. Neither is Gods pure and spotlesse Justice set forth by it, as I now come to shew: this being my third argument drawn from Gods attributes against absolute Reprobation.

THirdly, this absolute Reprobation is incompatible with Gods *justice.* 3 Against Gods *justice.*

The Lord (saith *David*) *is righteous in all his wayes*, Psal. 145. *The judgments of the Lord* (saith *Solomon*) *are weight and measure*, Prov. 16. 11. Exact and without exception. So apparently just is God, that he offereth the justice of his decrees and wayes to the tryall of humane understanding. *Esay* 5. 3. *Judge I pray you betweene me and my vineyard.* Those to whom the vineyard was committed, slew their masters heire, being sent unto them: *What will the Lord of the vineyard think ye* (saith Christ) *do: therefore when he commeth, to those husbandmen?* Mat. 21. 40. In which words, he appealeth to their judgement: nay, he is content to prove himself and his dealings to be just by plain and evident arguments. *Ezek.* 18. 25, *&c. Are not my wayes equall, and yours unequall, O ye*

houſe of Iſrael? And he permits *Abraham* when he was in his greateſt humility acknowledging himſelfe to be but duſt and aſhes, yet to reaſon with him about the equity of his doings: *Wilt thou ſlay the righteous with the Wicked? Shall not the Judge of all the earth doe right?* Gen. 18. 23, 25. And *Moſes* alſo is ſuffered to argue Gods juſtice in the ſame manner: *Shall one man ſin, and wilt thou be wrath with all the Congregation?* In a word, ſo evidently juſt is God in all his proceedings, that many both good and bad, who have felt his juſtice, have cleared God, and deeply charged themſelves. Witneſs *Ezra*, *Nehemiah*, and *Daniel* in their ninth Chapters: and *Adonibezek*, *Judg.* 1. 7. And the Emperour *Mauricius*, who having ſeen his children butchered, and waiting every minute for the bloudy ſtroke of Death, brake out into theſe words. (y) *Righteous art thou O Lord, and juſt is thy Judgment.*

Num. 16. 22.

(y) *Oſiand. Eccl hiſt. cant. 6. p. 261. Juſtus es domine & juſtum eſt judicium tuum.*

With this inviolable Juſtice of God, cannot abſolute Reprobation (of ſuch eſpecially as are commanded to believe, and are called to ſalvation) be reconciled.

My reaſons are theſe.

1 Be-

1 Because it maketh God to punish the Righteous with the wicked.

The *Supralapsarians* say directly in plain terms, that God decreed to destruction men considered without sin, and therefore yet righteous. And the *Supralapsarians* say as much in effect; for they say two things.

(1) That God did lay a necessity upon every man of being born in Original sin (as I have noted before.)

(2) That he hath determined for that sin to cast away the greatest part of mankind for ever: and so they make God to doe that by two acts, the one accompanying the other, which the other say he did by one.

This is so clear a case, that *Calvin* with some others have not stickt to say, that God may with as much justice determine men to Hell the first way as the latter. (See *Instit l. 3 c. 23. Sect. 7.*) Where against those who deny that *Adam* fell by Gods Decree, he reasoneth thus; All made are men guilty of *Adams* sin by Gods absolute Decree, alone: *Adam* therefore sinned by this onely Decree. (z) *What lets them to grant that of one man, which they must grant of all men?*

Calv. Instit. 3. c. 23. Sect. 7.
(z) Quid eos prohibet fateri de uno homine, quod inviti de toto humano genere concedunt? Quid enim ter giversando luderent operam?

men? And a little after he saith; (a) *It is too absurd; that these kind Patrons of Gods Justice, should thus stumble at a straw and leap over a block.* God may with as much justice decree *Adams* sin and mens damnation out of his onely will and pleasure, as out of that will and pleasure, the involving of men in the guilt of the first sin and their damnation for it; that is the substance of his reasoning. To the same purpose, speaketh *Maccovius.* From hence we may see (saith he) what to judge of that opinion of our adversaries, *viz.* That God cannot justly ordain men to destruction without the consideration of sin. (b) *Let them tell me which is greater, to impute to one man the sin of another, and punish him for it with eternal death, or to ordain simply* without looking at sin *to destruction:* surely no man will deny the first of these to be greater. *But this God may do without any wrong to Justice, much more therefore may he do the other.* To these consenteth D. *Twisse*, & saith, (c) *If God may ordain men to Hell for* Adams *sin, wch is derived unto them by Gods only constitution, he may as wel do it absolutely, without any such constitution.* And it is most true,

(a) Bonos istos justitiæ Dei Patronos perplexos hærere in festuca, alias vero trabes superare, nimis absurdum est.

(b) *Maccov. d. sp. 18 p. 16.* Nam dicant (quæso) nobis, quid magis sit, imputare alicui culpam alterius & propter ipsum illum morte æterna plectere; an vero ordinare ad interitum. At hoc potest sine ulla læsione justitiæ suæ: ergo multo magis potest illud posterius

(c) Dr. *Twiss. Vind. gra. l. 2. dig. 1 p. 15.* Quod potest Deus intercedente libera sua constitutione, illud etiam absolute poterit, vel sine aliqua constitutione intercedente.

true, it is all one in ſubſtance, ſimply, to decree the miſery of an innocent man, and to involve him in a ſin that he maybe brought to miſery.

Neither of theſe decrees (I take it) are juſt.

2 The ſecond reaſon, why it is againſt Gods juſtice, is, becauſe it maketh him to require faith in CHRIST of thoſe to whom he hath preciſely in his abſolute purpoſe denyed both a power to believe, and a CHRIST to believe in.

That God bindeth Reprobates to believe as well as others, it is the conſtant doctrine of Divines, among whom *Zanchius* delivereth it for a Theſis, (d) *Every man* (*eſpecially he that profeſſeth* CHRIST) *is bound to believe, that he is choſen in* CHRIST *to ſalvation*; *every man without exception* (*even the Reprobate himſelf*:) *and if he believe it not, he committeth a moſt grievous ſin above all others.* This he proveth by that ſpeech of CHRIST, *Ioh. 16. 9. The Spirit ſhall convince the world of ſin, becauſe they believe not in me.* Reprobates therefore are bound to believe. M. *Perkins* alſo ſaith

(d) Zanch l 5. de natur. Dei c 2. q. 1. de præd. Sanct. Quiſq; mandato Dei tenetur credere ad ſalutem æternam in Chriſto fuiſſe electum maxime autem is qui fidem in Chriſtum profitetur. Cum dicimus unumquemque teneri hoc credere neminem, ne Reprobos quidem, qui neque unquam credent. nec credere in Chriſtum poſſunt, exeipimus; & niſi credant graviſſime omnium peccant.

ſome-

something to the same purpose. (e) *Every one in the Church by vertue of this commandment* [believe the Gospel] is *bound to believe that he is redeemed by* CHRIST, *as well the Reprobate as the Elect, though for a different reason; the Elect, that by believing he may be saved; the Reprobate, that by not believing he may be without excuse: and this out of the very purpose of God.*

(e) *Perk. lib. de Præd. p. 89. Obj. 3* Quisq; in Ecclesia mandato Dei [crede Evangelio] tenetur credere se redemptum esse per Christum, etiam improbus perinde ac Electus, sed alia tamen & alia ratione: Electus tenetur credere, ut credendo particeps fiat electionis; reprobus, ut non credendo fiat inexcusabilis, etiam ex intentione Dei.

But now they cannot in justice be bound to believe, if they be absolute Reprobates, for three causes.

(1) Because they have no power to believe; they want it and must want it for ever. God hath Decreed they shall never have any to their dying day: [*Nemo obligatur ad impossibilia*] no man can be justly tyed to impossible performances. Because no man can fly like a bird, or reach heaven with the top of his finger, therefore God cannot with justice exact of any the performance of these actions; nor can he of Reprobates the obedience of faith, if it be not possible to them.

(2) Because it is not Gods unfeigned will they shall believe. No man will say that it is Gods serious will, that such a man

man ſhall live, when it is his will, that he ſhall never have the concourſe of his providence and the act of preſervation. Nor can we ſay, that God doth in good earneſt will that thoſe men ſhould believe, whom he will not furniſh with neceſſary power to believe. It may rather be ſaid, it is Gods unfeigned will they ſhall not believe, becauſe it is his will they ſhall want power to believe. For it is a Maxime in Logick, [*Qui vult aliquid in cauſâ, vult effectum ex iſtâ cauſa profluentem.*] *He who willeth a thing in the cauſe, willeth the effect that neceſſarily floweth from that cauſe.* Now if it be the certain will of God, that Reprobates ſhall in no wiſe believe, he cannot with reaſon and equity tye them to believe: For then he tyeth them to an act contrary to his determinate will.

(3) Becauſe they have no object of faith, no Chriſt to believe in: [*Credere jubet, & fidei nullum objectum ponit.*] He commandeth to believe, and affordeth no object to believe in; this ſoundeth not well. The Devils have no part in Chriſt or the new Covenant. We will not therefore ſay, that God

can

can justly bind them to believe, or punish them as transgressors of the Covenant; because they believe not. How then can we say, that God can justly require faith of Reprobates, or destroy them for not believing; if they have indeed no more part in Christ, or in the Covenant, then the Devils have? If a man should command his servant to eat, and punish him for not eating, and in the mean time fully resolve, that he shall have no meat to eat; would any reasonable man say, that such a man were just in the command or punishment? Change but the name and the case is the same. Again, that Christ dyed for Reprobates (by the Doctrine of absolute Reprobation) is a lye; and can God justly bind men to believe a lye?

This is the second reason.

3 The third reason, why the absolute decree infringeth Gods justice, is, because it will have him to punish men for omission of an act which is made impossible to them by his own decree: not by that decree alone, by which he determined to give them no power to believe, having lost it; but by that decree also, by which he purposed, that we should par-

partake with *Adam* in his ſin, and be ſtripped of all that ſupernaturall power, which we had by Gods free grant beſtowed upon us in *Adam*, before he fell.

Theſe are the reaſons which move me to think, that this abſolute decree is repugnant to Gods *juſtice.*

Three things are uſually anſwered.

1 That Gods wayes may be very juſt, and yet ſeem unjuſt to mans erring underſtanding: & ſo is this decree; though fleſh & bloud will not yeild it to be ſo.

This anſwer I take to be falſe, and the contradictory to it to be true, namely, that nothing is truly juſt, which humane underſtanding purged from prejudice; corrupt affections and cuſtomes, hath in all ages, places & perſons judged to be unjuſt. The reaſon is, becauſe God hath by the light of nature, and thoſe generall impreſſions of good and evill, honeſt & diſhoneſt, juſt & unjuſt, made in the hearts of men, ſufficiently inſtructed and enabled them to judge what is juſt & what is not. When a thing is done, reaſon ſo qualified is able to ſay, This is juſt, or this is unjuſt, whether it be done by God or man. For (vertues in men being but the image of thoſe perfections,

that

that dwel in God) juſtice in men & God are for ſubſtance but one and the ſame thing, though infinitely differing in degree, as the greater and leſſer light. That this power is ingrafted in men, God himſelf (who beſt knoweth with what endowments he hath beautified his creature) hath ſufficiently ſignified in thoſe Scriptures, where he calleth on men to be judges of the equity of his wayes: *Judge I pray you betweene me and my vineyard, Eſay* 5. *O ye houſe of Iſrael, are not my wayes equall, and your wayes unequall? Ezek.* 18. 25. God would never put them upon the tryall of reaſon, if he had not made it able to examine them. The incarnation of the Sonne of God, his birth of a Virgin, his dying, the reſurrection of the body, and ſuch myſteries as are peculiar to the Goſpel, and the proper objects of the Chriſtian faith, God hath not offered to the tryall of our underſtandings, but rather derideth thoſe that preſume to judge of them by reaſon, 1 *Cor.* 1. 20. *Where is the Scribe? where is the wiſe? where is the diſputer of this world?* and the reaſon is, becauſe, theſe things being ſupernatu-

rall, and therefore not diſcernable by natu-

naturall power; man is no competent judge of them by his naturall-understanding, nor may adventure upon the tryall and judgment of them with lesse danger, then *Uzzah* lookt into the Ark, for [*Scrutator majestatis opprimetur à gloriâ*] *he that pryeth into Gods majestie, will be overwhelmed of his glory.* But of the justice of his decrees and wayes, he maketh him a judge; because, the common notions of just and unjust being imprinted in nature, he is able by naturall reason to apprehend what is just in divine acts as well as in his own.

2 It is answered, that these decrees are set down in Scripture to be the will of God: and therefore, they must needs be just. For Gods will is the rule of all righteousnesse.

To this answer I have these things to reply.

(1) This rule in Divinity is much abused by the maintainers of absolute Reprobation, and may not be admitted in their sense and meaning. For Gods will is not a *rule of justice* to himself, as if things were therefore just, because he willeth them and worketh them: but his justice rather is a rule of his will and works,

works, which are the expreſſions of his will. He therefore maketh decrees and executeth them, becauſe they are agreeable to that juſtice which dwells in the divine nature: as he maketh nothing, which hath not [*potentiam objectivam*,] a power of being created without implying contradiction to himſelf or any thing in him: ſo he willeth and doeth nothing, but that which may be willed or done, [*ſalvâ juſtitiâ*] without wrong to this Juſtice. Saint *Hierome* ſpeaking of the Prophet *Hoſeas* taking a wife of fornications, *Hoſea* 1. 2. ſaith it was done [*in typo*] *tipically*, not really, (*quia ſi fiat turpiſſimum eſt*,) *becauſe if it had been indeed done, it had been a moſt foul thing*. But thou wilt anſwer (ſaith he) [*Deo jubente nihil turpe eſt*] *God commanding it, nothing is diſhoneſt*. Thus much we ſay, (ſaith the Father,) that God commandeth nothing but what is honeſt, but he doth not by commanding diſhoneſt things, make thoſe things honeſt which are abominable: plainly giving us to ſee what he thought, viz. that God doth not will a thing and ſo make it good; but willeth it, becauſe it is in it ſelf good antecedently and before the act of Gods will about it. And

Hierom. Proœm. in Hoſea.

And thus much doth *Zanchy* (though a rigid maintainer of absolute reprobation) not obscurely confesse in his Treatise *de natura Dei*: where he letteth fall such speeches as make Gods justice antecedent to his will; and therefore the rule of it, rather then a thing regulated by it. (*f*) *Neither can God will any thing* (saith he) *which is not just.* And again (*g*) *the princes pleasure hath the strength of a Law, is a rule* (saith he) *among the Canonists*: but (*h*) *this is true, where the King is just, & willeth nothing but what is just.* In which words, he plainly maketh the justice of the King antecedent to that will of his which must be a law. Many more speeches he useth there to the same purpose. Gods will therefore is not a rule of justice to himself. To whō then?

(*f*) Zanch. l. 3. de nat. Dei c. 4. q. 9. thes. 2. Neq; aliquid velle potest, quod justum non sit. (*g*) Quod placet principi, legis habet vigorem. (*h*) Ibi maxime verum est ubi rex justas est, & nihil vult nisi justum. Quanto magis in regno Dei? &c.

To us: for by it we are, (1) to square all our thoughts, words, & deeds. (2) to examine them when they are spoken and done: [*primum in aliquo genere est regula posteriorum, & supremum inferiorum.*]

(2) I reply, that those absolute decrees of mens inevitable salvation and damnation are no parts of Gods revealed will. The Scriptures teach us no such matter. And therefore, to say they are, is but a

meer begging of the question. It hath alwayes been ordinary with false Teachers, to make Gods word a Father to their false opinions, that they may stand the faster and win the greater credit. The Papists ground their Transubstantiation, and the Lutherans their Consubstantiation and Ubiquity upon the Scripture, [*Hoc est corpus meum*] *This is my body*, *Mat.* 26. And the defenders of absolute Reprobation doe so too: they make their cause to be Gods, and entitle his word to it; because they see it is the surest way to defend it: being herein like to some contentious people, who being in Law, and having a bad Cause which they are like to lose, they entitle the King to it, that they may the better uphold it.

(3) Absolute Reprobation can be no part of Gods revealed will. The reason is, because it is odious to right reason, and begetteth absurdities. For [*Nulla veritas parit absurda*] no truth begetteth absurdities. Divers truths are revealed in Scripture which are above, but not contrary to right reason, whether they be matters of faith or life: faith and reason, nature and Scripture

are

are both Gods excellent gifts; and therefore though there may be a diſproportion, yet there can be no repugnancy between them. The worſhip which God requireth, is [*cultus* λογικὸς] *a reaſonable ſervice*, *Rom.* 12.2. and the Word of God is [γάλα λογικὸν, καὶ ἄδολον] *milk reaſonable & without guile*, 1 *Pet.* 2.2.

Theſe things therefore being laid together, it will appear to be but a meer ſhift and evaſion, when abſolute Reprobation is proved to be unjuſt, and therefore unworthy of God; to ſay, Gods will is the rule of Juſtice: this is part of Gods revealed will; and therefore moſt juſt, whatſoever reaſon may cavil and ſay to the contrary.

3. Their third anſwer is, that God is not bound to reſtore men power to believe, becauſe they once had it, and have loſt it through their own fault, as a maſter is not bound to renew his ſervants ſtock, if he have waſted it by bad husbandry.

This anſwer doth not ſatisfie me; For I grant, that God is ſimply and abſolutely bound to no man, becauſe he is [*agens liberrimum*] a moſt free diſpenſer of his own favours, where and what,

and to whom he will, and no man is aforehand with God: [*Quis prior illi dedit ut retribuatur?*] *Who hath given unto him and it shall be recompensed again?* *Rom* 11. 15.

But yet he is conditionally bound; for he hath determined and tyed himself three wayes especially.

(1) *Decernendo*, by decreeing the Almighty is eternally subject to his own ordinances, or else he should be mutable: And therefore what gifts soever he hath decreed to men, he is bound to give them by vertue of his own decree.

(2) *Promittendo*, by promising. We use to say promise is debt, it is justice to performe what it was free to promise; & whosoever he be that promiseth and payeth not, is guilty of a trespasse (witness *Ananias* & *Saphira*,) & unworthy of the Kingdome of heaven, *Ps.* 15 4. If therefore God hath made a promise of any gift or grace to men, his promise bindeth him to performance,--*Nam semel emissum volat irrevocabile verbum.*

(3) *Legem ferendo*, by giving men a law to keep; which without supernatural grace they can no more keep, then they can eat a rock. By such a law

the

the ſupreame law-giver bindeth himſelf to his people, to give them ſuch power as may enable them to keep that law, or elſe he becommeth (as the evil ſervant in the parable ſtiled him) *a hard maſter, reaping where he ſowed not*, and the very true and proper cauſe of the tranſgreſſion of that law. We ſhall find God alwayes giving ſtrength when he giveth a command: When he commanded the creatures to *increaſe* and *multiply*, he gave them a multiplying vertue: when CHRIST bade the lame man *ariſe, take up his bed & walk*, he put into his limbs an ability of walking: when Adam had a ſpirituall law given him to obey, which without ſpirituall ſtrength he could not, God gave him ſtrength anſwerable to the law, as Divines agree, conſenting to that noted ſpeech of S. *Auſtin*, that Adam had [*poſſe non cadere*] though he never had [*non poſſe cadere*] *a power and poſſibility*, though no neceſſity of continuing in obedience.

That I may bring this home to my purpoſe, I ſay, that God is bound to reſtore unto men power to believe, ſuppoſing theſe things that follow.

1 That he hath vouchſafed to enter in to a new Covenant of peace with men, when he needed not.

2 That in that covenant, he requireth obedience at mens hands, even at theirs that periſh.

3 That he promiſeth eternall life to every man, if he obey and keep the Covenant.

4 That he puniſheth the diſobedient with everlaſting death.

Theſe particulars ſuppoſed, the moſt free God who is abſolutely bound to none, is engaged to give ability of believing unto men; nor can he juſtly without this gift puniſh the diſobedient any more then a Magiſtrate having put out a mans eyes for an offence, can command this man with juſtice to read a book, and becauſe he readeth not, put him to death; or then a Maſter (that I may return the Simile in the anſwer) when he hath taken away from his ſervant the ſtock which he hath miſimployed, can afterward exact of him a juſt imployment of the ſame ſtock, and puniſh him, becauſe he imployeth it not.

I conclude therefore, that the abſolute and inevitable reprobation of ſuch men as are called to believe in CHRIST, and puniſhed if they believe not, is utterly repugnant to the Juſtice

of

of God, and therefore can be no part of his word.

FOurthly, it oppugneth the *truth* and *ſincerity* of God. 4 *Oppoſite to Gods* Truth.

God is a god of truth, *Deut.* 32.4. *Truth it ſelf*, *Job* 14.6. ſo called, becauſe he is the fountain of truth, and the perfection of truth without the leaſt mixture of falſhood. *The ſtrength of Iſrael cannot lye*, *1 Sam.* 15.29. *let God, be true and every man a lyar* (ſaith the Apoſtle,) *that he might be juſtified in his ſayings, and overcome when he is judged*; that is, men may lye, (for all men are lyars,) but God can never lye. If any man would go about to challenge him with untruth, his challenge would eaſily appear to be a calumny; the truth of God like the glorious Sun will break through all the clouds of falſe accuſations that ſeek to obſcure it. [*Simile gaudet Simili*] Like loveth his like, *God loveth ſuch as are true of heart*, *Pſal.* 51.6. and hath an hypocrite in utter deteſtation; & therefore he muſt needs be true himſelf. No man (for ought I know) doubteth of it. But by abſolute Reprobation God is made untrue and Hypocritical in his Rom. 3.4.

dealings with men, and in all matters appertaining to their eternall ſtate, particularly, in his commands, in his offers of grace and glory, in his threats, paſſionate wiſhes and deſires of mens chief good, and in his expoſtulations and commiſeration alſo.

1 In his *commands*. For by this doctrine God commandeth thoſe men to repent& believe,whom he ſecretly purpoſeth ſhall not believe. (*i*) *Though God commandreprobates to believe the goſpel, yet he will not have them believe*, ſaith *Piſcator*.Now whom God commandeth to believe and repent,thoſe he willeth outwardly ſhould believe and repent; for by his commandments he ſignifieth his good will and pleaſure: and he muſt inwardly and heartily will it too, or elſe he diſſembleth; For words, if they be true, are an interpretation of the mind; when they are not, they are meer impoſtures and ſimulations.

(*i*) *L. contr. Schaſm pa.* 60. Etſi reprobos mandat Deus ut evangelio credant, non vult tamen ut credant.

2 In his *offers of grace and glory*,which he maketh to ſuch as refuſe them as well as to thoſe who do accept them to their ſalvation.

This is evident, *Eſay* 65. 2. *I have ſpread out my hands all the day long*. To whom?

whom? *to a rebellious people:* & *Mat.*22. we read, that thoſe men were invited to the wedding that came not: and *Act.* 3. 26. there 'tis ſaid to the Jews who had *denyed Chriſt*, as v. 14. *To you hath God ſent his Son* Jeſus *to bleſſe you, in turning every one of you from your iniquities. How oft* (ſaith Chriſt) *would I have gathered you?* ſpeaking of ſuch as neglected their viſitation, and ſo loſt their ſalvation. It is evident alſo by reaſon: For, as many as are under the Commandement, are under the promiſe too, as we may ſee, *Act.*2.38,39. *Repent and be baptized every one of you, and ye ſhall receive the gift of the holy Ghoſt; for to you and your children is the promiſe made.*

In which words *Peter* maketh the command & the promiſe of equall extent, both univerſal. And there is cauſe why; for he maketh the promiſe his motive to perſwade obedience to the command; & it would not have reached home, if it had not reſpected all thoſe to whom the command was given. No man, Reprobate or other, thinketh any leſs; every man that heareth the Goſpel preached, taketh himſelf to be under the gracious offer of eternall life; & upon

on theſe thoughts hath ſome deſires, ſome hopes of it, and ſtirreth up himſelf to forſake ſome pleaſing ſins, which otherwiſe he would not part with, and doe ſome unwelcome duties, which otherwiſe he would not doe.

But now Gods meaning is [by this doctrine] that the moſt of thoſe to whom he offereth his grace and glory, ſhall have neither. And ſo *Piſcator* ſaith, --(*k*) *Grace is not offered by God even to thoſe who are called, with a meaning to give it, but to the Elect onely.* In the ſame Book he hath ſuch another ſpeech: (*l*) *though God in words proteſt he would have reprobates to believe, yet indeed he will not have them.* They make God to deal with men in matters of Salvation, as the Poets feigne the Gods to have dealt with poor *Tantalus*: They placed him in a clear and goodly river up to the very chin, and under a tree which bare much ſweet and pleaſant fruit that did almoſt touch his lips: but this they did with a purpoſe that he ſhould taſt of neither. For when he put his mouth to the water to drink, it waved away from him; and when he reached his hand to the fruit to have eaten of it, it withdrew

(*k*) *l. de. prad. centr. Schaf. pa. 74.* Gratia non offertur a Deo ſingulis (licet vocatis) animo communicandi eam, ſed ſolis Electis.

(*l*) Non vult Deus reprobos credere, licèt lingua profiteatur ſe velle. *Pag.* 143.

it

it ſelf preſently out of his reach, ſo as he could neither eat nor drink. Juſt ſo dealeth God with Reprobates (by their Doctrine;) he placeth them under the plentifull meanes of Salvation, offereth it to them ſo plainly, that men would think they might have it when they will; and yet intendeth fully they ſhall never have it, with-holding from them either the firſt grace that they cannot believe, or the ſecond grace that they cannot perſevere. Did not thoſe Gods delude *Tantalus*? yes doubtleſſe. And if God doe ſo with Reprobates; what doth he but delude them, and diſſemble with them in his faireſt aud likelyeſt offers of Salvation that he makes them? And this doe *Zanchius* and *Bucer* grant by evident conſequence, as appeareth by a ſpeech or two of theirs, which cannot ſtand with their concluſion; and therefore [I ſuppoſe] fell unwarily from them.

Zanchius telleth us roundly, that every man who is called is bound to think that he is elected, otherwiſe he doth offer great injury to God, and (*m*) *accuſe him of lying, which ſaith to him in his word, that he deſireth his Salvation, and*

(*m*) *Zanch. l. 5. de nat. Dei. c. 2.* Perſtringere Deum mendacii qui illi in verbo dicit, ſe velle ſalutem ejus, & in hunc finem ad Chriſtum vocaſſe.

and for this cause hath called him. In which speech he plainly implyeth, that if God call a man whom he hath absolutely rejected, he doth but delude him when he calleth him. The like speech hath *Bucer*(n) *a man must believe that he is predestinate, or else he maketh God to mock him when he calleth him.*

(n) *Bucer. in c. 8. ad Rom. q. de præd.* Primum quod Deo debes, est, ut credas, esse te abeo Prædestinatum: Nam id ni credas, facis eum tibi, cum te ad salutem vocat per Evangelium, illudere.

A man therefore that is not predestinate, but an absolute Reprobate, when he is called to Salvation, is but deluded; it is the necessary resultance of their speeches.

If a Creditor should resolve, upon no terms to forgive his Debtor one farthing of debt, and yet make him offers to remit the whole upon some conditions, and bind his offers with a deep and solemn oath; would not we say, that he were a rank dissembler, and a meer deluder of his poor debtors; we can say no lesse of God, if it be true that he hath irrevocably decreed at no hand to save such particular men, and yet promiseth and sweareth that he will save them, if they will believe his promises, and repent. What can such oaths and promises be, but meer delusions of miserable men?

(3) In

(3) In his *threats* and comminations alſo (by this doctrine) isGod made to be hollow and deceitful. For againſt what ſins are threats denounced? Alwayes againſt actuall ſins, we never read that they are thundred out againſt us for originall ſin, they intimate therefore, that the ſins for which men go to Hell are their actuall tranſgreſſions. But if it be true, that God decreed men to Hell for originall ſin, that which thoſe threats import and ſignifie is not true, & ſo God is not ſincere in them. Beſides, all threatings imply that the evil threatned may be avoided. For therfore are they denounced, that men might by them be brought to repentance, and ſo eſcape the evils threatned. But if ſome men be peremptorily ordained to deſtruction, then their deſtruction cannot be prevented; and ſo the threatings of damnation (in this reſpect alſo) do ſignifie an untruth, and God in them dealeth not plainly with men.

4 In all the other things beforementioned, is God full of guile too (by this opinion) namely, in his--

(1) Paſſionate *wiſhes*, that even thoſe men might repent that repent not,

and

and might be saved, that through their impenitency are not saved. Of these we read, *Deut.* 5.29. *O that there were such a heart in them to fear me, that it might go well with them.* And Psalm 81. 11. *O that my people had hearkened,* & Israel *had walked in my wayes,* &c. And Esay 48.18. *O that thou hadst hearkned to my Commandement,* &c.

(2) In his mournful *Expostulations*, Esay 5.3. *judge* (*I pray you*) *between me and my Vineyard, what could I have done more for my Vineyard.* And Jeremiah 2. throughout the whole Chapter, especially ver. 31. *Have I been a Wilderneſſe to* Israel, *or a land of darkneſs?* And v. 32. *Can a Maid forget her ornaments, or a Bride her attire? Yet my people have forgotten me days without number,* Ezek. 33.11. *Turn ye, turn ye; why will ye dye, O houſe of* Israel?

(3) In his melting *commiserations* of the wofull condition of fooliſh men, who would not be reclaimed: *How ſhall I give thee up O* Ephraim? *how ſhall I deliver thee O* Israel? *My repentings are kindled together, my heart is turned within me.* Hoſ. 11.8. *O* Jeruſalem, Jeruſalem, *which killeſt the Prophets, and ſto-*

neſt

neſt them that are ſent to thee, &c. Matt. 23.37.

In all theſe there is but little ſincerity, if there be a ſecret reſolution that the moſt of thoſe, towards whom thoſe wiſhes, chidings, and pittifull bemoanings are uſed, ſhall be damned without remedy. Gods faireſt offers, his ſweeteſt invitations, his greateſt ſympathies, and ampleſt courteſies, (if this doctrine be true) come little ſhort (I think) of *Abſoloms* feaſt, *Joabs* congey, the kiſſe of *Judas*, and the *Hyænaes* tears. For in all theſe [*aliud animo vult, aliud verbis ſignificat*] he ſaith one thing and meaneth another, and therefore diſſembleth. Nay, the whole Miniſtery (wherein God commandeth, offereth, chideth, entreateth, lamenteth, &c.) if this be true, is but a meer impoſture, a giving of words without any meaning of anſwerable deeds; and an impoſture ſo much the greater, by how much the ſhew of kindneſſe is the heartier. For how can a good thing be offered with ſtronger ſhews of a good meaning, then when it is offered with exhortations and intreaties, to accept it, with clear demonſtrations of the excellencies of it, with unfeigned wiſhes that the parties to whom it is

offered

offered, would accept it, and bitter lamentations for their folly in refusing it. With all these inforcements is *Gods* tender of Salvation to Reprobates accompanied; and therefore in shew, most hearty and serious.

In a word, thus speaketh *God* (by this doctrine) to reprobates in the ministery.

"O ye Reprobates, (once most dearly beloved of me in your father *Adam*, but now extremely & implacably hated, and by mine eternall and uncontrolable order sealed up under invincible sin & misery;) amend your lives, & believe in the name of mine onely begotten Son. If you repent and believe not, there is no remedy, you must be damned; but if you repent and believe, you shall be saved; though your sins be as red as Scarlet, I will make them as white as Wooll. Think not that I would have you dye, for I swear, *as I live, I will not the death of him that dyeth*; I would have no man to perish, but all to come to repentance: I beseech you therefore be reconciled. I have cryed and called upon you, I have a long time waited upon you, that you might repent, and

still

"ſtill am I knocking at the doores of "your hearts for entrance. *O that there* "*were a heart in you to fear me, & keep* "*my commandements, that it might goe* "*well with you for ever! What ſhall I do* "*unto you? how ſhall I intreat you! Will* "*you not be made clean? when will it* "*once be?* Can *God* ſpeak thus to Reprobates, who by his own decree ſhall never repent, nor be ſaved, without the deepeſt diſſimulation?

That which is uſually ſaid to cleare the abſolute decree from this crimination, is, That *God* wiſheth the Salvation of the Reprobate ſeriouſly, but not abſolutely; he would have thoſe men ſaved, but yet upon condition they will repent and believe. And therefore, though they do periſh, yet *God* is candid and ſincere in his offers of Salvation to them: For therefore do they periſh, becauſe they perform not the condition, and not becauſe God offereth not Salvation ſeriouſly unto them.

But this anſwer is too ſhort: It is true indeed, God will have all men to be ſaved upon condition only, that they will believe and repent, according to that ſpeech of S. *Ambroſe*, [*Deus vult omnes*

salvari, si & ipsi velint.]*God would have all to be saved, if they themselves would*: For if he would absolutely have it so, what can hinder it? who hath resisted his will? and it is true likewise, that a conditionall promise may be serious as well as an absolute: but then the condition must be possible to them to whom the promise is made; and the performance of the condition must be a part of Gods will, as well as the Salvation promised: or else the promise cannot be candid and sincere. [*Conditio est oblata potestas aliquid eligendi*]a condition is the offer of a power of choice. Where there is no liberty of choice afforded, there is no true condition appointed. In substance it is all one to offer a courtesie under a condition not possible, and not to offer it at all; and in circumstance it is one much worse.

In substance all one: The Lawyers tell us that a Contract made [*sub conditione impræstabili nullus æstimatur*] under a condition not possible is esteemed no bargain. And the Logicians rule is, that(o) a conditionall proposition which hath an impossible condition annexed to it, is equivalent to a bare Negation.

(o) Conditionalis propositio quæ habet annexam conditionem impossibilem, æquipollet simpliciter neganti.

It

It is all one for me to offer a piece of money to one blind, upon the condition he will open his eyes and tell me what piece of money it is, and what ſtamp it hath; & to deny it flatly to another. For the one hath it no more than the other; And it is all one for a man to have a daughter to beſtow in marriage, to tell her Suiter, I will give you my Daughter, if you will ſpan the Earth, or touch the Heavens with your finger; and to tell him plainly, ſet your heart at reſt, I will never beſtow her upon you. For the Suiter ſpeedeth both wayes alike.

And it is in circumſtance a great deal worſe. For it is a deniall under colour of the contrary, a deniall joyned with a ſcoffe, a deriſion, as was that of the Jebuſites, 2 *Sam.* 5, 6. who told *David*, that he ſhould not enter into the Fort of Zion, *except he took away the blind & the lame:* Their meaning was, they would never deliver it up unto him: and becauſe they thought it impoſſible for him to take away the blind and the lame, they told him if he did ſo, then they would yield it up. It was an Ironicall and ſcoffing deniall of his demand. If the King ſhould make an unrepeal-

able Law, that no *German* ſhould be made a Citizen of *London*, or free Denizen of the Kingdome; and then make a decree to give ſome bountifull gratuities, but to the citizens of London or to the Subjects of the Kingdom onely, and to none but them; and yet for all this ſhould command it to be proclaimed, that he will give them to the *Germans* upon condition they will be made Free-men of London, or be incorporated into the Kingdom: would not any man ſay that the King in this caſe did diſſemble and delude the poor Dutchmen? and if any ſhould ſay, there would be no diſſembling in it; for if they would become Citizens or Subjects, they ſhould have the promiſed gratuities: a man might truly anſwer, that therefore the King doth counterfeit and coſin them, becauſe he maketh a tender of them upon a condition not poſſible by his own decree. In like manner, if God have made a decree, that ſuch men ſhall never believe, and yet offer them Heaven on condition they will believe; it may moſt truly be ſaid, that God doth not only deny them Heaven, but deny it with a bitter deriſion; which is far from

that

that candor & goodness that dwelleth in him.

And thus have I shewed the contrariety of this Opinion to four principall attributes of God, which is my second generall reason against it.

THirdly, it is contrary to the use and end of *Gods gifts* bestowed upon men; which gifts are of two sorts:

3 It is contrary to the use and end of *Gods gifts* to men.

(1) Gifts of *Nature*, our Creation, Sustentation, Preservation, together with Health, Strength, Beauty, Wisdom, &c.

(2) Gifts of *Grace*, which have a more immediate relation to everlasting life, and are meanes either of purchasing salvation or of applying it.

Means of purchasing it, are, the comming of CHRIST into the world, and the sacrificing himself on the Crosse.

Means of applying it, are, the ministry of the word and Sacraments, the long-suffering of God, the enlightening of mens understandings, the plantation of many excellent vertues in their hearts, with many more of the like sort.

Now of these endowments of nature and Grace, what the true use and end is, the Scripture doth plainly and particularly shew us.

Firſt, for the gifts of *Nature*, we find them beſtowed upon all that have them, for the encouraging and enabling of them to ſerve God and ſave their Souls. For, *Act.* 14.16, 17. The Apoſtle ſaith, that God (even in thoſe times in which he ſuffered the Gentiles to walk in their own wayes, and withheld from them the light of his holy word) did give unto the people of the world, *rain from Heaven and fruitfull ſeaſons, filling their hearts with food and gladneſſe*; and in ſo doing he left not himſelf among them *without witneſſe*. This implieth, that therefore he gave them theſe good things, that he might make himſelf known unto them, and ſo might draw them to glorifie him according to the knowledge which they had of him.

Act. 17. 26. The Apoſtle ſaith directly, that therefore men are made and placed in this world, and appointed to their ſeverall times and dwellings, *that they might ſeek and find God*: that is, that they might ſerve him and ſave their Souls. For what is it to ſeek God, but to ſerve him? and what is it to find God, but to enjoy his face and favour here

here and in Heaven? To this purpoſe *Proſper*; (p) *Therefore* (ſaith he) *is every creature made & ordained eſpecially, that Mankind which is endued with knowledg and ability to diſcourſe, might by the ſight of ſo many goodly ſorts of Creatures, and the taſte of ſo many bleſſings, be drawn to the love & ſerviee of his & their maker.*

And a little after he ſaith, in the ſame Chapter.

(q) *Look of what uſe the Law and Prophets were to the Iſraelites; of the ſame uſe were the gifts of Creation and Providence to the Gentiles.* God never intended to deal with the Gentiles (as the foul-mouthed *Manichees* ſaid he dealt with the Jews) to feed and fat them up with outward and more common bleſſings, as ſo many Hogs and Swine with husks and akornes, but to draw them up by theſe to an expectation of better things, and a careful endeavour to pleaſe God, that ſo they might obtain them.

The end of all Creatures, and of all created gifts beſtowed upon man, is ſubordinate to the end of man. Mans

(p) *Proſper. de voc. Gentium. l. 2. c. 4. p. 828.* Cœlum quippe & terra & mare, omniſque creatura quæ videri & intelligi poteſt, ad hanc præcipuè diſpoſita eſt humani generis utilitatem, ut natura rationalis de contemplatione tot ſpecierum de experimentis tot bonorum deperceptione tot munerum, ad cultum & dilectionem ſui imbueretur authoris, implente omnia ſpiritu Dei, in quo vivimus, movemur & ſumus.

(q) *Ibid* Quod ergo in Iſrael per conſtitutionem legis, & Propherica eloquia gerebatur, hoc in univerſis nationibus totius creaturæ teſtimonia & bonitatis Dei miracula ſemper egerunt.

end is to glorifie God upon earth, and enjoy perpetuall ſociety with him in heaven; and the end of thoſe gifts is to direct and encourage man to atchieve that high and excellent end to which his Creator had appointed him.

Now for the gifts of *Grace*, they likewiſe are given to all them that enjoy them, from the ſame uſe and end too.

For firſt, CHRIST came into the world, not that he might be a rock of offence, at which the greater part of men ſhould ſtumble and fall; but to ſhed his bloud, and by that bloud to purchaſe ſalvation for all mankind, not onely for thoſe who are ſaved, but for thoſe alſo who through their wilfull unbelief and impenitency are not ſaved; as we may ſee, *Joh.* 3.17. *God ſent his Son* (ſaith the Son) *into the world, not to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be ſaved.* In which words the end of his coming is ſet down.

1 Negatively [*not to condemn the World.*] 2 Affirmatively, [*but that the World through him might be ſaved*] and therefore very fully.

The like ſpeech we have *Joh.* 12.17. *I came not to judge the World, but to ſave*

it

it. Theſe Negations joyned with affirmations, ſhew, that the Salvation of all men was the onely end of CHRISTS coming, the end excluſively, no other end was properly intended by it but this. *The Son of man came to ſeek and to ſave what was loſt*, *Luk.*19 10. Therefore he came to ſave every man, for every man was loſt. And *Act* 3.26. *To you* (ſaith S. *Peter*) *hath God ſent his Son* Jeſus, *to bleſſe you, in turning every one of you from your iniquity*, [*every one of you*] you that reject him as well as you that receive him. The end then of *Chriſts* coming into the world was the Salvation of all and every man therein.

2 The miniſtery of the word and Sacraments is given alſo and appointed for the ſame end, and is in its own proper nature and uſe, an inſtrument of conveying the Spirit of regeneration to thoſe that live under it, and to all thoſe.

Better proofs for this I cannot have, then thoſe which our reverend Divines at Dort gathered to my hand: *Eſay* 59. 21. *This is my Covenant with them* (*ſaith the Lord*) *my Spirit that is upon thee, and my words which I have put in thy mouth, ſhall not depart out of thy mouth, nor out of*

the

Suffrag. Brit. p. 30 31. art. 2. theſ. 5.

the mouth of thy ſeed, nor ſeeds ſeed for ever. Hinc patet (ſay they) *from theſe words it appeareth, that the word and ſpirit are joyned in the miniſtery of the word with an inſeparable band, by the promiſe of God. Hence it is, that the Miniſters of the New Teſtament are called, Miniſters not of the letter but of the ſpirit; not of the letter that killeth, but of the ſpirit that giveth life,* 2 Cor. 3. 6. And *the miniſtery of the Goſpel is called* διακονία τῦ πνεύματος, *the miniſtery of the Spirit, in the ſame place,* v. 8. *Hence alſo is the Goſpel called* χάρις σωτήριος, *Grace bringing Salvation,* Tit. 2. 11. *And* λόγος καταλαγῆς *the word of Reconciliation,* 2 Cor. 5. 19. To theſe let me add 1 *Pet.* 1. 23. Where the word is called *the ſeed of the new birth*: and 2 *Cor* 5. 20. Where Miniſters are called *Embaſſadors for* CHRIST, *to beſeech men to be reconciled to God*: They are ſo called, to ſhew that the word preached is by Gods appointment an inſtrument to make men new creatures, and that the proper matter of Miniſters errands is reconciliation with God, and the naturall fruit of it is in Gods intent, not the obdurations and deſtruction, but the converſion and ſal-

salvation of men. The same Authors out of *Joh.*15 22[*If I had not come & spoken unto them, they should not have had sin*] *do say it is evident, that* CHRIST *in his preaching did administer so much inward grace as was sufficient to convince those that rejected the Gospel, of positive unbelief, and render them obnoxious to just punishment*: and by good consequence (say I) so much as sufficed by their good husbandry, to have converted and saved them: for that grace leaveth none without excuse, which is not sufficient to convert them. I will conclude what they say of this gracious intention of God in the ministery of the word, with that speech of *Prosper*, cited by them in the same place. (r) *They that say, that all those to whom the Gospel is preached (even those that obey not the Gospel) are not called to grace, they say an untruth. God looked for grapes* (sayes the Text) *Esay* 5.2. What doth this imply, but that it was Gods principall aime in the husbandry which he bestowed upon the Church of Israel, that it should bring forth good fruit, though in the event it did not? *How oft would I have gathered you:* saith CHRIST to Jerusalem,

(r) *Prosper. ad. c. Gal. resp. ad Obj* 4. Non omnes vocari ad gratiam eos, quibus omnibus Evangelium prædicatur, non recte dicitur; etiamsi sint qui evangelio non obaudiunt.

lem, *Mat.*23.37. *These things* (saith he) *have I spoken to you, that ye might be saved: but ye will not come to me that ye might have life, Joh.*5.34,40. In those words intimating no lesse then this, that it was his full intent, by his preaching to gather and to save those very particular men that in the end were not gathered nor saved, through the contempt or neglect of Christs Ministry.

Touching the Sacraments, this is also the use and end for which they were ordained; as we may see, *Luke* 7.30. where we have these words; *But the Scribes and Pharisees and expounders of the Law despised the counsell of God against themselves, and were not baptized of John.* In which words thus much is evidently included, that it was Gods counsell and purpose in *Johns* baptisme to bring them to Christ, and in him to Heaven. So much also is said of his Baptisme, *Mark* 1. 4. *John did baptize in the Wilderness, and preach the baptism of Repentance, and remission of sins.* If this were the end of *John*'s, much more was it the end of Christs Baptisme; it being more excellent rhen *John*'s was, not in substance, but in the fulnesse of

grace

grace adminiſtred and diſpenſed by it. *All that have been baptized into Chriſt* (ſaith the Apoſtle) *have been baptized into his death*, Rom. 6. 3. *All ye that have been baptized into Chriſt, have put on Chriſt*, Galat. 3. 27. The very phraſes there uſed, ſhew that Baptiſme is in its originall intention, an inſtrument of uniting men to Chriſt, and giving them communion with him in the benefits of his death. *Except a man be born again of water* (ſaith our Saviour) *and of the Spirit, he cannot, &c. John* 3. 5. In which words are theſe two things:

1. The neceſſity of Regeneration [*Except a man be born again.*]

2. The working cauſe of it: Efficient, *the Spirit*; inſtrumentall, the Sacrament of Baptiſme, there called *water* from the outward matter of it. Baptiſme therefore is appointed to be a means of Regeneration to all thoſe that are baptized; and doth effect it in all who do not put an obſtacle in the way to hinder it. So much doth the Apoſtle aſcribe to Baptiſme, *Eph.* 2. 26. and for this cauſe doth dignifie it with this title, [*The laver of regeneration,*] *Tit.* 3. 5.

I will shut up this with *Act.* 2.38. where *Peter* saith, *Repent and be baptized every one of you for the remission of sins*; plainly implying, that therefore is baptisme ordained to be received, that those who do receive it, might have their sins remitted.

This is also Gods intent in the Lords Supper. *This is my body* (saith CHRIST) *and this is my blood, Mat.* 26.26, 27. in those words teaching us, that in that Sacrament there is an exhibition of CHRIST and his benefits intended on Gods part, and received of those by whom no obstacle is interposed: and therefore doth the Apostle call it in expresse words, 1 *Cor.* 10.16. *The communion of the body and bloud of Christ.*

For this end also is the patience of God (another singular dignation of God) exercised among men, as we may see, *Rom.* 2.4. *Despisest thou the riches of his goodnesse & forbearance, not knowing that the bountifulness of God leadeth thee to repentance: but thou after thy hardnesse and heart that cannot repent, heapest up wrath to thy self*, &c. In these words may be noted for our purpose: (1) Gods intent in forbearing sins, which is, *the*

leading

leading of them to repentance, and so on to Salvation: for repentance is *per se ordinata ad salutem*, by him ordained to Salvation as a meanes to the end.) (2) The persons to whom God intendeth this good by his forbearance: and they are such as *despise the riches of his goodnesse*, & have *hard and impenitent hearts*. (3) The issue and event of this their contempt of Gods patience, and that is, *a treasuring up of wrath unto themselves against the day of wrath*. Out of all which layed together ariseth thus much, that God by sparing wicked men who have hard and impenitent hearts, intendeth their everlasting good, though they by the abuse of his patience and refusall to repent, do treasure up unto themselves wrath and misery everlasting. The like to this is delivered in 2 *Pet.3.9. God is not slack* (saith *Peter*) (*as some men count slackness*) *but patient toward us*; that is, us men. And why patient toward us? *because he would have none to perish*. The end therefore of Gods patience, is mans Salvation and Repentance.

In the last place, those other gifts of God, by which mens understandings are

are enlightned, and their souls beautified, (namely, knowledge, faith, repentance, fortitude, liberality, temperance, humility and chastity, and such like) are bestowed upon all that have them [among whom are many that prove Reprobates in the end] that by the exercise of them and continuance in them they might come to eternall life.

That Reprobates are adorned with many of these graces, appears by sundry Scriptures, especially *Heb.* 6. 4. where the Apostle saith, that *It is impossible for them that have been enlightned, tasted the heavenly gift, been made partakers of the holy Ghost, tasted the good word of God, & the powers of the world to come; if they fal away, should be renewed by repentance.* The graces which the *Apostle* here speaketh of, are not ordinary and common, but special & excellent graces; illumination, faith, a relish of Gods word, & a taste of heaven; and the persons spoken of, are apostates, such as are under a possibility of falling away for ever (for upon a danger not possible cannot be built a solid exhortation,) and consequently Reprobates: and the thing intimated is, that upon Apostates and Reprobates

are

are theſe excellent gifts many times beſtowed. The like ſpeech we have, *Heb.* 10.26. For, *if we ſin willingly after we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more Sacrifice for ſin, &c.* From whence we may collect, that, men who ſin willingly and and unpardonably, may receive the knowledge of the truth; yea and be ſanctified by the blood of the Teſtament and the Spirit of grace, *v.* 29.

In the 2 *Pet.* 2.20. They may (ſaith *Peter*) *eſcape the filthineſs of the world*: that is, be waſhed from their former ſins by repentance. The *unclean ſpirit may go out of them, Mat.* 12.43. *they may receive the word with joy, Mat.* 13.20. & many more excellent graces they may have beſides. Now all theſe vertues and graces are not therefore given them that they might abuſe them, and ſo purchaſe to themſelves the greater damnation; or that they might do good to others with them, but none to themſelves: but rather, that (as by the former gifts of nature, ſo) by theſe of grace they may obtain ſalvation. For it God aime at this in thoſe gifts that are farther off, much more in theſe, which make thoſe

have them (like the young man in the Gospel) *not far from the Kingdom of heaven.* My proof for this I borrow of our Divines at the Synod, who in their Suffrage have these two Positions.

1 (s) *There are certain internall works preparing a man for justification, which by the power of the word and Spirit are wrought in the hearts of men not yet justified; such as are the knowledge of Gods will, a sense of sin, fear of punishment, &c* that is their first.

2 Their 2d position is this, (t) *Those whom god by his word and Spirit affecteth after this manner, those he truly and seriously calleth and inviteth to conversion.*

Out of these two Theses thus much ariseth, that God worketh the knowledge of his will, the sense of sin, fear of hell, hope of pardon, and consequently many other excellent graces in the hearts of men, that by these they may be converted, and so eternally saved.

We see by these things, what end God aimeth at in his gifts to men.

But there are some Scriptures that seem to say the contrary, namely, *Rom.* 1.20. where God is said to reveal himself to the Gentiles by the creatures,

(s) Suffrag. B. ti. p. 41. thes. 2. & p. 43. thes. 3. Sunt quædam effecta interna ad conversionem prævia, quæ virtute verbi, spiritusq; in nondum justificatorum cordibus excitantur, qualia sunt, notitia voluntatis divinæ, sensus peccati, timor pœnæ, cogitatio de liberatione, spes aliqua veniæ.

(t) Quos Deus (mediante verbo) per Spiritum suum in hunc modum afficit, eos ad fidem, conversionemq; vere & serio vocat & invitat.

[his

[εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἀναπολογήτους] *that they might be without excuſe.* & *Luk.* 2.34. *Simeon* ſaith of Chriſt, that *he is appointed for the falling & riſing again of many in Iſrael.* & 1 *Cor.* 1.23. *I preach Chriſt* (ſaith S. *Paul*) *to the Jews a ſtumbling-block.* 2 *Cor.* 2.16. *We are the ſavour of death to death, &c.* By theſe places it ſeemeth, that God giveth theſe things to ſome, to make them ſtumble, and that they might be left without excuſe: what ſhall we ſay therefore to theſe places?

Of all theſe places in generall I may ſay this; that they are to be underſtood of the end, which is many times effected by theſe gifts of God, & not of the end which is primarily intended in them; & they ſhew what Chriſt, the Word preached, and the gifts of nature and grace are [occaſionally] to ſome men, through their voluntary rebellion againſt God and his ordinances, and not what they are [intentionally] in *Gods* firſt thoughts and reſolutions: he intendeth them for their good, though many times they receive them to their hurt. It is with Gods ordinances and gifts (and that very often too) as it is ſometimes with phyſick: it is given by the Phyſician for

the patients good, but many times through the diſtemper of his body, it doth him hurt. And as it is with the Sun, God intendeth by the ſhining of it, the enlightning and clearing of men and other creatures in this inferiour world; & ſome men are hurt by the light of it, others are ſcorched by the heat of it; [accidentally] by reaſon of the climates wherein they live, or the ill-affectedneſſe of their eyes and bodyes.

So the bleſſings of God, which out of his abundant goodneſs are beſtowed on men for their eternall good, through their ill frame and temper of heart, do effect their hurt, partly becauſe lighting on naughty hearts, they loſe their edge; (for *quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis*) & partly becauſe of the ſeverity of God; who as he hath an antecedent and gracious will to do men good; ſo he hath a conſequent and judiciary will of giving up obſtinate men to their own hearts luſts, and of permitting them to daſh againſt *Chriſt*, and other means of eternall life, & ſo to fall into endleſs miſery and miſchief, as we may ſee, *Pſ.* 81.11,12. & *Rev.* 22.11 which made *Proſper* ſay, (n) *They that hav e*

(n) *Proſp. reſp. ad obj.* 16. *Vincent.* Qui voluntatem Dei ſpreverunt invitantem, voluntatem Dei ſentient vindicantem.

have despised Gods inviting will, shall feel his revenging will.

Now if this be the meaning of these Scriptures, then do they not thwart that which hath been said of Gods gracious intent of promoting the eternal good of men by his blessings bestowed upon them? For, [*argumentum ab eventu ad intentionem Dei non valet:*] because no sinful event is properly under Gods decree, but his prescience only, or at most under a permissive decree: and many things happen in the world which are beside the antecedent & principall purpose of God; not because there is any want of power in God, but because his will is oftentimes conditionall, and therefore not effected, because the condition is not performed.

But by the opinion of absolute Reprobation, the gifts both of Nature and Grace have another end: either God doth not mean them to those that perish (although they do enjoy them, because they are mingled in the world with the elect to whom only they are directed:) or if he do, he meaneth they shall have them, and be lifted up by them above the common rank of men; [*ut lapsu*

graviore ruant,] that their fall may be the greater: and so much is said by the chief defenders of it. (y) *God sendeth his word to Reprobates* (saith *Calvin*) *that they might be made more deaf: he setteth up a light before them, to make them the blinder; he giveth them a remedy, that they might not be healed*: & (z) *it should not seem absurd unto us* (saith *Beza*) *that God should offer his grace in the word & Sacraments to some Reprobates in the Church, not to this end that they might be saved by it, but that they might be lesse excusable then others, & obnoxious to the sorer punishment.* Speeches like to these hath *Maccovius* in his Disputations, (a) *Christ* (saith he) *knocketh at the hearts of Reprobates, who he knoweth neither can nor wi lopen unto him, not that he may enter in, but partly that he may upbraid them for their impotency, & partly that he may increase their damnations.* And immediately after to a place in *John*, c. 15. v. 22. he giveth this exposition: (b) *There*

(y) *Calv. Instit. l. 3. c. 24. n. 13.* Ecce vocem ad eos dirigit, ut magis obsurdescant; lucem, accendit, sed ut reddantur cæciores; doctrinam profert, sed quam magis obstupescant; remedium adhibet, sed ne sanentur.

(z) *Bez. prelud. in c. 9. id Rom. p. 434.* Absurdum videri non debet, deum reprobis quibusdum, qui in Ecclesiam Dei versantur, gratiam suam in verbo suo, sive etiam per Sacramenta sua offerre, non eum in finem, ut per eam serventur; sed contram ut minùs habeant excusationis quam reliqui, & tandem gravius puniantur. (a) *Mac. desp. 14. pag. 11. 12* Pulsat Christus ad ostium reproborum, quos novit nec posse nec velle aperire; non ut intret, sed partim ut exprobret illis impotentiam sua ipsorum culpa contractam, partim ut condemnationem in illis augeat, &c. (b) Nimirum ideo locutus est iis, ut ex contemptu odioque filii unigeniti gravior condemnatio esset, sore

fore did God speak to them, that by the contempt and hatred of his Son, they might procure the greater Damnation. In another place likewise of his disputations he speaketh the same thing four or five times over, very positively. *(c) God doth propound his word to Reprobates for no other end then that they might be left with out excuse.*

(d) If the Gospel be considered in respect of Gods intention, the proper end of it, and not the accidental, in reference to Reprobates, is their inexcusableness. And very consequently do these writers speak to their main conclusion. For how can God intend the means or Gifts of grace for the Salvation of them, whom he hath by his absolute eternal decree rejected utterly from grace and Glory?

(c) *Disp* 2. *p.* 3. Deus reprobis verbum suum proponit non alio fine, quam ut inexcusabiles reddantur.

(d) *p.* 16. Si Evangelium consideres ratione intentionis Dei, finem ejus esse per se, & non per accidens, inexcusabilitatem ratione reproborum.

More particularly by this Doctrine,

1 *Christ* came not into the world to procure the Salvation of them that perish, because they were inevitably ordained to perish.

2 The word of grace is not sent to them: or if it be, it is sent, that they might slight it, or contemne it; and so increase their damnation by contem-

ning of it, which being so, these inconveniences will arise;

(1) That God is a meer deluder of miserable men, whom he calleth to salvation in the name of his Son by the preaching of the word. For what else can he be that fairly pretendeth their good, whom he fully intendeth to ruine?

(2) That Ministers are but false witnesses, because in their ministry they offer salvation conditionally to many whose dãnation is determined absolutly

(3) The ministry of the word cannot leave men without excuse. For Reprobates may have this just plea; "Lord, "doest thou punish us for not believ- "ing in thy Son, when thou didst call us "to believe by the preaching of thy "word? why? Thou didst decree to "leave us (woful men) in *Adams* sin, to "give us neither power to believe, nor "a *Christ* to believe in. How canst thou "justly charge us with sin, or increase "our punishment for not believing in "him whom thou didst resolve before "the world was that we should never believe in? Certainly that (e) *Ministry giveth men a fair excuse, that is given for no other end, then to leave them without excuse*

Neq; enim ea fingi potest homines reddere inexcusabiles, per verbum & Spiritum vocatio, quæ eo tantum fine exhibetur ut reddat inexcusabiles, *Suffrag. Brit. de* 3. *&* 4. *art. de Antecedaneis ad Conver. thes.* 3 *p.* 45.

3.

3. The Sacraments also(by this opinion) do signifie nothing,seal up nothing, confer nothing to such as are not saved; but are meer blanks and empty ordinances at the best unto them, not through the fault of the men, but by the primary and absolute will of God.

Lastly, Gods other gifts which he bestoweth upon men, of what nature soever they be, are to the most that receive them in Gods absolute intention

(1) *Unprofitable*, such as shall never do them good in reference to their eternall condition.

(2) *Dangerous* and hurtful, given them not out of love but extrem hatred; not that they might use them well, and be blessed in so doing, but that they might use them ill, and by ill using of them,procure to themselves the greater damnation. God listeth them up (as the Devil did *Christ*) to the pinacle of the Temple, that so they might fall; and loadeth them with knowledge and other goodly endowments, that with the wieght of them he might sink them down to Hell.

And so by good consequence, Gods choisest gifts are intended and used as

snares

snares to entrap mens souls. Men that have them, have little cause to be proud of them, (for they are the more unhappy, because they have them:) or small reason to be thankfull for them, or to love the giver of them, but to hate him rather; because they are but giftlesse gifts, of the same nature with a griping Usurers bounty, *Iaels* courtesie, *Sauls* marrying of *Michal* to *David*, or a bait for a poor fish which she swallowed with a hook to boot:

Munera magna quidem misit, sed misit in hamo:
Num piscatorem piscis amare potest?

4th. Reason, It is prejudiciall to Piety.

MY fourth generall reason against this absolute Reprobation is, It is a hindrance to *Piety*: it is a doctrine that serveth greatly to discourage holinesse, and encourage prophanesse. It maketh Ministers (by its naturall importment) negligent in their Preaching, praying, & other services, which are ordained of God for the eternall good of their people. It maketh people careless in hearing, reading, praying, instructing their families, examining their consciences, fasting and mourning for their sins, and

all

all other godly exercises. In a word, it cutteth asunder the very sinewes of religion, and pulleth away the strongest inducements to a holy life. Therefore it is no true wholsome doctrine.

That it doth so, will appear by these reasons that follow.

I. It taketh away [Hope] & [Fear:] Hope of attaining any good by godlinesse; fear of substaining any hurt by wickednesse: and so it taketh away two principall props of Religion.

This reason may be resolved into these two branches.

1 Hope and fear uphold godlinesse. Were it not for these, it would come to ruine: by these are men strongly led on to vertue, & with-held from vice. Hope doth [*excitare*] stir men up to begin, & [*corroborare*] strengthen them in the doing of any good action begun. By this hope of Heaven did our Saviour stir up himself to *endure the Crosse, & despise the shame, Heb.* 12.2. By this he heartned his disciples to do and to suffer for his sake, *Mat.* 5.11. *Mat.* 10.32. By this have all the godly in all ages encouraged themselves in wel-doing, as we may see in generall, *Phil* 3. 20. *Col.* 1.5. *Tit.* 2.12,

13.

13. And in particular, *Heb.* 11. *Abraham* left his Countrey and Kindred at Gods call, *because he looked for a City whose builder and maker was God*, v. 8, 9, 10. *Moses* left all the *pleasures* and treasures of Egypt, & *endured afflictions with the people of God, because he saw him that was invisible*, & *had respect to the recompence of reward*, v. 25, 27. The Martyrs endured racks, gibbets, lions, sword, fire. with a world of other torments, because *they looked for a better resurrection*, v. 35. *Paul* indeavoureth *always to keep a clear conscience*, through the hope which he had of a blessed resurrection, *Act.* 24. 35. All the noble and heriock acts, of active and passive obedience, have sprung from the hope of eternall glory. Souldiers, Merchants, Husbandmen, all are whetted on by hope to diligence in their callings, as dayly experience sheweth us. Hope, saith *Aquinas* [*confert ad operationem*] *conduceth to action*: and he proveth it: first by Scripture, 1 *Cor* 9. 10. *he which eareth and thresheth must eare and thresh in hope*. And then he proveth it by a twofold reason. 1. From the nature of Hopes object, which is [*bonum arduum, et possibile haberi*]

Aquin. i. 2. q. 40. art. 8.

some

ſome excelent good attainable by induſtry [*Exiſtimatio ardui excitat attentionem*] hope to get that by paines, which is conceived to be a thing of worth, ſtirreth up to pains-taking. 2. From the effect of hope, which is, [*delectatio*] an inward pleaſure, which the party that liveth under hope is effected with by his hope. There is not any man which hath an inward contentment and ſatisfaction of heart in the work he hath to do, but goeth on merrily. The hope of Heaven therefore is a great encouragemen to piety.

The fear of Hell alſo is a ſtrong curb to hold men in from impiety; & therefore (ſaith one) God hath planted in men a fear of vengeance, that by it as the ſhip by the Rudder, the ſoul may be preſently turned aſide from any rocks, gulfs, or quickſands of ſin, when it is near them, and may ſteer its courſe another way. For this cauſe, fear of God & abſtaining from evil are often joyned together in Scripture, *Iob* 1. 1. *Exod.* 1. 17. And the want of this fear is made the root of all licentiouſneſs in ſinning, *Gen.* 20. 11. Nor doth fear only hinder a bad action, but it promoteth a good. It hin-

hindreth a bad action [directly] becauſe it is [*fuga mali*] a flying from that evil of miſery which is annexed to the evil of ſin: and it promoteth a good action [accidentally;] becauſe men think that they are never ſo ſafe from the miſchief which they fear, as when they are exerciſed in ſuch imployments as tend to the getting of a contrary ſtate. *Work out your ſalvation* (ſaith the Apoſtle) *with fear & trembling*; implying that the working out of ſalvation goeth not on handſomly, except the fear of miſſing it be an ingredient into the work.

The ſecond branch of this reaſon is, That by the abſolute decree, Hope and fear are taken away: for hope is properly exerciſed about] *bonum poſibile haberi*] ſome good thing which may be obtained, not which muſt be obtained of neceſſity: and the object of fear is [*malum poſſibile vitari*] an evil that may be eſcaped. For [*metus eſt fuga mali*] fear is a fleeing from evil, & therefore ſuppoſeth the evil to be avoidable. For no man will flee from an evil that cannot be prevented, but will yeeld up himſelf to it, as *Caſar* did his body to the murtherers in the Senate-houſe. Now (by this

this decree) Heaven and Hell are not objects possible, but necessary. Heaven shall unvoidably be obtained by those that are elected, and Hell must as certainly be endured by those that are reprobated. For men have no power to alter their eternall estates: all men by this decree are precisely determined *ad unum*, to one state, to necessary salvation or necessary damnation, without any power or liberty to choose whether.

And from hence this conclusion is clear, that the absolute decree taketh away the chiefest inducements to holinesse, and determents from wickednesse, and consequently hindreth a godly life exceedingly.

The Injuriousnesse of this doctrine to a godly life, may further appear by these considerations that follow, one depending upon another.

1 Absolute and peremptory decrees are inevitable, whatsoever the things be about which they are exercised: and mens everlasting states, if they be absolutely determined, are altogether undeclinable. [*Stat fati lex indeclinabilis*] the law of destiny is undeclinable. And the reason is, because it hath an inevi-

table

ble cause, the Adamantine decrees of Almighty God, which are indeclinable two wayes.

(1) *Irreversible*, lyable to no repeal (as the Statutes are which are made in our Parliaments) but far more unalterable then the Laws of the *Medes* and *Persians*. *As I have spoken, so will I bring it to passe: I have purposed, and I will doe it*, *Esay* 46,11. Men do many times bite in their words again, because they utter things rashly; and do repeal their statutes and ordinances, because they see some inconvenience in thē being made, which they could not foresee: but God never calleth in his decrees, because they are all made in great Wisdome.

(2) *Irresistible*. It lies not in the power of any creatures to disanull them. *Who hath resisted his will? Rom.* 9.19. *Our God is in heaven, he doth whatsoever he will*, *Ps.* 115.3. Whatsoever is once concluded by his absolute will, is no ways alterable by the will of man. It is more possible for a man to hinder the rising of the Sun, or to stay his course in the heaven, to stop the revolutions of the year, & overturn the whole course of nature, then to make the least change in any of Gods absolute decrees.

2.

2. Mens actions about ends and things determined by an abſolute decree are vain and fruitleſſe; and the reaſon is, becauſe they cannot make them otherwiſe then they are determined to be. It is abſolutely decreed, the Devils ſhall be damned; were it not a fruitleſſe thing in them by prayers, tears, and endeavours to ſeek to alter it? It is alſo ſimply decreed, that the ſoul of man ſhall be immortall; is it not a labour in vain for any man to uſe means that his ſoul may be annihilated? It is ordained, that the Son ſhall rule the day, and the Moon the night; that the one ſhall finiſh his proper courſe in a yeare, the other in a moneth; would not a mans endeavour to make an alteration in theſe things be unprofitable & ridiculous? Without doubt it would. So likewiſe, in vain doe men labour to obtain everlaſting life, and avoid eternall death, if there be no power & liberty in their hands to chooſe life or death, but muſt of neceſſity take that which is aſſigned them, be it life or death. For by their labour they effect juſt nothing: if they be abſolutely appointed to deſtruction, their hearing, reading, praying, almes-giving, and mourning for their ſins cannot poſſibly procure their ſalvation: damned they muſt be. And if they be abſo-

lutely ordained to Salvation, their neglect of holy duties, their ignorance, their love of pleaſures, and continuance in a courſe of ungodlineſſe cannot bring them to damnation, they muſt be ſaved. If ſo many ſoules in a pariſh be in this manner decreed to Heaven or Hell; the Miniſter preacheth in vain, and the people hear in vain. For there cannot one ſoul be ſaved by all his or their pains, which is ordained to Hell; nor one ſoul be caſt away by his or their negligence, which is appointed to Heaven.

Act. 9. 5. *It is hard for thee* (ſaid Chriſt to *Saul*) *to kick againſt pricks*: that is, to endeavour by thy perſecutions & ſlaughters to root out my Church out of the world, becauſe the preſervation of it is abſolutely decreed in heaven: Teaching us by that ſpeech, that a mans labour in any thing whatſoever, is never profitable, except it be exerciſed about an end attainable thereby, & without which the end may be loſt.

3 Men are not willing to be employed in fruitleſſe actions, if they know it.

1 Cor. 9. 25. *I ſo run* (ſaith St. *Paul*) *not as uncertainly; ſo fight I, not as one that beateth the air: but I keep under my body, & bring it into ſubjection, leſt that by any means, when I have preached to others, I my ſelf ſhould be a caſtaway.*

away. The meaning is, I endeavour to keep Gods Commandments, I fight with the temptations of the Devil, the allurements of the world, and mine own corruptions; I keep my body low by watchings and faſtings, and other ſevere exerciſes of holy diſcipline: But *cui bono?* Doe I all this at randome? uncertain whether I ſhall obtain any good, or prevent any miſchief hereby? No, but I doe this, as one that is ſure that by ſo doing, I ſhall attain everlaſting life; and without ſo doing, I cannot avoid eternall death: intimating in theſe words the common diſpoſition of men, which is, to labour, where ſome proportionable good is to be gotten, or evil prevented: otherwiſe to ſpare their heads and hands too.

To be employed in fruitleſſe affairs, is both a folly and a miſery.

(1) A *folly*, for [*De neceſſariis nemo ſapiens deliberat*] *no man uſeth deliberation about things neceſſary*, ſaith the Philoſopher. And our Saviour ſpeaking of things above our power; *Cur eſtis ſoliciti?* ſaith he to his Diſciples, *Mat.6.27. Luk.* 12.25,26. *Why take ye thought* about ſuch things? which is as much as if he had ſaid, It is an argument of folly in you to trouble your ſelves about ſuch things as lie not in your power.

(2) It is a miſery in the opinions of all men, as the fable of *Siſyphus* implieth, who (as the Poets feign) is puniſhed in Hell for his Robberies, with the rolling of a great ſtone to the top of a ſteep hill, where it cannot reſt, but preſently tumbles down again.

The Morall of that Fable is, that it is a torment, and a torment fit for Hell, for a man to be ſet about any work that is fruitleſſe and in vain. Men will rather be exerciſed in high & hard imployments that produce proportionable ends; then pick ſtraws, play with feathers; or with *Domitian* ſpend their times in flapping and killing of flies, or do any other eaſie work, which endeth in nothing but aire and emptineſſe, except they be fools or ſelf-tormenters. And therefore, when *Balaam* once *ſaw that the Lord had fully determined to bleſſe Iſrael*, and that all his Sorceries could not effect the contrary; he preſently gave over and ſet no more Enchantments. And reaſon teacheth every man to do the like. If any man were fully poſſeſt with a perſwaſion that his temporall eſtate were determined in Heaven, and that he ſhould be worth juſt ſo much, neither more nor leſſe; he would conclude in his thoughts, that his care & pains could nothing profit him, nor his idleneſſe impove-

Num. 24 1.

poveriſh him: and ſo would quickly be perſwaded ſo take his eaſe. And were it evident that every Common-wealth had [*terminum magnitudinis*] a condition appointed for it which could not be altered, and a fatal period which could not be avoided; then would the King call no Parliaments, uſe no privie Counſellors, make no Laws and Ordinances for the preventing of a Kingdoms ruine, or the procuring of its proſperity and continuance. For it would be to little purpoſe (as once a famous privie Counſellor told our late Queen *Elizabeth*) but would follow the Poets counſell:

Salvite mortales animos, curiſque levate, *Manilius.*
Totque ſupervacuis animum deplete querelis:
Fata regunt orbem, certâ ſtant omnia lege.

From theſe three premiſſes laid together it followeth directly, that the doctrine of an abſolute decree, which determineth mens ends preciſely, is no friend at all to a godly life. For if events abſolutely decreed be unadvoidable; if mens actions about unavoidable ends be unprofitable; if in unprofitable imployments men will have no hand willingly: whoſoever they be that believe and conſider this, will have nothing to do with the practice of godlineſſe. For their ends being abſolutely pitched, & therefore

unavoidable; they will conclude that their labour in religion will be unprofitable, and ſo will not labour in it at all.

That which hath been ſaid, may be yet confirmed by two Witneſſes: The one of them is Mr. *Calvin*, who in his Inſtitutions hath theſe words, (*f*) *If any man* (ſaith he) *ſhould ſpeak thus to the people; If there be any among you that believe not, it is becauſe ye are ordained to deſtruction; this man would not onely cheriſh ſlothfulneſſe, but wickedneſſe alſo.* Which is as much to ſay (methinks) as this; If a man ſhould ſet forth the doctrine of Reprobation in its colours, and explain it to people in a clear and lively faſhion, he would hereby open a door to liberty and prophaneneſſe.

The other witneſſe is a man of another ſtamp, the miſerable Landgrave of *Thuring*, of whom it is recorded by *Heiſterbachius*, that being by his friends admoniſhed of his vicious conſervation & dangerous condition, he made thē this anſwer; (*g*) *If I be elected, no ſins can bereave me of Heaven; If I be reprobated, no good deeds can help me to heaven.*

I conclude therefore, that by this opinion (which is taught for one of Gods principall truths) Religion either is or may be made a very great loſer; which is my forth generall Reaſon againſt it.

But

(*f*) *Inſtit. l. 3. c. 23. Sect. 14.* Si quis ita plebem compellet; Si non creditis, ideo fit, quia jam divinitus exito prædeſtinatieſtis; is non modò ignaviam fovet, ſed etiam indulget malitiæ.

(*g*) *Heiſt l. 1. de m. mor. hiſt. c. 27. p. 38.* Si prædeſtinatus ſum, nulla peccata poterunt mihi regnum cœlorum auferre. Si præſcitus, nulla opera mihi illud valebunt conferre.

But there are three things which are usually answered to vindicate this opinion from this crimination.

First, that many of them which believe, & defend this doctrine, are holy & good men: and therefore of it self it openeth no way for liberty of life, but through the wickedness of men, who use to pervert the sweetest and surest truths of Scripture to their own damnation. The like defence to this did the Epicures of old make in favour of their sensual and swinish doctrine, which was, that happiness consisted in pleasure. They said that many of their Sect were honest men, & so much *Tully* granted to be true, but with exception still against their doctrine. (*h*) *I take* (saith he) *Epicurus himself to be an honest man, yea & many Epicures have been and are faithful in friendship, square and constant men in all conditions of life, ordering themselves & their lives, not by pleasure but by duty.* But (saith he) (*i*) this proceeded not frō the principles of their opinion, but from their own vertuous inclination: & the *force of honesty by their so doing, appeared to be more prevailing in them, then the force of pleasure*, which they pleaded for. A little after he hath other words to the same purpose; (*k*) *As*

(*h*) Cic. l. 2. *de finibus bon. & mal. p.* 117. Ac mihi quidem videtur quod ipse vir bonus fuit, & multi Epicurei fuerunt, & hodiè sunt & in amicit iis fideles, & in omni vita constantes & graves; nec voluptate, sed officio consilia moderantes

(*i*) Hoc videtur major vis honestatis, minor voluptatis,

(*k*) Atq; ut cæteri existimantur dicere melius quam facere, sic hi mihi videntur melius facere quam dicere.

other mens doctrines are eſteemed to be better then their deeds; ſo theſe mens deeds ſeem to me to be better then their doctrines.

Like to this anſwer of *Tully* to the defenders of Epicuriſme, will I ſhape mine.

It cannot (I confeſſe) be denyed, that many of this opinion are godly men; but it is no thanks to their opinion that they are ſo; (the true and natural *genius* of which is to beget ſloth, to drown men in ſecurity, and to countenance men in carnall liberty:) but to ſomething elſe, either to Gods providence, (who will not ſuffer this doctrine for his own glories ſake, and the good of men, to have any great ſtroke in their lives;) or to mens incogitancy, who think not of reducing it [*ad praxim*] to practice, & drawing concluſions out of it, but reſt in the naked ſpeculation of it, as they do of many others: or laſtly, to ſome good practicall coneluſions which they meet with in the word of God, and apply to their lives (as they do not the former deductions;) ſuch as theſe are for example: *Be ye holy as I am holy. Without Holineſs no man ſhall ſee God. If ye conſent & obey, ye ſhall eate the good things of the land. Godlineſs hath the promiſes of this life and of the life, to come*, &c. And hence we may learn to meaſure this opinion, not by

by the lives of ſome few of the men that hold it, but by the ſequels, which the logick even of ſimple men, if they ſhould apply their brains to conſider it, would fetch out of it. No man that hath throughly ſuckt it in, & underſtandeth the force of, but will either quite relinquiſh it, or live according to the naturall appointment of it, that is, licentiouſly.

Secondly, it is ſaid, that albeit this doctrine teach, That men are abſolutely elected, or abſolutely reprobated: yet,

(1) It tells no man who in particular is elected, who rejected.

(2) It teacheth that men muſt get the knowledg of their Election by good works, and ſo by conſequent, doth rather encourage, then ſtifle holy & honeſt endeavours.

For anſwer to the firſt of theſe; The ignorance of a mans particular ſtate (in my judgment) doth not alter the cauſe a jot. For he that believeth in general, that many, and they the greateſt company without compariſon, are inevitably ordained to deſtruction, & a few others to ſalvation; is able out of theſe two generall propoſitions, to make theſe particular concluſions, and to reaſon thus with himſelf: Either I am abſolutely choſen to grace and glory, or abſolutely caſt off from both. If I be choſen, I muſt

must of necessity believe and be saved; if I be cast off, I must as necessarily not believe, and be damned.

What need I therefore take thought either way about means or end? My end is pitched in heaven, & the means too; my finall perseverance in Faith and my salvation, or my continuance in unbelief & my damnation. If I lie under this necessity of believing and being saved, or of dying in unbelief and being damned; in vain do I trouble my self about means or end, I have my *Supersedeas*, I may take mine ease, and so I will: enough it is for me to sit down & wait what God will do unto me. Thus (it is likely) did *Tiberius* reason with himself. For *Suetonius* reports of him, that he was (*l*) *The more negligent in religion, because he was fully perswaded, that all things came to passe by destiny.* And in this manner (it is to be feared) do too many reason in their hearts, and by this very ground (though they will not perhaps acknowledge it) encourage themselves in prophanesse. Though men cannot hide their wickedness, yet they will hide their grounds which flesh them in it, either through modesty, or to avoid some further ignominy: *The fool hath said in his heart there is no God, Psal.* 14.

(*l*) *Suet. de vit. Tib. c.* 69. *p.* 180. Circa Deos & religionẽ negligentior, quippe addictus Mathematicæ, persuasionisq; plenus omnia fato agi.

To the second I answer, that men ordinarily

rily will not think the getting of the knowledge of their election (if that be all) worth all thoſe painfull duties of religion that are to be performed, and all thoſe ſweet and pleaſing ſins which are to be relinquiſhed; they will reſt contented without it for a while, rather then pay ſo dearly for it: and the rather, becauſe,

1 When they have gotten it, it is in moſt but a weak and conjecturall knowledge, obſcured with many clouds and uncertainties.

2 It muſt be maintained with a great deal of pains & care, or elſe it will be loſt again. To the retaining of it is required a continuall endeavour to keep a clear conſcience, which is irkſome & tedious. Men therefore had need of a ſtronger motive to obedience then this is, or elſe they will do nothing.

Thirdly, they that defend and teach this abſolute reprobation (ſay they) do earneſtly exhort men to good works, & deny that any can be ſaved except they live honeſtly.

So much was alſo ſaid in the behalf of *Epicurus*, viz. That he denied that any man that lived not honeſtly could live pleaſantly. But *Tully* anſwered roundly: (*m*) *As if I cared what he affirmeth or denyeth: this I ask, what is meet for him to ſay who placeth happineſſe in pleaſure.* And ſo it matter-

eth

(*m*) *Cic. offic. l. 3. prope finè* Quaſi ego id curem quid ille aiat aut neget; illud quæro, quid ei qui in voluptate ſummum bonum putat, conſentaneum ſit dicere.

reth not what these men teach, but what they should teach, if they will speak consequently to their own conclusions.

p. 89. 5th Reason. *It is an enemy to true* comfort.

I Come now to my last reason against it, drawn from the *uncomfortablenesse* of it: it is a doctrine full of desperation, both to them which stand, and to those that are fallen; to men out of temptation, and to men in temptation.

It { leadeth into / leaveth in } Temptation.

And therefore can be no doctrine of Gods word, for that is εὐαγγέλιον, good news to men, a store-house of sweet consolations for us in our [*turbidis & lucidis intervallis*] in our best and worst conditions and changes. *These things are written* (saith the Apostle) *that by patience and comfort of the Scriptures we might have hope*: implying, that therefore was the word written, & left to the Church, that by the comforts comprised in it, those poor souls that look toward Heaven, might never want, in any changes or chances of this mortall life, a sweet gale of hope to refresh them, & to carry on their Ship full merrily toward the Haven.

Rom. 15. 4.

I. First, this doctrine leadeth men in Temptation, & into such an one too, as is as

sharp

ſharp and dangerous as any the Tempter hath. The Devil can eaſily perſwade a man that maketh abſolute reprobation a part of his creed, that he is one of thoſe abſolute Reprobates: becauſe there are far more abſolute Reprobates (even a hundred for one) then abſolute choſen ones: and a man hath a great deal more reaſon to think that he is one of the moſt, then one of the feweſt; one of the huge multitude of inevitable caſt-awaies, then one of that little flock for whom God hath preciſely prepared a kingdom. Such a man is not onely capable of, but framed & faſhioned by his opinion for this ſuggueſtion; which is a very ſore one, if we may believe *Calvin*, *Bucer* and *Zanchius*. *Calvin* telleth us, (*n*) that the *Devil cannot aſſault a believer with a temptation more dangerous.*

And a little after he ſaith, that it is ſo much the deadlier, by how much commoner it is then any other.

(*o*) So ordinary is this temptation, that *he which is at all times free from it, is a rare man* (we are to conceive that he ſpeaketh of thoſe who hold abſolute Reprobation:) and ſo dangerous it is, that if it get ſtrength, he which is under it, is either *miſerably tormented*, or *mightily aſtoniſhed.* And a little af-

(*n*) *Calv. Inſtit.* l. 3. c. 24 *Sect.* 4. Quod nullâ tentatione vel gravius, vel periculoſius fideles percellit Satan.

(*o*) Rariſſimus eſt cujus non interdum animus hac cogitatione feriatur unde tibi ſalus niſi ex Dei electione? Electionis autem quæ tibi revelatio? quæ ſi aliud quempiam ſemel invaluit aut diris tormentis miſerum perpetuo excruciat, aut reddit penitus attonitum.

ter

ter he ſaith again; (p) *He that will not wrack his ſoul muſt avoid this rock.* *Bucer* alſo hath a paſſage like to this. (q) *This doubt whether we be predeſtinate or no, muſt be repell'd as the head of every pernicious temptation: for he that doubteth of this, cannot believe that he is called or juſtified, that is, he cannot be a Chriſtian.* (r) *Every man therefore muſt preſume upon it as a principle of his faith, that he is elected.* (s) This very ſpeech of *Bucers*, *Zanchy* maketh uſe of to the ſame purpoſe.

We ſee then by the teſtimonies of theſe worthy men, that this temptation is very dangerous and ordinary too, to ſuch as think there be abſolute Reprobates.

The truth of both will further appear by the example of (t) *Petrus Iloſuanus*, a School-maſter in Hungary, who going to hang himſelf, ſignified in a writing which he left in his Study for the ſatisfaction of his friends and country-men, the true cauſe of that his unnaturall fact: In that writing he delivered theſe three things.

(1) That he was of *Calvins* and S. *Auſtins* opinion, that men are not dealt withall [*ſecundum bona aut mala opera*] *according to their works good or evill*; but there are [*oc-*

(p) Ergo ſi naufragium timemus ſollicitè cavendum ab hoc ſcopulo in quem nunquam ſine exitio impingitur.

(q) *Bucer. in 8 ad Rom. q. de. præd.* Ut caput omnis noxiæ tentationis, repellenda eſt hæc quæſtio, Sumuſne prædeſtinati: nam qui de hoc dubitat, nec vocatum ſe nec juſtificatum eſſe credere poterit

hoc eſt, nequit eſſe Chriſtianus (r) Præſumendum igitur ut principium fidei nos omnes eſſe a Deo præſcitos. (s) *Zanch. l. 5. de nat. Dei. q. d: præd.* (t) *Gregor. major. in 2. ad Tim. fol.* 1109.

cul-

cultiores cauſæ] *more hidden cauſes* of mens eternall conditions.

(2) That he was one of that wofull company of abſolute Reprobates: [*Vas formatum in ignominiam*] *a veſſell prepared to diſhonour*: and that therefore (though his life had been none of the worſt) he could not poſſibly be ſaved.

(3) That being unable to bear thoſe dreadfull apprehenſions of wrath with which he was affrighted, he hang'd himſelf. For theſe are ſome of his laſt words there recorded: (*u*) *I go to thoſe infernall lakes, an eternall reproach to my Country, I commend you to God, whoſe mercy is denied* to me.

(*u*) Diſcedo igitur ad lacus infernales æternum dedecus patriæ meæ: Deo vos commendo, cujus miſericordia mihi negata eſt.

Out of this example two things we may ſafely collect.

1 That men who think there are many whom God hath utterly rejected out of his only will & pleaſure, may be eaſily brought to think by Satans ſuggeſtion that they are of that company.

2 That this Temptation is very dangerous.

I conclude therefore this firſt part of my laſt reaſon, which is, That abſolute Reprobation leadeth men into temptation.

II. It leaveth men in Temptation: and this it doth two wayes; by

1 Making the tempted uncapable of true comfort.

2 Making Ministers unable to give true comfort.

1 If maketh the Tempted uncapable of true comfort: like a Gorgons head, it doth so trouble their fancies and amaze them, especially in their paroxysmes & fits, that the strongest arguments of comfort, applyed with as much art & cunning as may be, will not fasten upon them. With *David* they say in their feare, that *all men are lyars*, namely all such as come to comfort them in their temptation. The reason is, because it is an opinion incompatible with any word of comfort that can be ministred to the distressed soul in this temptation. Gods love to mankind, Christs death for all men, the calling of poore sinners without exception, to repentance and salvation, with all other grounds of consolation; the tempted will easily elude with the grounds of his opinion.

Which that we may the better see, let us imagine that we heare a Minister and a Tempted Soul, reasoning in this or the like manner.

Tempted. WO is me; I am cast away: I am absolutely rejected from Grace and Glory.

Mi-

Miniſt. *Diſcourage not thy ſelfe thou poore afflicted ſoul; God hath not caſt thee off: For he hateth nothing that he hath made, but beareth a love to all men, and to thee among the reſt.*

Tempt. God hateth no man as he is his Creature, but he hateth a great many as they are ſinners in *Adam.* And God hath a two-fold love (as I have learned) a generall love, which putteth forth it ſelf in outward and temporall bleſſings onely, and with this he loveth all men: and a ſpeciall love, by which he provideth everlaſting life for men; and with this he loveth onely a very few, which out of his alone will and pleaſure he ſingled from the reſt. Under this generall love am I, but not under the ſpecial.

Min. *Nay but God ſo loveth all men, as that he deſireth their eternall good: for the Apoſtle-ſaith,* He would have all to be ſaved, and he would have no man to periſh, *nor thee in particular.*

Tempt. (All) is taken two wayes; for all ſorts and conditions of men high and low, rich and poore, bound and free, &c. and for all particular men in theſe ſeverall ſorts & ranks. God would have all men to be ſaved in the firſt ſenſe; that is, all ſorts: but

he would not have all to be saved in the second sense, that is, all particular men of those sorts: some of my country, my calling, my condition of life, but not all and every one, nor me in particular. Or if it be true, that God would have all particular men to be saved; yet he willeth it onely with a revealed will, not with a secret: for with that he will have millions to be damned. Under this revealed will am I, not under the secret.

Min. *Nay*, Christ *came into the world to seek and to save what was lost, and is a propitiation not for our sins onely*, viz. *the sins of a few particular men, or the sins of all sorts of men, but for the sins of the* [*whole*] *world. Therefore he came to save thee, and to be a propitiation for thy sins: for thou art one of them that were lost, and thou art one of the whole world.*

Tempt. The [world] as I have heard, is taken two wayes in Scripture: largely for all mankind, and strictly in a restrained signification, for the elect, or for believers. In this latter sense, *Christ* dyed for the world, namely, for the world of the Elect; for the world of believers. Or if it be true, that he dyed for all mankind, yet he dyed for them but after a sort:

ſort: he dyed for them all [*dignitate gretii*] he did enough to have redeemed all, if God would have had it ſo; but he did not dye for all [*voluntate propoſiti*] God never intended that he ſhould ſhed his blood for all and every man, but for a few ſelected ones onely, with whom it is not my lot to be numbred.

Min. *God hath founded an univerſall Covenant of peace with men upon the Mediators blood: and therefore he intended it ſhould be ſhed for all men univerſally. He hath made a promiſe of ſalvation to every one that will believe, and excludeth none that do not exclude themſelves.*

Tempt. God purpoſed that his Son ſhould dye for all men, & that in his name ſhould be preached and offered remiſſion of ſins to every one; but yet upon condition they will repent, believe, and do that which he meaneth the greateſt part of men ſhall never do, nor me among the reſt.

Min. *God hath a true meaning, that all men who are called, ſhould repent and believe, that ſo they might be ſaved; as he would have all to* be ſaved, *ſo he would have them come to* the knowledge of the truth; *and as he would have* no man to periſh, *ſo he would have* all men to repent; *and therefore he*

calleth them in the preaching of the word to the one as well as to the other.

Tempt. God hath a double call, an outward by the preaching of the word in mens eares, an inward by the irreſiſtible work of the Spirit in their hearts.

The outward call is a part of Gods outward will: with that he calleth every man to believe: the inward and effectuall call is a part of his ſecret will; and with that he calleth not every man to believe, but a very few onely, whom he hath inevitably ordained to eternall life. And therefore by the outward call, which I enjoy among many others, I cannot be aſſured of Gods good will and meaning, that I ſhould believe, repent and be ſaved.

By this we may ſee, that no ſound comfort can be faſtned upon a poor ſoul rooted in this opinion, when he lyeth under this horrible Temptation.

The example of *Francis Spiera* an *Italian* Lawyer, will give ſome further light and proof to this. This *Spiera* about the yeare 1548. againſt his knowledge and conſcience, did openly abjure his Religion and ſubſcribe to Popery, that thereby he might preſerve his life, and goods, and liberty. Not long after he fell into a deep

diſtreſſe

diſtreſſe of conſcience, out of which he could never wreſtle, but ended his woſull daies in deſpaire.

To comfort him came many Divines of worth and note, but againſt all the comforts which they applyed to him, he oppoſed two things eſpecially.

(1) The *greatneſſe* of his ſin: it was a ſin (ſaid he) of a deep die, committed with many urging and aggravating circumſtances: & therefore could not be forgiven. This argument they quickly took from him, & convinced him by the example of *Peter*, that there was nothing in his ſin that could make it irremiſſible. *Peter* that committed the ſame ſin, and with ſome more odious circumſtances, repented and was pardoned, and ſo (no doubt) might he.

(2) He oppoſed his abſolute *Reprobation*, and with that he put off all their comforts. *Peter* (ſaith he) repented indeed and was pardoned, becauſe he was elected: as for me, I was utterly rejected before I was born; and therefore I cannot poſſibly repent or be ſaved. If any man be elected, he ſhall be ſaved, though he have committed ſins, for number many, and haynous in degree: but if he be [*ex repudiatis*] one of the *Caſt-awayes*, [*neceſſario condemnabitur*] *he*

ſhall be inevitably condemned, though his ſins be ſmall and few. (w) A Reprobate muſt be damned, *be his ſins many or few, great or little, becauſe Gods mercy and* Chriſts *merits belong not to him.*

(w) Nihil interest an multa, an pauca an magna, an parva sint, quando nec Dei misericordia, nec Christi sanguis, quicquam ad eos pertinet.

In this Story (recorded by *Cælius Secundus* and *Calvin*, with ſome others who lived at that time, & wrote of it to their friends) as in a glaſſe we may ſee the diſconſolate condition of a poor ſoul that is ſtrongly conceited that the greateſt part of the world are abſolute Reprobates, & that he is one of thē: he ſticketh ſo faſt in the mire & clay, that he can very hardly be drawn out.

2 It maketh miniſters unable to afford true comfort to the Tempted; and this it doth, becauſe it---

1 Taketh from them all ſolid grounds of comfort.

2 Leaveth them onely weak and inſufficient grounds.

1 It bereaveth them of all ſolid arguments of comfort, which are theſe; The univerſality of Gods love, of *Chriſts* death, & of the new Covenant of grace: That Miniſter which doth explain and apply theſe three things ſoundly and wiſely to him which is tempted in this kind, doth that which is abundantly enough for the

the relieving and releaſing of him from this Temptation. And he that doth not apply theſe, leaveth him as he found him, in the midſt of the Temptation ſtill; whatſoever may be ſaid to the contrary in the heat of Diſputation. (x) *Though* (ſaith *Melanctbon*) *there be many things diſputed in this point more harſhly; yet when all is done, the univerſall promiſe of Grace and Salvation is a Chriſtians only Bulwark in this temptation & combate.* (y) *Let us not therefore* (ſaith he) *leave* Chriſt, *and ſeek for an election out of the word*: but let us judge of Gods will of ſaving men by the promiſe: and commandment, which are both univerſall. And in another place of the ſame Book he hath theſe words: (z) *As it is needfull to know that the promiſe of Salvation is free: ſo it is needfull to know that it is univerſal, againſt ſome dangerous conceits of Predeſtination.*

(x) *Melanct. loc. com. p. 5. 26. c. de Prad.* Etſi multa diſputantur durius, tamen neceſſe eſt in vero agone ad hanc arcem confugere, videlicet, quod de voluntate Dei judicandum ſit expreſſo verbo, & quod promiſſio ſit univerſalis, & quod ſit mandatum Dei æternum & immutabile audire filium, & aſſentiri promiſſioni. (y) Obtemperemus igitur ne vagentur animi quærentes electionem extra verbum, & relicto Chriſto & omiſſo mandato de amplectenda promiſſione; ſed teneamus certa & indubitata fide promiſſionem gratiæ non inanem eſſe fabulam; ſed Deum vere patefeciſſe voluntatem ſuam in promiſſione, & vere præſtare quod promiſit. (z) *P. 130 de prom. Evang.* Sicut eſt neceſſe ſcire Evangelium eſſe promiſſionem gratuitam; ita neceſſe eſt ſcire Evangelium promiſſionem univerſalem eſſe. Hanc univerſalem tenere neceſſe eſt adverſus periculoſas imaginationes de prædeſtinatione, ne diſputemus hanc promiſſionem ad paucos quoſdam alios pertinere, non pertinere ad nos. Non enim dubium eſt, quin omnium animos hæc cogitatio exerceat.

By theſe ſpeeches we ſee clearly what this learned man thought to be the true *balm of Gilead*, whereby a wounded ſoul ſhould be cured, *viz*: The univerſality of the promiſe, & of Gods love and of *Chriſts* death; for they all hang together, and cannot be diſ-joyned.

The reaſon why thoſe grounds are able to help a man in ſuch a caſe, is two-fold.

1 Becauſe they are directly contradictory to the temptation: a will to ſave all, a giving of *Chriſt* to death for all, a ſerious offer of grace to all, cannot poſſibly ſtand with an abſolute antecedent will & intent of caſting away the greateſt part of mankind, or to ſay the truth, of any one man in the world. Upon this followeth the ſecond reaſon.

2 Becauſe they ſerve to convince the Tempted, that he cannot be in that condition in which he ſuppoſeth himſelf to be. For if two contradictories cannot be true, he that evinceth the truth of the one, convinceth the underſtanding of the untruth of the other: and he that maketh it appear that this contradictory, [God would have all to be ſaved, redeemed and called, to repent and believe] is true; putteth it out of all doubt to the underſtanding, that the other contradictory [God will have moſt

men

men to be abſolutely and inevitably damned] muſt needs be falſe, and ſo raiſeth up that poor ſoul which was preſſed down with an erroneous conceit and fear, that it was true. In this manner did *junius*, (though not in the ſame temptation) relieve a woman perplexed exceedingly with a ſtrong perſwaſion, that ſhe and all her children ſhould be damned; becauſe ſhe was buſied about her children at a certain time when ſhe ſhould have been at maſſe. *Junius* maketh ſhort work with her, telleth her, that her imployment about her children was a duty pleaſing to God, but the Maſſe was a meer will-worſhip: and ſo (delivering her of her error upon which the temptation was built,) giveth her preſent eaſe and comfort. In like manner tell a man who feareth himſelf to be an abſolute Reprobate, that there are no ſuch abſolute Reprobates, and that his fear is but a meer fancy, and his doubt a dream; convince him once by contradictory grounds, that there is no man in the world in that ſtate in which he thinketh himſelf to be, and you drive out one naile by another, & expel the temptation. Theſe are the ſword of *Alexander* which will cut aſunder this Gordian knot of abſolute Reprobation; & theſe are the true Nepenthes of a ſick and ſorrowfull ſoul. But

But now these true grounds of hope & comfort no Minister can make use of, that holdeth absolute Reprobation: nor if he do usurp them, can he possibly maintain them against the replies of the tempted, unless he relinquish his opinion; because (as I have said,) there is a plain contradiction between them, and no man is able to maintain two propositions which speak contrary things, to be both true, any more then he can make it good, that the same thing may have a being, and no being at the same time. For example, A minister commeth to comfort a man that thinketh himself to be an absolute Reprobate, and how doth he set about it? He telleth him, that God would have all to be saved, that *Christ* dyed for all, &c.

But what right hath he to these grounds of comfort, seeing he holdeth the contrary conclusions, *viz.* That God will have a great many to be damned, and to have no part in *Christ*? Well: he usurpeth them notwithstanding; but is he able to maintain them against the answers of the tempted? or can he make a good reply? No certainly, for thus answereth the tempted, God would have all to be saved with a revealed, but not with a secret will: and

Christ

Chriſt dyed for all men ſufficiently, but not intentionally; or if God did intend that he ſhould dye for all, yet he intended it upon a condition, which he purpoſed the moſt ſhould never perform.

What can the Miniſter reply, to this? If he will make a direct reply, which ſhall take away the anſwer, he muſt deny that God hath two wills, the one oppoſite to the other, a ſecret will that many ſhall unavoidably be damned, and a revealed will that all men may be poſſibly ſaved. And he muſt alſo deny that God had an intent, that Chriſt ſhould not dye for a great many, or that he intended he ſhould dye for all, upon condition they would believe or repent, and yet purpoſe that the moſt ſhould never believe or repent. But can he deny theſe things? he cannot, except he deny his own concluſion, which is, that there are many thouſands eternally and unavoidably rejected in Gods abſolute purpoſe from grace and glory. For that concluſion is all one with the anſwers of the Tempted, & contradictory to thoſe arguments of comfort which he is glad to make uſe of.

Abſolute Reprobation therefore bereaveth that Miniſter who believeth it, of all ſolid grounds of conſolation; and ſo maketh him

him unable to recover a poor Soul wounded with this temptation.

Secondly, it leaveth a Miniſter ſome weak grounds only and inſufficient to quiet the tempted: and therefore it maketh him unable to comfort him.

The grounds which it leaveth him, are inſufficient, becauſe they cannot convince and make it evident to the underſtanding of the Tempted, that he is not that which he feareth: that is, a Reprobate. Out of temptation probabilities will uphold a mans hopes (as they did *Manoahs* wives, *Judg.*13.22,23. *If the Lord would kill us he would not have received a burnt offering at our hands, nor ſhewed us all theſe things*;) becauſe men are not ſo miſtruſtfull then; but in temptation men are uſually very ſuſpicious and increduluos, like *Jacob* who would not be perſwaded that *Joſeph* was alive, and a great man in Egypt; till he ſaw the Chariots that were ſent to fetch him thither, *Gen.*45.25. And like *Thomas*, who would not believe that *Chriſt* was riſen, till he ſaw the print of the nailes and ſpear, *Joh.* 20.25. They will not believe any thing that is ſpoken for their comfort, till it be made ſo apparent, that they have nothing to ſay to the contrary.

My

My ſelf have known ſome who in their temptations have often put their comforters to their proofs, to their proteſtations, nay to their oathes too, before they would believe their words of comfort. And in this temptation (we ſpeak of) men are ſtrongly poſſeſt with the fear of eternall rejection from the face of God, that they will not eaſily without manifeſt conviction believe the contrary.

But grounds convincing and ſatisfying, a Miniſter that maintaineth abſolute Reprobation hath not in ſtore: nothing can he ſay that is able to make it appear infallibly & undeniably to the underſtanding of the Tempted, that he is no abſolute Reprobate. All that he can ſay is, Be of good comfort; you are a Believer, a truly repenting ſinner: therefore no Reprobate: for faith & repentance are infallible fruits of Election, and arguments of a ſtate contrary to what you fear. But this the Tempted will deny; he will ſay, that he is no believer, &c. and how will the Miniſter convince him that he is? He muſt prove to him by the outward acts of Faith and Repentance, (for they onely are apparent to him;) that he doth repent and believe.

But this proof is not demonſtrative, nor doth

doth convince, because [*opera virtutum simulari possunt*] the externall acts of Faith, Repentance, or any other grace may be counterfeited. The Devil may seem to be an Angel of light, Wolves may go in sheeps clothing, *Judas* may make the world believe by his preaching and following of *Christ*, that he is a true Apostle; and *Simon Magus*, though he remain in the gall of bitterness & bond of iniquity, may be thought by his receiving of baptisme, to be a true believer: and so may any hypocrite by some exterior acts of Faith and Repentance delude the best discerner of spirits among men, and gain the opinion and esteem of a true penitent and believer. Actions externally good, or good in appearance, may be evil indeed for want of a good rule, manner, end, or some other good circumstances, with which an action that is good must be clothed. For [*bonum non oritur nisi ex integris*:] and so by good consequence cannot certainly prove the man who doth them to be a good man, or to have the grace of Faith, Repentance, or any other truly planted in his heart.

Which being so, I say, that a Minister cannot by the outward acts and fruits of faith and Repentance which he seeth come from him,

him, make it evident to the Tempted (to the silencing of all replies;) that he is without doubt a true believer and repenting sinner, and consequently no Reprobate. For still the Tempted may say, you may be deceived in me: for you cannot see any thing more in me, then hath been seen in many a Reprobate. And if this be all you can say, to prove me to be none; I am not satisfied, I may be a Reprobate: nay I am a Reprobate, and you are but a miserable comforter, a Physitian of no value.

This that I say, *Piscator* doth confesse *in Disput. de Præd. contra Schafmanu. thes.* 85. where he saith,

1 That no comfort can be possibly instilled into the soules of Reprobates afflicted with this horrible temptation: from whence it followeth, that the far greatest part of men, even a hundred for one must beare their burden, (if they fall into this distemper and trouble,) as well as they can: the Gospel is not able to afford them any solid comfort.

2 That the Elect being in this condition may indeed be comforted, but it must be by their sense of sinne, and their desire to be freed of it by *Christ*: which proofes are but onely probable to the

the best, and to a man in temptation no proofs at all: and consequently either no comforts, or very small ones.

In the end of the same *Thesis* also, where he saith, that a man should reason thus with himself; Grace is offered to some with a mind of communicating it unto them: therefore it may be that I am one of those to whom it is so offered. In this place (I say) he implyeth plainly, that the Doctrine of absolute Reprobation, which teacheth the communication of grace to a very few onely, affordeth but a [*fieri potest*] a peradventure I am Elected (and that a very poor one too) for a poor soul to comfort himself withall.

FINIS.